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ABSTRACT 
   
Ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals in Mostar espoused a discourse of 
ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in order to 
establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal colonization of 
residential and commercial property through manipulating the pre-Bosnian War discourse 
on property relations. This is not to argue that some or most of these politicians and 
criminals did not believe in their virulent nationalist rhetoric, but instead that the effects 
of the discourse created well-used pathways to personal, not community, wealth. 
Elites used the Yugoslav economic crisis and perceived past grievance to enflame 
growing tensions between ethnicities and social classes. I use Mostar as an object of 
analysis to examine the creation of Bosnian Croat and Bosniak ethnocratic regimes in this 
divided city. However, I focus more on the Bosnian Croat regime in the city because it 
envisioned Mostar as its capital, making the city the site of its political competition 
among factions. 
Even though ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals still hold a level of power 
in Mostar, the IC did succeed in instituting a high level of property restitution, which 
does not necessarily imply return, because the IC was able to impose rule of law when it 
acted in an organized manner. Also, the ethnocratic regimes were weakened due to 
regional economic and political factors that undercut the regimes' hold over the 
population. 
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Figure 1: A Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Dayton Peace Agreement (source: 
Ezilion Maps, "Political Map of Bosnia Herzegovina" 
www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/bosnia-maps.html)
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On 9 May 1993, Bosnian Croat nationalist forces began the second siege of 
Mostar when they expelled Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) from the west side of the city 
and attempted to conquer the rest of the city through military force. This event 
irrevocably changed future sociocultural relations in the city by dividing it in half. The 
effects of this event are still felt in Mostar and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FBiH) today. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) began a year earlier. Mostar 
was the subject of an earlier siege by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Bosnian 
Serb military forces, but it had a less dramatic lasting effect on the city.
1
 After these 
forces failed to conquer the city, their withdrawal from the city led to the voluntary and 
involuntary exile of Bosnian Serbs. Most of them never returned. The city is the historic 
capital and economic center of the Herzegovina region (the southern part of BiH), 
making it a strategically valuable wartime prize. Even though tensions within the Bosnian 
Croat and Bosniak military alliance resulted in violent outbursts in central Bosnia and 
western Herzegovina before this event, 9 May 1993 was a distinct historical turning point 
                                                 
1
 While the territory that is modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a number of different 
administrative appellations, for the time frame analyzed in this thesis the territory mostly retained its 
geographic form throughout the period, except for a few brief historical moments. I generally will call the 
territory BiH for simplicity’s sake and to avoid increasing the alphabet soup that already pervades this 
study. However, here is a short history of the territory’s name changes. Under the Ottoman Empire, the 
territory was called the Bosnia Eyalet until the Ottoman administrative reform of 1864 when the territory 
gained its modern-day form and became the Vilayet of Bosnia. Under Austro-Hungarian administration, 
the territory was called the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Kingdom of Croat, 
Serbs and Slovenes, the kingdom was divided into 33 oblasts, but the form of the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was maintained through six oblasts. When the kingdom was renamed the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, BiH was divided amongst a number of the nine banovinas that formed the kingdom. During 
World War II, BiH became part of the Independent State of Croatia. After the war, BiH became the 
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the Bosnian War, numerous ethnocratic para-states 
developed on the territory, but after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became an independent country with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Republika Srpska.  
 3 
for Bosnian Croat and Bosniak relations as the city, which was the Yugoslav symbol of 
bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), was transformed into the Bosnian symbol of 
ethnic division through ethnic cleansing.
2
 
Ethnic cleansing is an attempt to homogenize a territory by expelling other ethno-
national communities. The Bosnian War during the 1990s displaced over two million 
people abroad and domestically.
3
 It was the worst case of ethnic cleansing in Europe 
since World War II and the subsequent “population transfers.” The nationalist fervor that 
developed in BiH due to political and economic instability before the Bosnian War gave 
power to politicians to redefine society according to ethnic criteria and the opportunity to 
forge ethnocratic regimes. The manipulation of land administration and control over the 
legal structures governing it were methods to legalize the effects of ethnic cleansing. 
Before the war, Yugoslav land administration emphasized social ownership and 
usage rights over private or state ownership in property relations.
4
 Yugoslavia pioneered 
the concept of social ownership, which meant neither private nor state ownership, but an 
in-between category where the communities had the theoretical right to allocate 
residential property for the common good. However, the concept was still an ill-defined 
legal category when the Bosnian War began. Even though Yugoslavia began privatizing 
                                                 
2
 While at many times I refer to different nationalist groups, using terms such as Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, 
and Bosnian Serb, this should by no means be interpreted that these groups are homogeneous in thought 
or action, nor should it be interpreted that these groups are clearly defined historically or contemporarily. 
Identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like in all areas, is fluid and changes over time as political, social, and 
cultural conditions change, affecting the multidimensional hierarchy by which people define their 
identity. The use of this nationalist categorization is at the moment the most common way in which to 
speak about the heterogeneous groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and are used in this thesis to simplify the 
narrative of a city and country where identity is a controversial issue. 
3
 The postwar internally displaced persons and refugees represented half of BiH’s prewar population. 
4
 In this thesis, the term “property” will only refer to residential property, such as apartments and houses, 
unless noted otherwise. 
 4 
some socially-owned apartments (mostly those possessed by members and formers 
members of the Yugoslav military), the privatization process made insignificant progress 
before the war began. Wartime regimes and criminal networks, using the flexible, vague 
prewar definition of social ownership, passed laws over “abandoned” apartments to give 
a legal basis to the redistribution of property to the majority ethnic group and favored 
elites in political and criminal circles. It is the thesis of this study that the control over 
socially-owned residential and commercial property and their subsequent privatization by 
politicians and criminals allowed for these forces to steal BiH’s economic resources and 
exclude minority returnees and non-favored social groups from economic opportunities 
for survival. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement brought the military conflict to a close, which was 
commendable because it stopped the brutal war, but the settlement created two 
autonomous political entities – FBiH and Republika Srpska. The two entity political 
structure in some sense legitimized the violent aims of the wartime ethnocratic regimes 
and institutionalized ethnocratic structures that obstructed the implementation of the 
agreement’s comprehensive human rights provisions. Among these provisions was 
Annex 7 – the requirement that refugees and IDPs would be returned to their prewar 
residences in order to undo the demographics effects of the Bosnian War. This 
requirement represents the culmination of a historical shift in the IC’s handling of 
refugees. While responses to refugee situations during the Cold War characteristically 
favored the relocation of refugees to their host countries, particularly because of the 
demographic effects of World War II, the rise of ethnic conflicts in the third world and 
asylum cases caused a shift in response to favor return over relocation. BiH became the 
 5 
international community’s first experiment to return refugees and IDPs not only to their 
prewar country of residence, but to their actual prewar address. After the conflict, the 
international community (IC) exerted significant financial and political efforts to reverse 
the demographic effects of the war by dismantling the property regimes forged through 
war and replacing a dysfunctional socialist system with a capitalist one. 
Like many attempts by the IC to “fix” problems in troubled countries through aid 
or military intervention, the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement through 
international intervention had mixed results. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) touted that the return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in post-Dayton BiH as a successful example of reversing ethnic cleansing, 
claiming that over one million people returned to their prewar homes by 2004.
5
 However, 
many contemporary scholars argue that the process through which return was “achieved” 
resulted actually in consolidating ethnic territorial division instead of reversing it.
6
 The 
UNHCR claim failed to acknowledge that returnees were not provided an adequate 
economic and social infrastructure to ensure sustainable return and ethnocratic regimes 
forged by nationalist politicians and criminals colonized BiH’s economic resources, 
which obstructed return. The analysis of this case study draws conclusions that can be 
applied to other post-conflict and international aid situations. 
                                                 
5
 This amount of “return” represents a little less than half of Bosnia’s postwar refugees and IDPs. 
6
 Anders H. Stefansson, “Homes in the Making: Property Restitution, Refugee Return, and Senses of 
Belonging in a Post-war Bosnian Town,” International Migration 44, no. 3 (2006); Barbara Franz, 
“Returnees, Remittances and Reconstruction: International Politics and Local Consequences in Bosnia,” 
The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 11, no. 1 (January 2010); Catherine 
Phoung, “Freely to Return: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 13, no. 2 (2000); Richard Black, “Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing 
Link, or Mistaken Priority?,” SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), 189. 
 6 
POST-WAR SCHOLARSHIP ON MOSTAR 
Mostar was the only city that had its urban center ripped in two during the 
Bosnian War. Since Dayton, Mostar has been used as a microcosmic example of the 
problems that have plagued postwar BiH. The city was a major focus of the IC’s 
reconciliation efforts because feared that if Mostar failed, BiH would fail, discrediting the 
Dayton Agreement. In some respects this fear is well-founded because Mostar remains 
the center of Bosniak-Bosnian Croat relations in FBiH. If FBiH were to dissolve through 
the creation of a third entity, which Bosnian Croat parties still advocate, BiH as a state 
could easily dissolve with it.
7
 Since Mostar was one of the few divided cities in postwar 
BiH, it presents an opportunity to examine how both Bosniak and Bosnian Croat wartime 
and postwar property regimes sought to legitimize their territorial gains. However, this 
thesis focuses more on the Bosnian Croat regime because Mostar was central to their 
territorial ambitions, making it the site of their internal competition. Because Mostar is an 
important city to the reconstruction of BiH, it has been the center of considerable 
scholarship. 
Even though scholars have studied Mostar through various academic lenses, the 
main scholarly discussions about the city can be broken down into two main foci.
8
 The 
                                                 
7
 Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “42nd Report of the High Representative 
for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations,” November 8, 2012, http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=47611 (accessed January 10, 2013). 
8
 Nebojsa Bjelaković and Francesco Strazzari, “The Sack of Mostar, 1992-1994: The Politico-military 
Connection,” European Security 8 (1999): 73-102; Martin Coward, “Community as Heterogeneous 
Ensemble: Mostar and Multiculturalism,” Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 29-66; Larissa Vetters, “The 
Power of Administrative Categories: Emerging Notions of Citizenship in the Divided City of Mostar,” 
Ethnopolitics 6, no. 2 (2007): 187-209; Azra Hromadžić, “Bathroom Mixing: Youth Negotiate 
Democratization in Postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 34, 
no. 2 (2011): 268-289. 
 7 
first group consists of political scientists, historians, and anthropologists who focus on the 
institutionalization of political and social division in Mostar, demonstrating how this has 
caused fractures in social and political structures along ethnic lines. In Bosnia after 
Dayton, Sumantra Bose includes a significant examination of the ethnic fracturing of the 
economic and political infrastructure of Mostar.
9
 Bose uses Mostar as a microcosmic 
example of BiH to demonstrate the problems of the country after the Bosnian War and to 
argue that the schizophrenic nature of the Dayton Agreement, which aimed for social 
reintegration, institutionalized geographic segregation. Azra Hromadžić’s anthropological 
study examines the efforts of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the IC to 
reunify the ethnically segregated Mostar Gymnasium.
10
 She argues “that the IC’s ‘failure’ 
to fully integrate the Mostar Gymnasium has to be understood in terms of the contested 
space of the IC’s quest for integration and the national minorities’ (especially Croats’) 
search for segmental autonomy.”11 In Florian Bieber’s comparative analysis of the 
political developments of Mostar and Brčko, he argues against the complex form of 
consociationalism (ethnic power-sharing) used in Mostar. He argues that political parties’ 
manipulation of the system only increased the city’s territorial fragmentation, explaining 
that these political structures established the deep roots of institutional parallelism that 
socially fractures the city along ethnic lines.
12
  
                                                 
9
 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
10
 The Mostar Gymnasium is an example of “two schools under one roof.” 
11
 Azra Hromadžić, “Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (November 2008): 542. 
12
 Florian Bieber, “Local institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brčko,” International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 426. 
 8 
The second group of scholars mainly consists of architects and urban planners 
who focus on the role that (re)construction played in two conflicting spatial processes – 
ethnic territorialization and reintegration. Scott A. Bollens focuses on the use of urban 
planning in Mostar as a method to combat division in a comparative context. He argues 
that the administrative division of Mostar into six ethnically-based municipalities helped 
nationalists solidify division. This division also helped render the shared space of the 
Central Zone – the seventh and supposedly neutral municipality of Mostar – to be 
ineffective and neglected.
13
 Because of the deliberate destruction of specific parts of the 
city, Martin Coward explores the concept of urbicide, using Mostar to argue that urbicide 
is the destruction of heterogeneous, shared space with the aim of creating a homogeneous 
community.
14
 Amir Pašić, a native of Mostar, initiated the “Mostar 2004,” which brought 
together students and academics from around the world “with the goal of reconstructing 
the city’s historic center within ten years of its destruction.”15 This project produced a 
number of articles about the IC’s attempts to recreate multiculturalism in the city. One of 
the most important discussions on spatial interventions is about the symbolic meaning of 
Stari Most, Mostar’s famous Turkish bridge, because it was at the center of the IC’s 
campaign to reconcile the two sides in Mostar. Pašić asserts that the bridge symbolizes a 
link between cultures and Mostar’s multicultural past. Carl Grobach disputes this 
interpretation, explaining that historically the bridge did not have this meaning before the 
                                                 
13
 Scott A. Bollens, Cities, Nationalism and Democratization (New York: Routledge, 2007), 211. 
14
 Coward, 36. 
15
 Judith Bing, “Ideas and Realities: Rebuilding in Postwar Mostar,” Journal of Architectural Education 54, 
no. 4 (2001): 238. 
 9 
war and that Pašić and the IC have reinterpreted it by shifting the discourse to fit within 
their aims of reconciliation.
16
 
This debate over the meaning of Stari Most could be an indication that the 
meaning of prewar objects shifted for residents as a result of wartime and postwar 
migrations into the city from the countryside or because the traumatic war created a new 
framing strategy that shifted people’s interpretations.17 Emily Gunzburger Makaš, a 
participant of the “Mostar 2004” project, wrote a dissertation analyzing residents’ varying 
interpretations of reconstructed monuments and buildings.
18
 Her work represents the best 
attempt at a thick description of Mostar’s postwar cityscape and explaining the symbolic 
complexities of reconstruction. Kathryn Heffernan, building on Makaš’s work, outlines 
the different physical structures of division and unification and how they have affected 
Mostar and its residents.
19
 These works demonstrate how competing nationalists used the 
war and the reconstruction process to attach a homogeneous identity to a territory. 
The main gap in the analysis of Mostar is the lack of attention paid to the return of 
IDPs, to refugees, and to the property restitution process. The only significant work in 
this area in relation to Mostar is by Larissa Vetters. By focusing on postwar categories, 
such as refugee, IDP and returnee, she argues that administrative categorization practices 
“constitute a source of shared experience for citizens, thus shaping their perception of 
                                                 
16
 Carl Grodach, “Reconstituting Identity and History in Post-War Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina,” City 6, 
no. 1 (2002): 61-82. 
17
 Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2000). 
18
 Emily Gunzburger Makaš, “Representing Competing Identities: Building and Rebuilding in Postwar 
Mostar, Bosnia-Hercegovina,” (PhD diss., Department of Architecture, Cornell University, 2007). 
19
 Kathryn L. Heffernan, “Reinventing Mostar: The Role of Local and International Organizations in 
Instituting Multicultural Identity,” (Master's Thesis, Nationalism Studies Program, Central European 
University, 2009). 
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what it means to be a citizen of BiH” and “fuel new divisive forces that diminish the 
internal solidarity of ethnic groups.”20 Other works on Mostar mention how the city 
remains demographically divided after property restitution, but little work has been done 
in Mostar to substantiate this claim. While the goal of this thesis is not necessarily to 
confirm or disprove this observation, a further understanding of how property restitution 
worked and how specific power dynamics operated in Mostar are important steps to 
understanding and interpreting the results of the upcoming census.
21
 
ETHNIC CLEANSING: CONFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 
Before the Bosnian War, nationalist politicians in Croatia and Serbia largely 
interpreted BiH as a borderland between cultures. With this belief, BiH became a 
battlefield for nationalist forces to satisfy Greater Croatian and Greater Serbian territorial 
ambitions. Political forces similarly interpreted Mostar as a borderland society between 
Bosniak and Croatian cultures. Prewar Mostar was known as a multicultural city where 
an inclusive Yugoslav identity was taking root, diminishing perceived cultural 
differences. During the Bosnian War, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna attempted 
to create an internationally recognized geo-body with Mostar as its capital. A geo-body is 
a perceived or actual territoriality where nationhood and identity are spatially applied to 
it.
22
 The Bosnian Croat leaders imagined their geo-body to be a “purely” Bosnian Croat 
space, devoid of “others,” so they attempted to “cleanse” the territories that they 
                                                 
20
 Vetters, 187 
21
 Since a census is theoretically on the horizon for BiH, it would have been unnecessarily time consuming 
and difficult for this thesis to confirm observations about the success or failure of IDP and refugee return 
in Mostar.  
22
 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, HI: University 
of Hawai'i Press, 1994), 16. 
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conquered by destroying demographic and spatial heterogeneity to legitimize their claim 
to the territories as Bosnian Croat space.  
Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman examine the geopolitical forces and processes that 
acted upon BiH since the outbreak of the Bosnian War. They define ethnic cleansing as a 
geopolitical process, explaining that “‘geo’ and ‘politics’ can be parsed to signify two 
interrelated practices: first the attempt to produce a new ethnoterritorial order of space, 
and second the attempt to build an ethnocratic political order upon that space.”23 They 
analyze what they describe as two geopolitical processes: the efforts of military and 
political forces to ethnically cleanse parts of BiH during the war and the IC’s attempt to 
reverse ethnic cleansing through the return of refugees and IDPs in postwar BiH.
24
 They 
focus on the effects of the two processes in the municipalities of Dobroj, Jajce, and 
Zvornik, demonstrating how ethnic cleansing occurred through the removal of people, 
homes, and cultural objects and how the process of return only gained momentum when 
the IC established rule of law and built institutional capacity through assertive 
intervention. To create a new ethnoterritorial order of space in BiH, nationalist military 
forces used ethnic expulsions and urbicide to clear space of the presence of other 
ethnicities. This clearing and “unmixing” was a significant part of identity construction in 
Mostar and BiH. Bosniak, Croat, and Serb nationalist military and political forces tried to 
create homogeneous nation-states modeled on maps. To them, the geo-bodies of the 
nation-states had meaning partially defined by the absence of other cultures or symbols. 
                                                 
23
 Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5. 
24
 Ibid., 8. 
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These spaces were not only areas where a certain identity should exist, but also where 
others should not exist. 
This thesis intends to build upon the work of Toal and Dahlman, but there are 
three aspects of ethnic cleansing not emphasized in their account that will be areas of 
focus in this narrative: ethnic colonization of space to create an ethnocratic cultural order, 
elites’ theft of BiH’s resources to build personal wealth and maintain ethnocratic political 
regimes, and the role of property administration in legalizing that theft.
25
 While the 
Bosnian Croat military forces failed to create an internationally recognized state and 
“cleanse” their “capital,” Mostar, nationalist forces continued to reinforce the cultural, 
social, and political integrity of the geo-body through the ethnic colonization of space to 
divide the city into distinguishable Croat and Bosniak parts. To strengthen their 
territories’ identity, they colonized space with Croatian nationalist and Catholic symbols 
to give the geo-body an identity defined against Bosniaks (Muslim) and Bosnian Serbs 
(Orthodox Christian) in order to transform the fuzzy borderland into a geographically- 
and ethnically-defined border town. Even after the OHR officially unified the city, 
nationalist politicians manipulated political, demographic, and cultural space to maintain 
an ethnocratic social organization that kept and continues to keep Mostar divided – a 
situation that is beneficial to their maintenance of power over the territory’s resources. 
It is especially important to distinguish between political and cultural orders. Even 
though in many cases, and especially in BiH, the two orders reinforce each other, their 
agendas are not the same. In BiH, a political order – significantly criminalized by war – 
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manipulated and reinforced a nationalist cultural order through constructing a false 
consciousness to legitimize new social relations that were beneficial to their maintenance 
of power. However, the interests of criminal politicians and true nationalists did not 
always coincide. This can particularly be seen at the local level of the Bosnian War where 
nationalist military and political factions within the same ethnic side fought each other 
for resources and supremacy. These battles were not always or even most of the time 
fought to champion a nationalist cause, but simply to control the spoils of war. This study 
analyzes these factions and builds on the considerable scholarship on the wartime and 
postwar political economy of BiH,
26
 which is part of a larger growing field of academic 
study that examines criminality and economic factors in conflict and post-conflict 
situations.
27
 
There are two interrelated sets of scholarship on the political economy of BiH that 
generally are divided chronologically – wartime and postwar. The first set examines the 
war period, drawing attention to the interconnected local and regional developments of 
criminal and political networks and their role in profiting and perpetuating the war.
28
 This 
set of scholarship takes the stance that wartime and postwar BiH “cannot be explained 
without taking into account the critical role of smuggling practices and quasi-private 
                                                 
26
 Bjelaković and Strazzari; Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a 
Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Peter 
Andreas, “The Cladestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International Studies 
Quarterly 48 (2004); Timothy Donais, “The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton Bosnia,” Southeast 
European Politics 3, no. 1 (June 2002); Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton 
Bosnia (Routledge: New York, 2005); Michael Pugh, “Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace,” Global Governance 8, no. 4 (2002). 
27
 Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, June 15, 2000); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, October 21, 2001); Dietrich Jung, ed. Shadow Globalization, Ethnic 
Conflicts, and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War (London: Routledge, 2003). 
28
 Bjelaković and Strazzari; Andreas; Pugh and Cooper. 
 14 
criminal combatants,” and that the factionalism within ethnocratic regimes cannot be 
understood without examining regional relations and loyalties.
29
 The second set, which 
focuses on the postwar period, argues that the IC’s overemphasis on liberalization and 
privatization allowed for the manipulation of the privatization process by local 
powerbrokers. This weakened the IC’s ability to dismantle ethnocratic regimes and 
establish state-building institutions based in rule of law.
30
 
The Yugoslav economic crisis in the 1980s laid the groundwork for the future 
development of regional personal networks in BiH. Because of high unemployment and 
inflationary pressures, informal and shadow economies began to develop, especially in 
the Herzegovina region, creating a criminal underworld sustained through smuggling and 
other illicit activities. Yugoslavia neglected and ostracized the western Herzegovina 
region because of its strong support of and involvement with the Croatian nationalist 
Ustasha movement during World War II.
31
 This antagonism produced a strong cadre of 
Croatian nationalist émigrés who returned during the years leading up to the Bosnian 
War. Even though the federal government had some control over the Yugoslav economy 
in the 1980s, republican and local communist elites held tight control over the economic 
levers. The breakdown of the Yugoslav government led to the creation of a power 
vacuum where these elites fought over BiH’s resources. The confluence of forces led to 
the development of personal networks between politicians, émigré nationalists, criminals, 
and businessmen. The war and subsequent international sanctions strengthened the links 
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between these groups, creating regional and personal factions that struggled to divide 
BiH and create their own territorial units. 
The creation of territorial units was an important of part of ethnic cleansing 
during the Bosnian War and this was influenced by how the IC is currently ordered. The 
current political and social organization of the world has produced a geographic mosaic 
of nation-states. According to Stef Jansen, “the idea of nations as discrete and countable 
bounded units is the bedrock of all dominant representations of the ‘international 
community’ as a ‘family of nations.’”32 The mosaic of nations reproduced on maps is the 
result of treaties establishing borders, which are then enforced through the state’s 
authority and accepted as a representation of reality by the populace. The instruments of 
land administration reinforce this understanding of the world by precisely delimiting the 
boundaries that separate people’s property and establishing rights over these territories, 
making reality legible. While maps used for land administration are designed to represent 
reality, they also give the state a tool to shape reality through categorization and the force 
of law.
33
 In BiH the power over land administration became especially important to 
regimes during and after the Bosnian War as a tool to legalize and protect their 
redistribution of property. The IC sought to remake and manage physical, represented and 
imagined space in order to undo the effects of ethnic cleansing. 
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In this thesis, I argue that nationalist politicians and criminals espoused a 
discourse of ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in 
order to establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal 
colonization of residential and commercial property by manipulating the prewar 
discourse on property relations. This is not to argue that some or most of these politicians 
and criminals did not believe in their vitriolic nationalist rhetoric, but instead that the 
effects of the discourse created well-used pathways to personal, not communal, wealth. 
Elites used the Yugoslav economic crisis and perceived past grievance to enflame 
growing tensions between ethnicities and social classes. I use Mostar as an object of 
analysis to examine the creation of two ethnocratic regimes in this divided city. I focus 
more on the Bosnian Croat regime in the city because it envisioned Mostar as its capital, 
making the city the site of its political competition among its factions. The Bosniak side – 
even though recently it has experienced internal disruptions
34
 – was significantly united 
behind its wartime leadership and remained relatively detached from Bosniak politics in 
Sarajevo. Even though nationalist politicians and criminals still hold much power in 
Mostar, the IC succeeded in instituting a high level of property restitution, which does not 
necessarily mean return. This was achieved because the IC was able to impose rule of law 
when it acted in an organized manner and the ethnocratic regimes were weakened due to 
regional economic and political factors that undercut the regimes’ control over the 
population. 
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SOURCES AND ORGANIZATION 
The sources used in this thesis are varied and sometimes disjointed due to limited 
access to and lack of documentation and statistics. There is more detailed information on 
criminal dealings in the commercial than the residential sector, but many of the same 
political and criminal actors influence and manipulate both. Therefore, I will juxtapose 
cases from both sectors to demonstrate the range of criminal activity and imply who the 
main criminal actors are in residential property crime because reports about residential 
crime are particularly vague. The most important sources for this thesis include court 
cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
Human Rights Chamber for BiH, statistics and IDP records from the departments for 
IDPs for the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and the municipality of Mostar, and reports 
from international organizations, such as UNHCR and the International Crisis Group.
35
 
The first chapter will outline the history of land administration in BiH from 1878 
to the 1990s by examining the development of the cadastral map and land registration in 
relation to changing property regimes. The intention of this chapter is to provide an 
historical background to the legal and social complexities of property ownership, 
particularly focusing on socially-owned apartments and the property laws that regulated 
their use. This is an important foundation to understanding how these apartments got 
entangled in complex legal and political battles during the property restitution process, 
especially given the prevalence of Yugoslavia’s informal economy for property. Even 
though the state of usage rights before the Bosnian War gave occupants numerous strong 
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protections akin to a semi-ownership right, the land administration system of usage rights 
gave nationalists a way to legalize their territorial gains. This chapter also examines the 
deterioration of Yugoslavia’s political economy and the early development of criminal 
networks. The main sources for this chapter will come from articles in BiH’s “Geodetski 
Glasnik” (Gazette on Geodesy), interviews, laws, and secondary sources, such as UN-
HABITAT’s report on property rights in the former Yugoslavia and academic scholarship 
on the history of the Yugoslav economy. 
The second chapter will provide a politico-economic and sociocultural history of 
the division and territorial consolidation of Mostar to show the structural development of 
powerful ethnocratic regimes and personal networks that made property restitution for 
IDPs and refugees very difficult. The chapter will achieve two purposes: it will situate 
Mostar within the Bosnian War to contextualize the military operations to divide the city, 
and it will demonstrate how nationalist networks consolidated political power over social, 
economic, and spatial structures in the city. The first part will draw on the theoretical 
framework of Toal and Dahlman, examining the effects of ethnic cleansing in Mostar, 
analyzing two aspects: Mostar as an imagined capital of a Bosnian Croat state (Herceg-
Bosna) and the military execution of ethnic cleansing. The second part will focus on the 
consolidation of parallel institutions in postwar Mostar and the colonization of space in 
the city through (re)construction and land administration. The parallel institutions gave 
power to nationalists to obstruct international peace efforts. Documents from war crime 
trials and international organizations will contextualize the criminal nature behind the 
demographic and representational division of the city.  
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The third chapter will examine the history of property restitution in BiH to 
demonstrate the significance of the IC’s creation of institutional capacity for the return of 
IDPs and refugees to BiH. It also will examine the changing regional support situation of 
the Herceg-Bosna parallel state to demonstrate how activist intervention, changes in 
Croatia’s political environment and the poor economic management of the regime led to 
the regime’s weakening. By examining property restitution cases in Mostar – both those 
that went to the Human Right Chamber and other restitution cases in the city – I analyze 
how obstruction of the property restitution process occurred in Mostar. This will 
demonstrate how the regimes manipulated laws on usage rights to consolidate territorial 
gains through ethnic cleansing and how the privatization process helped criminal war 
profiteers to consolidate control over the city’s political economy. The conclusion will 
summarize the findings revealed in the narrative and delineate lessons learned from this 
case study to determine possible applications to other post-conflict and development aid 
situations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LAND ADMINISTRATION IN BIH FROM 1878 TO THE 1990S 
Control over land administration was an important aspect to legalizing and 
consolidating the effects of wartime ethnic cleansing. While there are cases of destruction 
and manipulation of these documents during and after the Bosnian War in Mostar, there 
is little evidence that the destruction of records was intended and record manipulation 
mostly occurred in specific cases motivated by the property’s postwar economic value. 
Widespread systematic physical changes to the records was not the case; instead, 
nationalist politicians passed wartime laws, creating property regimes that manipulated 
the legacy of socialist prewar laws on property usage rights and social ownership to 
legitimize the ethnic redistribution of property. Even though before the war usage rights 
basically developed the equivalent security of an ownership right, I argue that because the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) created a property regime 
framed in terms of usage rights and ill-defined social ownership instead of private 
ownership, wartime regimes in Mostar had a legal system that could be exploited and 
manipulated to legitimize territorial gains through the reallocation of usage rights. 
Besides the system of usage rights, the poor condition and inaccuracy of property 
records before the Bosnian War complicated international efforts to resolve property 
issues and undo ethnic cleansing. Even though the Austro-Hungarian administration of 
BiH created a land administration system that was relatively accurate in depicting 
ownership in BiH, over time, especially during the SFRY, a large discrepancy between 
the situation depicted in land records and the actual situation grew. There are various 
reasons for this discrepancy, such as poor maintenance, regimes’ disinterest in updating 
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the records, high taxes on record changes, and uneven development of land 
administration systems throughout the country. In this chapter, I will outline the 
development of the land administration system and property rights in BiH and explain the 
SFRY’s unique brand of property relations mediated through its conceptualization of 
social ownership. 
LAND ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE OTTOMANS AND AUSTRO-
HUNGARIANS 
Following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Congress of Berlin gave a 
mandate to the Austro-Hungarian Empire to occupy and govern the Ottoman Vilayet of 
Bosnia (the territory of modern-day BiH), establishing the Condominium of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1878-1918). On 7 October 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Empire officially 
annexed the condominium into the empire. From 1884, based on the “Law on Land 
Books,” the Austro-Hungarian administration implemented a new land registry system 
simultaneously with a cadastral survey, replacing the previous Ottoman system. 
However, property relations remained similar to the Ottoman period.
36
 Even though land 
reform was a major demand of the rebelling Christians in BiH and widely expected of the 
Austro-Hungarians, land reform did not occur until the interwar period when BiH became 
part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after World War I.
37
 
The Development of the Dual Registration System 
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Before the Austro-Hungarian occupation, BiH used the Ottoman tapija and defter 
system. Tapijas were property deeds and defters were the registries or books where 
records of the deeds were maintained. The system was also used in other former 
Yugoslav states, which were under Ottoman rule (Macedonia, Serbia, and a part of 
Montenegro). The system was very centralized where any changes in the records at the 
local level had to be made at the regional level (sandzak or province) and then brought 
into conformity with records at the defterhana (the main land registry office) in Istanbul. 
The system was very slow and complicated, creating discrepancies between the records 
and reality. Also, the tapija system delimited property borders according to descriptions 
without any graphical representations, only approximating land in thousands of square 
kilometers or dulumas. According to Vladmir Lukić et al, this level of accuracy was 
unable to satisfy the needs of society at the time, driving a desire for reform, which 
ironically occurred in the Ottoman Empire immediately after Austria-Hungary took 
BiH.
38
 
The military administration conducted the first cadastral survey of BiH from 1881 
to 1884, producing maps generally on a scale of 1:6250, but on a 1:1562 scale in towns.
39
 
On 13 September 1884 the Austro-Hungarian administration instituted a land registry law 
for BiH, creating a land book system similar to those used in Austria-Hungary and 
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Germany.
40
 In 1886, the administration began implementing the land books and the task 
was completed by 1911.
41
 The land administration structure was a dual-system that 
combined land books that detailed property rights, ownership, and their subsequent 
changes, and a cadastral survey that was used as a graphical representation, detailing the 
borders of parcels.
42
 While the previous Ottoman defter system of land administration 
was based on a fairly inaccurate qualitative system, the new cadastral survey detailed 
moderately exact borders, providing the first geographic basis for land administration in 
BiH. When World War I began, the system had been implemented in the entirety of BiH. 
Property Relations 
Even though the Austro-Hungarian administration drastically changed the way 
land ownership and rights were documented in BiH, the administration did little to 
change property relations in the country. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied 
BiH, it did not undertake any real land reform, which the peasant/serf population 
expected. This left most of the usable land in BiH in the possession of Muslim 
landowners and the Islamic community and governed according to feudal relationships, 
producing resentment among the Christian populations who were the majority of the 
peasant class.
43
 Instead, the Austro-Hungarian administration maintained most of the 
Ottoman laws and enforced laws that the Ottoman Empire had just begun to implement 
when the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the province. 
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During the nineteenth century, there were a number of land tenure changes that 
putatively occurred in BiH and the Ottoman Empire; however, the Ottoman Empire did 
not have the prerequisite control over its territory to enforce significantly the changes. 
The Ottoman Empire attempted to modernize its socioeconomic system through the 
tanzimat reforms to bring it closer in line with western European systems.
44
 However, the 
empire experienced significant resistance to these reforms from Muslim landlords in BiH 
who were accustomed to fairly autonomous rule.
45
 Still, a number of these laws were 
implemented after the Crimean War and slowly changed property relations in response to 
agrarian unrest in BiH.
 46
 One of the laws that resulted from this period and lasted until 
1945 was the “Land Law of 1858.” The law pushed the registration of land to increase 
tax revenue and was an attempt to assert fiscal control over the ailing empire.
47
 It 
classified land into different types: mulk (private property), miri (state land), mefkufe 
(vakuf),
48
 metruke (the common), and mevat (unoccupied land).
49
 According to Jozo 
Tomasevich, “this law increased greatly the rights of disposition of the holders of various 
types of land.”50 In 1859, the Safer decree codified the contractual obligations of serfs to 
landowners, theoretically easing the serfs’ burdensome obligations to landowners and 
obligating landowners to provide serfs with housing.
51
 However, the decree only affected 
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agalik lands and not beglik lands so while this decree attempted to assuage unrest, in the 
end, serfs experienced no material change and the decree provided for a legal mechanism 
for landowners to more easily transform agalik lands into beglik lands. Agalik lands were 
claimed by begs and agas as their full, hereditary properties where they had rights of 
utilization, but lands were still under the control of the reaya. Beglik lands, on the other 
hand, were considered full property of the landlords and no longer under the control of 
the reaya.
52
 In a late response to continued unrest, the Ottoman Empire passed the “Law 
of February 1876,” which gave serfs the option to free themselves with the landowner’s 
consent and the payment of an agreed upon indemnity. However, by then the revolt of 
Christian serfs in BiH against Ottoman rule had begun.
53
 The Austro-Hungarian Empire 
brought these laws into force during its administration and “between 1879 and 1911 a 
total of 28,481 serf families bought themselves out of serfdom,” which represented over a 
quarter of all serf families in the province.
54
 
One of the few land relation changes the Austro-Hungarian administration 
implemented was the centralization and enforcement of pre-existing laws on vakufs, 
which were important charitable religious foundations that managed land for Islamic 
communities. Vakufs were established by a charitable donation of money and/or property 
to the Islamic community and then a foundation was established to manage the upkeep of 
the land and buildings on the property, such as mosques, schools, inns, markets, and 
bridges. There is also a type of vakuf where the head of a household, who is always male, 
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manages the property according to a contract and the property is then passed on to a male 
heir. If there is not a male heir or if he is deemed incapable of managing the land, the 
vakuf is then passed to the Islamic community to be administered by a new or pre-
existing vakuf foundation. Unfortunately, many of these foundations during the Ottoman 
period became sites of family nepotism, effectively establishing tax-free family trust 
funds. By 1878 it is estimated that one-third of all usable land in BiH was owned by 
vakufs and according to Islamic law once property was under vakuf administration, it 
could no longer revert back to private or public ownership. In 1884 the Austro-Hungarian 
administration attempted to regulate properly vakuf foundations by establishing a 
centralized Vakuf Commission, which required the use of proper accounting methods and 
the submittal of budgets.
55
 
The strict centralization of vakufs created resentment in regional centers and 
became a political issue at the end of the nineteenth century because the government 
appointed the representatives of the Vakuf Commission, and Sarajevans held most of the 
political power in the commission. Political dissent against the system grew out of Mostar 
under the leadership of Mula Mustafa Džabić. In 1899 the Islamic community in Mostar 
presented a draft statute to institute a Vakuf Assembly of Herzegovina, which would 
create a bottom-up structure where local associations would appoint members to a district 
assembly that would in turn appoint representatives to the regional assembly.
56
 The 
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Austro-Hungarian administration rejected the statute and seized the group’s property and 
financial assets, sparking protest around Herzegovina.
57
 
Once a formal agreement between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire was signed in 1909, the condominium gained more political autonomy to conduct 
its internal affairs. However, even with some political autonomy, the Serbian National 
Organization and the Croatian National Society did not have the political strength to 
institute land reform, which would have significantly benefited their constituents. Noel 
Malcolm argues that land reform failed to be a major issue among these political parties 
because they consisted of more educated and prosperous elites for whom land reform was 
not a personal issue. Also, neither party could command a majority in the parliament so 
both parties lobbied for support from the Muslim National Organization, which firmly 
opposed land reform.
58
 By World War I, land reform was a major issue for the general 
populace in the territory. Because of the turmoil created by World War I, land reform for 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the war became a matter of formalizing 
and expanding the land reform that peasants started during the war. 
THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA: LAND REFORM 
After the Austro-Hungarian administration, there were a number of processes that 
changed land tenure in Bosnian-Herzegovinian rural and urban spaces. During the 
administration the enforcement of pre-occupation laws moderated the control of Muslim 
landowners and Islamic institutions over land and resulted in the slow deterioration of the 
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Ottoman regime in the country, which ceased to exist during the interwar period. After 
World War I the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1941).
59
 The kingdom consisted of 33 oblasts of 
which the former condominium formed six. After the war, the kingdom decreed wide-
reaching land reform, redistributing land to peasants and predominantly dispossessing 
Muslim landowners in the territory. However, even though Regent Alexander announced 
land reform early during the kingdom’s existence, the reimbursement process largely was 
unfinished when the World War II expanded to the kingdom, ending the reimbursement 
process. 
The mechanisms behind land administration in BiH did not change during the 
interwar period. Instead, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia passed a law in 1930 to continue the 
dual registration system used in the regions of BiH, Croatia, and Vojvodina and to 
institutionalize it in regions of Yugoslavia that still used the Ottoman defter system.
60
 
When the land book system was institutionalized, tapijas were used as the foundation of 
the land books and were accepted in court as evidence of ownership. The resulting land 
books were harmonized with the land cadastre.
61
 During the interwar period, the land 
books and land cadastre were well-maintained; however, unfortunately, during World 
War II, 30% of the land books in BiH were destroyed and many were not restored 
afterwards.
62
 While this destruction did not affect Mostar, the destruction of these books 
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during World War II was very significant to the property restitution process in general 
after the Bosnian War because when the books were available, they were typically the 
only property records that could be used to confirm ownership rights. 
The initial push for land reform came from the peasants themselves who refused 
to pay tithes or rents to landowners and in some cases attacked landowners to seize their 
property after World War I.
63
 Rural unrest and violence against landowners led Regent 
Alexander to declare the “Manifesto to the People of 6 January 1919” in an attempt to 
end the violence, promising the abolition of serfdom, the dismantlement of large land 
estates, the redistribution of land to peasants that work the land, and the payment of 
compensation to former landowners.
64
 Regent Alexander followed the manifesto by 
issuing the “Interim Decree of 25 February 1919,” officially delivering on the promises 
of the manifesto and also declaring forest properties to be state property for common 
use.
65
 Tomasevich argues that in some sense land reform was a fait accompli, stating that 
“no government in Yugoslavia after 1918 could have upheld the serfdom and serfdom-
like institutions.”66 Even though land reform was an overdue process in most of 
Yugoslavia, the contingency of the decree allowed landowners some time to regain some 
political clout after World War I, forcing land reform to be executed gradually in the 
country. The process did not reach its legal conclusion until 1933 and was not even 
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administratively completed in some areas until 1940.
67
 This delay was in spite of the fact 
that property records in BiH were in good condition at that point and could have allowed 
land reform to be instituted rather quickly. 
The most significant opportunity for landowners to ease the blow of land reform 
occurred during the creation of the kingdom’s constitution in 1921. Land reform and 
property rights became a key issue to get Muslim parties to vote for the Vidovdan 
Constitution. In the constituent election, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization won nearly 
all of the Muslim votes in the region of BiH, giving the party 24 of 419 seats at the 
constitutional assembly. Since the centralist and federalist parties did not have enough 
votes to constitute a majority themselves, they courted the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization as a swing vote, allowing the party to negotiate with the centralists to soften 
the blow of land reform to its constituents. Even though the party wanted autonomy for 
BiH and ideologically opposed Serbian centralists, to side with Croat federalists would 
have placed the party in direct confrontation with Belgrade endangering BiH to the risk 
of partition, the worst result possible for the party.
68
 The Yugoslav Muslim Organization 
negotiated a compensation plan for around 4,000 former Muslim landowners whom land 
reform affected. However, the compensation for the land was below the market value, 
causing some families to go into poverty.
69
 The compensation plan was supposed to 
disburse 255,000,000 dinars to affected families over a 40-year period at a 6% interest 
rate, but payments did not begin until 1936 and World War II brought the discontinuation 
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of the program, so only 10% of the projected total was disbursed.
70
 Land reform mostly 
affected the region of BiH, which represented about 66.9% of the land that the reform 
affected in the kingdom. 
As a result of the land reform, 113,103 former serf families gained 775,233 
hectares of land (666,076 hectares of cultivated land, 161,978 hectares of forest, and 
47,179 hectares of pastures). Also, another 54,728 tenant families on beglik lands gained 
400,072 hectares of cultivated land.
71
 Tomasevich argues that because of the nature of 
BiH’s tenure system before the World War I, land reform produced a positive effect on 
agricultural production in the region since farmers were more invested in the land and 
small farms were expanded.
72
 Even though land reform in the interwar kingdom affected 
rural more than urban areas, land reform had a significant effect on vakufs by reducing 
their size. The vakuf properties in urban and rural areas of the municipality of Mostar 
were reduced and the state gave properties to tenants. Land reform also gave the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia an opportunity to reward members of the Serbian military that 
served during World War I.
73
 The redistribution of land to military veterans, their 
families, and war victims – or as it has been called in Yugoslav documents, “internal 
colonization” – is a process that repeated itself after World War II and the Bosnian War. 
SFR YUGOSLAVIA: NATIONALIZATION TO PRIVATIZATION 
The Tito-led Partisans won World War II in Yugoslavia against the Nazi German-
supported Ustasha government and the royal government-in-exile-supported Chetniks. 
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After World War II, the Partisans established the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (1945-1992) with the region of BiH forming a constituent republic – the 
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tito and his Politburo established an 
economic and political system that followed the Soviet model, instituting state ownership 
over property.
74
 However, housing rights along with the economic structure in the SFRY 
changed drastically from this centrally-planned model during the period after World War 
II. In 1948, a split between Tito and Joseph Stalin led to the expulsion of the SFRY from 
the Cominform and the Eastern Bloc. In the early 1950s, the SFRY dismantled the Soviet 
model, ideologically rejecting state ownership and developing their particular brand of 
social ownership, which was intended to introduce a model of social self-governance.
75
 
The period is marked by a slow transition, devolving power from the federal to the 
republican level. Property rights followed a similar devolution from nationalization in the 
late 1940s to privatization in the very early 1990s. 
Following the Soviet model, the SFRY introduced an étatist or administrative 
socialist system where the economy was centrally planned after World War II and 
property was state-owned. The nationalization project altered property relations in both 
rural and urban areas. Three months after World War II, the SFRY passed the “Law on 
Agrarian Reform and Colonization in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
which reduced the maximum property holdings of a farmer to 87 acres and of non-farmer 
to 12 acres. Unlike the land reform during the interwar period, landowners were not 
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supposed to receive compensation for lost property.
76
 However, similar to the previous 
land reform, this law prioritized the allocation of nationalized land to members of the 
Yugoslav Partisans and victims of fascist terror.
77
 
The regime nationalized all Yugoslav land and simultaneously developed the 
concept of usage rights on nationalized property. However, the regime always still 
allowed the private ownership of houses in some form even though the property upon 
which they were built was considered nationalized and subject to seizure for the benefit 
of the common good. After nationalizing property, the regime nationalized private capital 
as well. The Constitution of 1946 solidified the position of the centrally-planned 
economic system, stating that “the state directs economic life and development through a 
general economic plan relying on the state and cooperative sector and exercising general 
control over the private sector in the economy.”78 In 1946, private capital in industry, 
mining, transport, banking and wholesale trade establishments was nationalized. The 
process was extended to retail trade and catering in 1948 and to houses with more than 
three apartments in 1958.
79
  
Land Administration in the SFRY 
The land administration system implemented by the Austro-Hungarian 
administration and the interwar kingdom was used throughout the SFRY period. Any 
changes during the postwar period were intended to increase the accuracy of the records. 
                                                 
76
 Branko Horvat, “Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional 
Developments,” The American Economic Review 61, no. 3 (June 1971), 73. 
77
 Zakon o agrarnoj reformi i kolonizaciji u narodnoj republici Bosni i Hercegovini, “Sluzbeni list NRBiH,” 
br. 2/46, 18/46, 20/47, 29/47, 37/49, 14/51, 41/67. 
78
 SFRY Constitution of 1946, Article 15, quoted in Horvat, 74. 
79
 Horvat, 73. 
 34 
Since the establishment of the land books, discrepancies between the details in the books 
and the facts on the ground moderately grew. However, these discrepancies increased 
significantly under the SFRY.
80
 At first they were poorly updated because of pure neglect 
by Yugoslavia authorities. This occurred especially when the economy followed the 
Soviet model, which is when the Yugoslav authorities made the most significant changes 
in property relations – the reallocation of property. As property records became more 
important to the regime, extremely high fees on processing changes in the property 
records and the complexity of the system discouraged citizens from registering changes. 
Even though at times the Yugoslav administration attempted to improve the records, the 
regime never fully implemented any of their plans to rectify the discrepancies. 
In 1952, the SFRY adopted the “Law on the Cadastre,” which was intended to 
create a new land survey and harmonize the new survey with the land books.
81
 A new 
cadastral survey was undertaken in the 1960s with a scale of 1:1000 in urban areas and 
1:2500 in rural areas. Technicians took aerial photographs of marks that landowners or 
possessors used to delimit their parcels. Because of the maps’ high quality, this survey 
was easily digitized after the Bosnian War, but the updating of the property records was 
not systematically done so they were still unreliable before the Bosnian War.
82
 As Jean-
Luc Horisberger noted, “in addition to the maps, information was kept in the form of lists 
of parcels with parcel description and name of users. In cases where old land books have 
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been destroyed, these lists have been maintained in a similar way to land registry.”83 
Unlike the land books, after the Bosnian War these possession lists were considered 
reliable for reestablishing property rights. The Commission for Real Property Claims 
mainly used these lists to establish possession, but not ownership.
84
 
In the immediate period after World War II, land reform and the nationalization of 
property allowed for strong government intervention in property issues. In the climate of 
massive displacement and urbanization, the benefits of this strong interventionist model 
were higher social equality and the ability to resolve the housing situation quickly. Also, 
the land reform law allowed government officials to allocate the “surplus living space” of 
landowners to IDPs and the homeless as tenants who paid government-regulated rents. 
However, the economic structure of housing relations produced a number of problems. 
The main problem that affected the housing stock was that since rent was fairly nominal 
during this period, lessors and tenants did not maintain their housing units, resulting “in 
the decline and deterioration of the already limited housing fund.”85 This problem was 
semi-resolved during the de-étatization of the Yugoslavia economy that allowed 
municipalities the freedom to increase rents and shift the financial responsibility from the 
housing fund to lessors and tenants for socially-owned housing. However, according to 
Harold Lydall, even by 1980 the average rent for socially-owned housing was “absurdly 
small,” representing only .52% of the cost of the dwelling.86 
Developing Social Ownership  
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After the expulsion of the SFRY from the Cominform in 1948, the regime initially 
attempted to strengthen state ownership and central planning by accelerating 
collectivization and absorbing more of the national income into the state through the 
second “Nationalization Law” of April 1948.87 Branko Horvat argues that this response 
by Yugoslavia was to prove that they were not deviationists. However, the split led to 
leading politicians and economists, mostly the Yugoslav Politburo, to rethink what 
socialism really was or should be by expanding their understanding of socialism to 
include works of western Marxists.
88
 They reinterpreted Marx and Engels, arguing that a 
centrally planned economy and state socialism would not lead to true socialism as 
defined by Marx and Engels, but to state capitalism. They focused on Marx and Engels’ 
statement that the state would wither away in a classless society and argued for 
decentralization and self-government as the true way to reach socialism. This 
understanding of socialism led the Yugoslav state to construct the New Economic 
System.
89
 
Even though state ownership in Yugoslavia reached a climax in 1950, by the end 
of 1951, the Politburo drastically changed the centrally-planned economic and political 
system. The first step was the “Law on the Management of Government Business 
Enterprises and Economic Associations by Worker’s Collectives” in 1950, which 
established worker councils and managing boards to conduct the affairs of enterprises.  
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Year 
Number of New 
Housing Units 
1952 34907 
1953 38199 
1954 34208 
1955 29849 
1956 37005 
1957 44725 
1958 61681 
1959 60611 
These worker councils were elected by all of the employees and formed the foundation of 
social self-governance. The New Economic System from 1952 to 1960 was considered a 
transition period where decisions would be devolved from the federal state to society, but 
the transition of power was slow and in many cases purely symbolic. The federal state did 
not relinquish its control over planning nor were the five-year plans characteristic of the 
Soviet model abandoned quickly. Instead, the power to decide how to achieve the goals 
of the plans was given to socially-owned enterprises by reducing the levels of oversight 
and reporting. In 1949, each enterprise submitted 600-800 different reports to their 
superiors every year and this burden was reduced considerably during this period.
90
 
However, as Branko Milanovic has indicated, “despite decentralization, the Federal 
government retained a strong hold on all levers of economic and political power, mostly 
through its control of the General Investment Fund (created in 1954).”91 The federal 
government’s control of investment allowed them to interfere in the administration of 
enterprises by holding funds hostage, but the intrusion in enterprises’ affairs was less 
pervasive than before. 
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In the 1950s, property rights and regulation followed the general decentralization 
of the Yugoslav economy, favoring the concept of social ownership over state ownership. 
In 1954, the “Decree on Administration of Residential Units” introduced the “right to an 
apartment,” which gave a subjective right to occupancy right holders to permanently use 
allocated apartments.
92
 This decree began the strengthening of usage rights in favor of 
tenants and the transformation of the right into a quasi-ownership right. In 1956, the 
“Law on the Contribution to the Housing Fund” shifted the financial responsibility of 
housing construction from the general state budget to a newly established fund that 
imposed a compulsory contribution of 10% of employees’ salaries for housing 
construction. This financing sparked a building boom in Yugoslavia, ensuring the ability 
of the country’s citizens to acquire suitable housing. 
By the late 1950s, the New Economic System and the concept of self-
management over the means of production were firmly established, limiting the federal 
government’s monopoly on decision making. In turn socially-owned enterprises93 and 
non-economic institutions
94
 were authorized to set up housing enterprises that were 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of socially-owned apartments. 
Municipalities as non-economic institutions were responsible for the management of the 
housing enterprises.
95
 In 1959, the “Law on Housing Relations” introduced the concept of 
an occupancy right, which replaced the previous “right to an apartment.” The right was 
extended to all family members, guaranteeing “the secure tenure of all household 
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members.”96 The law also gave socially-owned enterprises and non-economic institutions 
the right to allocate socially-owned apartments to their employees and the power to 
initiate eviction proceedings. 
The SFRY adopted a third Constitution in 1963, which was accompanied by 
further reforms in 1965. Its authors’ intention was to drive the country further toward 
self-governing socialism by broadening “the role of the market mechanism at the micro 
level” and encouraging “the use of indirect measures in the implementation of economic 
policy.”97 The Constitution of 1963 formally defined the concept of social ownership, 
stating: 
…nobody has the ownership right over social productions means – nobody 
meaning neither social-political communities, associated labour 
organizations nor single workers – and nobody can under any legal 
ownership title claim the product of the ‘social work,’ nor operate, nor 
dispose of social production forces, nor arbitrarily determine the 
conditions of distribution.
98
 
In 1965, the “Federal Resolution on the Further Development of the Housing Economy” 
was passed, confirming housing as a priority of social interest and giving self-
management force at the local level. It allowed municipalities to legislate the minimum 
and maximum amount of rent. Following this development, rents rose to reflect the cost 
of maintenance and allowed for the reduction of employees’ contribution to the housing 
fund from 10% to 4%.
99
 However, as mentioned earlier, rents were still relatively very 
low. After the reforms of 1965, the participation of private construction in the housing 
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market continually increased and the percentage of socially-owned apartments 
constructed in relation to the total declined. 
Power to the Republics 
The reforms of 1965 began the shift of legislative power from the federal to the 
republican level. As part of the reform, the legislation attempted to dismantle the central 
planning of investment by decentralizing investment planning to the republics and giving 
autonomy to self-managed banks to invest funds according to profitability criteria. 
However, a few years later political bodies reasserted control over the banks by 
appointing senior members and applying pressure through the communist party. 
According to Milanovic, the reforms of 1965 began a pivotal time when the SFRY could 
have evolved into one of three systems: federal centralism, republican éstatism, or market 
self-management. Eventually, republican or polycentric étatism won out over the 
Table 2: Residential Housing Construction in the SFRY, 1960-70 (source: Mikelic, et al., 
22-3) 
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others.
100
 Amendments to the Constitution in 1971 shifted legislative powers on housing 
to the Yugoslav republics, allowing the republics to decide on housing fund contribution 
levels. During this period, there was the advent of “solidarity apartments” for low-income 
groups that needed help from society to satisfy their housing needs. While only Slovenia 
had an explicit law on the allocation of these apartments, all of the republics allocated 
funds for such apartments and the allocation right holders passed internal acts to 
determine the criteria for their distribution.
101
  
The 1974 Federal Yugoslav Constitution created the principles of a new socio-
economic order based on the concept of “self-management” and “associated labour.” It 
also gave to the republics “the right to be solely responsible for their economic 
development as well as the means to implement this.”102 This constitution laid the 
groundwork for the SFRY’s future inflation problems by politically decentralizing 
monopolistic investment banking from the federal to the republican level and subdividing 
worker councils into “Basic Organizations of Associated Labor.”103 Inter-republic 
investment flows began to cease and the republics basically became financially 
responsible only to themselves. The constitution also made the occupancy right of a 
socially-owned apartment a constitutional principle. Simultaneously, the republics began 
to address the discrepancies in the property records. Possession rights were “registered in 
the cadastre offices through disclosure commissions, which started in 1974 when 
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geodetic experts began registering and reregistering possession rights based on new aerial 
surveys throughout the former Yugoslavia.”104 
In 1975, the “Program of Publicly Directed Housing Construction” was adopted at 
the federal level and established a common interest institution called a Public Housing 
Enterprise (PHE) at the municipal level. The purpose of PHEs was to coordinate the 
interests of various stakeholders in the construction of apartments in order to avoid the 
accumulation of profits by a single actor. PHEs distributed money from the housing fund 
to construct socially-owned apartments, which PHEs then managed. Socially-owned 
enterprises and non-economic institutions made legal contracts with PHEs to construct 
the apartments and once the construction was complete they were entitled to allocate 
apartments to employees. These socially owned enterprises and non-economic 
institutions were know as the allocation right holders and maintained the allocation 
decisions in their records. 
For example, in Mostar the PHE was called DOM Mostar. A socially-owned 
company like Aluminij would contract DOM Mostar to construct an apartment building. 
Once DOM Mostar completed construction, Aluminij had the right to allocate the 
apartments to its employees according to the company’s internally defined eligibility 
criteria. According to Veljko Mikelic, “the eligibility criteria included generally the years 
of employment, the number of household members for each employee, the social and 
economic position of their household members, their health conditions and their housing 
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need.”105 If an employee was eligible, the allocation right holder would allocate an 
available apartment to them, issuing them an allocation decision, (the occupant’s proof of 
their occupancy right to use the apartment) and maintaining a copy for their internal 
records. As Mikelic, et al., notes, “the allocation decision required the employees to 
conclude a contract of use over the apartment with PHE within a short period of time, 
usually one month, upon the physical possession of the apartment.”106 However, the 
inefficient or corrupt misdistribution of housing was common and created significant 
inequality within the social sector. The privileged paid little rent while other workers 
(13% of social sector in 1978) lived in crowded conditions with relatives or became sub-
tenants, “paying as much as 12 times the normal rent and up to half their income.”107 
From the establishment of this program until the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the 
condition of socially-owned housing improved. However, the economy faced an extreme 
decline in the 1980s, placing a significant strain on the housing market. Because PHEs 
became the exclusive “buyers” and “sellers” of apartments, an institutionalized monopoly 
developed. This introduced significant inefficiencies in the housing market as contractors 
charged high interest rates to shield themselves from future inflation. In the 1980s, 
Yugoslavia’s economy experienced a number of problems, such as a decline in gross 
material product or “social product,” negative rates of investment growth, and the 
increase of unemployment. Inflation rates increased above normal for Yugoslavia. In the 
1960s the average inflation rate was around 10% and in the 1970s the SFRY had an 
average inflation rate of around 20%, but in the 1980s inflation even increased further. 
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By 1986, inflation of consumer prices increased to 195% and from December 1988 to 
December 1989 it increased as high as 2,714%.
108
 
In the 1980s, it became obvious that the Yugoslav political economy was no 
longer sustainable. Under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, the central government poorly attempted to institute austerity measures to lessen 
the country’s overwhelming debt problem through structural adjustment loans. However, 
they only resulted in declining living conditions and real wages. Unemployment among 
youth was a growing problem in BiH and the rest of Yugoslavia. While the general 
unemployment rate in BiH was 24.4% in 1985, the unemployment rate for people 27 
years-old and younger was at 52.7%.
109
 Migrant work was also down because of 
lessening demand and growing immigration restrictions abroad. This particularly affected 
western Herzegovina where a significant portion of the population historically worked 
abroad in Germany and remittances played a significant role in the region’s economy. 
In 1984, BiH passed the “Law on Basic Housing Relations,” which defined the 
legal categories of legal and lawful possession. According to the law, a “legal possessor” 
is a person who has a contract for the property, but is not registered in the land books. 
With this type of possession, the possessor may acquire an ownership right after ten 
years. A “lawful possessor” is a person who does not have a contract, but has the bona 
fide belief that the property is theirs and can prove possession with evidence other than a 
contract. With this type of possession, the possessor may acquire an ownership right after 
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twenty years.
110
 Also, in 1984, the Republic of BiH in the SFRY passed the “Law on the 
Real Estate Cadastre.” The Real Estate Cadastre was an attempt by BiH to harmonize the 
land books and the land cadastre and to fix the discrepancies between the land books and 
the real situation. The law introduced a new system of registration, which included a new 
cadastral survey and the reregistering of property rights. Unfortunately, this new system 
was only implemented in 10% of the country when the Bosnian War began. This process 
had not begun in the municipality of Mostar so this type of cadastre did not have any 
bearing on property restitution in the city. 
After a couple of failed plans to restructure and stabilize the SFRY’s economy by 
refinancing its burdensome foreign debt in the 1980s, real momentum for market reform 
surfaced in 1988.
111
 Under the leadership of Branko Mikulić, the SFRY reduced import 
restrictions, removed restrictions on foreign investment, and abolished the Basic 
Organizations of Associated Labor.
112
 In March 1989, Ante Marković replaced Mikulić 
as Prime Minister, and worked out an economic reform project under the advisement of 
foreign economists like Jeffrey Sachs and Kenneth Zapp.
113
 While reform provided for 
the privatization of socially-owned enterprises and housing, the privatization process did 
not make significant progress before the Bosnian War. The only apartments that were 
privatized had belonged to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) through the “Law on 
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Securing Housing for the JNA.”114 After reforming the National Bank of Yugoslavia and 
a short period of hyperinflation due to removing domestic price controls, the Yugoslav 
dinar was stabilized and completely revaluated on 1 January 1990. However, the 
pressures of taxes, the removal of subsidies, and new bankruptcy procedures endangered 
the jobs of half the workforce. Even though the central government successfully reformed 
the currency, the federal level did not have control over the republican governments to 
keep them from breaking ranks from the austerity/restructuring plan to assuage problems 
with socially-owned enterprises. In the second half of 1990, inflation began to rise as the 
republics added money, Marković lost his hard won popularity, and ethnic politics took 
center stage. 
CONCLUSION 
While this narrative thus far has focused on economic developments, this by no 
means is intended to imply that economics was the only factor that led to the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. It was a complex series of events that was the result of the confluence of 
various internal crises and new international geopolitical forces. Toal and Dahlman 
contend that a multivariable explanation is needed to understand the violent breakup of 
Yugoslavia, emphasizing institutional (the debate between centralism and federalism), 
economic (economic decline and instability), political (mass media and political actors), 
and cultural (nationalist discourses) factors and explanations. They argue that 
“Yugoslavia was always a vulnerable state project” and BiH was a shared space 
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contested by Croatian and Serbian symbolic geographies.
115
 I generally agree with their 
delineation of factors, but I would like to highlight five prewar developments that 
asserted a role in the property situation of wartime and postwar BiH: the vague definition 
of social ownership, previous land reform, the role of the informal economy, personal 
networks and the development of organized crime. 
Yugoslavia’s new geopolitical situation after the cold war brought the likely 
possibility of market liberalization, democratization, and privatization. The breakdown of 
power and legitimacy in Yugoslavia produced a political and military scramble of various 
elites for Yugoslavia’s socially-owned, ill-protected economic resources. The political 
battle over social ownership resonated in the housing market. Even with the privatization 
of socially-owned apartments, the process had barely begun and it was unclear who had 
ownership over this type of housing. Even though occupancy rights were strengthened to 
the point that occupancy right holders and their family could inhabit the property 
indefinitely unless the occupant broke certain conditions of the contract, the allocation 
right holder still had the authority to evict residents and legislative bodies still had the 
power to weaken the legal basis for occupancy rights and social ownership. Property laws 
passed by wartime regimes, as will be seen in the following chapters, are evidence of the 
preexisting fluidity of the interpretation of social ownership and the precarious position 
occupants held in regard to their housing. 
Beyond understanding the prewar legal mechanisms that governed land 
administration in BiH, the processes of land reform and nationalization that occurred 
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within the 72 years before the Bosnia War affected and still affect postwar BiH. As seen 
in the narrative, compensation for lost property was never completely fulfilled even when 
it was promised. During reconstruction after the Bosnian War, the IC only attempted to 
remake BiH according to the immediate prewar situation, leaving other historical 
moments of significant change in property relations out of the discussion. After the war, 
property restitution based on such earlier moments only occurred unilaterally when 
ethnocratic political bodies returned property to religious institutions. For example, the 
Muslim community in Mostar was able to restore numerous mosques that were 
demolished or repurposed during nationalization and reestablished some of the vakuf 
properties. However, this also allowed politicians and religious leaders to make false or 
historically very old claims to validate the replacement of a mosque with a church or vice 
versa. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s spurred the growth of the informal economy. 
Particularly in the 1980s, “a coping economy grew out of farming and small service 
enterprises” because of the crisis.116 While the size and magnitude of Yugoslavia’s 
informal economy is unknown and necessitates further research, the informal economy in 
the Yugoslav real estate market can be partially understood in reference to the problems 
that it caused postwar property restitution. As mentioned earlier, high transaction taxes 
and administrative complexity drove people to conduct informal transactions, which 
undermined the accuracy of property records.
117
 According to a postwar real estate 
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market report, in Sarajevo only about 18% of property sales or transfers were registered 
and 10-15% in Travnik.
118
 Postwar estimates of the land books and the cadastre indicate 
that the discrepancies between the records and the actual situation ranged from 70-95% 
and that was even if the land books and the cadastral records agreed.
119
 These problems 
in land administration created a ripple effect in the postwar BiH economy, complicating 
the ability of international and domestic officials to determine ownership, encumbering 
housing privatization and market processes, and obstructing people from registering 
property as valid legal sales. 
Personal networks and their regional characteristics played a significant role in 
the rise of particular individuals and factional competition. While the personal 
connections will be elucidated in chapter 2, a word on regional factionalism within the 
Bosnian Croat ranks is important, especially since many researchers treat them as a 
relatively unified group. The main division within Bosnian Croat party politics is the split 
between those from western Herzegovina and those from central Bosnia, which is noted 
by some scholars.
120
 Bosnian Croats in central Bosnia generally lived in mixed 
communities and had stronger inter-ethnic ties. In western Herzegovina, on the other 
hand, Bosnian Croats lived in smaller communities, which were largely mono-ethnic, and 
were economically connected to Croats in Dalmatia. Many Bosnian Croat politicians 
from western Herzegovina lived or were born in some of the least ethnically diverse 
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municipalities in BiH: Grude, Široki Brijeg, and Čitluk. Also, western Herzegovina was 
one of the poorest regions in the SFRY. Considered an Ustasha stronghold during World 
War II, the SFRY did not allocate significant funding for the region’s development. 
Therefore, Bosnian Croats from western Herzegovina tended to view themselves as 
victims of Tito’s regime and, unlike people from central Bosnia, they emigrated from 
western Herzegovina at a high rate, especially to Germany.
121
 These regional 
developments produced groups of former communist party members, émigrés, business 
managers, and small-time criminals in the western Herzegovina region. 
Criminal networks grew out of Yugoslavia’s cold war security concerns as the 
State Security Administration (UDBa) funded spies domestically and abroad. Abroad 
these agents established bases in cities, such as Frankfurt, Stockholm, Paris, Amsterdam, 
Vienna, and Milwaukee, specializing in the assassination of dissidents, robbery, 
extortion, and human trafficking.
122
 However, according to Sheelagh Brady, a former 
analyst for the EU Police Mission in BiH, while the Yugoslav state condoned and 
facilitated the black market in the 1980s, “it is difficult to fully assess this assertion, or to 
fully explain the presence and role played by OC [organized crime] in pre-war BiH.”123 
Unfortunately, more research needs to be done on the extent of organized crime in pre-
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1990s Yugoslavia, beyond general corruption. Most evidence about organized crime is 
more hearsay than hard evidence, such as the State Security Administration funding of 
Željko Ražnatović aka “Arkan” and Mladen Naletilić aka “Tuta” to commit crimes in 
Europe, and Ljubo Ćesić aka “Rojs” and Dinko Slezak aka “Dika” participating in 
international smuggling through their bus routes.
124
 However, whatever the size of Cold 
War criminal networks, there is no doubt that organized crime and crime bosses played a 
significant role in the economic and military establishment of post-Yugoslav states. In the 
chapter three, we turn to how property restitution contributed to that new criminal reality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FORGING AN IMAGINED BORDER 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia began with the people of Slovenia and Croatia 
voting on independence 25 June 1991, opening the serious possibility of BiH’s secession 
from Yugoslavia. Secessionist wars erupted in both Croatia and Slovenia against the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).125 The war in Croatia increased ethnic and political 
tension in the Socialist Republic of BiH because the JNA used military bases in the 
republic to launch their operations against Croatia. This particularly angered Bosnian 
Croats in western Herzegovina who in response initiated armed confrontations with the 
JNA in the region. After the Socialist Republic of BiH declared independence on 5 
March 1992, the Bosnian War erupted and lasted until 1995. The war affected Mostar in 
three stages. The first stage was from the joint Bosnian Croat-Bosniak defense of the city 
from the siege by the JNA, which began on 3 April 1992, until the proposal of the Vance-
Owen Plan on 2 January 1993. After initial cooperation, the relations between Bosnian 
Croat and Bosniak political and military structures deteriorated during this period due to 
the radicalization of the main Bosnian Croat party and competition over military 
resources and territory. The failure of the Vance-Owen Plan began the second phase as 
the Bosnian Croat government attempted to implement unilaterally the plan because it 
was territorially generous to them. This brought them into direct physical confrontation 
with Bosniak forces, initiating events that led to the Croat-Bosniak Civil War and the 
second siege of Mostar, which began on 9 May 1993. The siege violently divided the 
previously ethnically mixed city of Mostar between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, 
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changing the demographic spatial composition of the city. Before the end of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak governments signed the Washington 
Agreement on 1 March 1994, which established the transitional EU administration of 
Mostar. This agreement began the third stage when nationalist politicians held the fragile 
peace of the immediate post-conflict situation hostage to continue the “war by other 
means” in order to impose an ethnically divided political structure that was beneficial to 
their maintenance of power over the city. 
Alongside an orientation on the history of Mostar until the 1990s, the purpose of 
this chapter is to analyze two processes. The first is the process of military forces forging 
the territorial division of BiH and Mostar. The second is the process of political 
manipulation that politicians used to consolidate territorial gains through the construction 
of a divided political structure and cityscape immediately after the war and continuing 
until the IC strengthened its capacity to affect change in 1999. While I focus mostly on 
Bosnian Croat nationalists’ role in dividing Mostar, I do not intend to argue that either 
Bosnian Croat or Bosniak nationalists are more or less blameworthy for the city’s 
postwar state of affairs. Instead, I focus on the Bosnian Croat regime because Mostar was 
the main object of their territorial desire. I argue that even though Bosnian Croat military 
forces failed to ethnically “cleanse” the entire city and make Mostar the capital of a 
homogeneous Bosnian Croat nation-state, they divided the city into two ethnic enclaves 
by demographically and spatially “cleansing” the territory of a socially constructed 
“other.” Then through institutionalized parallelism and the ethnicization of the landscape, 
nationalists and criminals consolidated their hold on the territory through politically, 
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socially, and culturally reinforcing the division of the city along an imagined boundary 
forged by war. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOSTAR BEFORE THE BOSNIAN WAR 
Mostar has been a strategically important point on trade routes since the Roman 
administration over the area because of the ability to cross the Neretva River. To cross 
the river, a wooden suspension bridge was built where Stari Most (Old Bridge) stands 
today – the contemporary symbol of the city and its main tourist attraction. There is no 
record of when this bridge was constructed or by whom. In 1468, the Ottoman Empire 
conquered the area and, in 1566, on orders from the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the 
Magnificent the wooden bridge was replaced by a new stone bridge, Stari Most. Mostar 
was under Ottoman rule, like the rest of the region, until the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation in 1878. During this period, Mostar grew from a minor river crossing into a 
significant trade hub. The older part of the city (Stari Grad) began to develop into an 
urban space focused around Stari Most and in this period, it gained its distinctive look, 
which borrows heavily from Ottoman and Dalmatian influences. While the city 
developed under Ottoman rule, the Ottoman Empire still lagged behind European powers 
in industrial development and the Vilayet of Bosnia was one of the empire’s least 
developed and most autonomous provinces.
126
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The Austro-Hungarian administration brought significant change to Mostar since 
it invested considerable resources into expanding the city to make it a base of regional 
administration. A construction project sought to expand upon the city’s core instead of 
replacing it. The old Ottoman portion of the city was left untouched and development 
focused on building around a new roundabout called the Rondo in the flat plain on the 
west side of the river. The administration built large government office buildings along a 
road connected to the Rondo and it constructed Mostar’s famous Old Gymnasium (Stara 
gimnasija) and Musala Square along another of the Rondo’s connecting roads. The 
Austro-Hungarian administration built broad avenues and instituted an urban grid system 
on the west side of the city, which gives it a different urban organization in comparison to 
Figure 2: A Comparison of Mostar from 1881 to 1918. (image: Pašić, Celebrating 
Mostar, 33 & 59). 
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the east side where streets are narrower and blocks are much smaller.
127
 The population 
of the city grew significantly from 11,727 people in 1879 to 16,392 in 1910. 
During the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on the other hand, the city 
languished and experienced very little development. In 1929, Prince Regent Alexander 
suspended the constitution, renamed the country the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and 
reorganized the states of the kingdom into banovinas in an attempt to break the power of 
nationalist states. The six oblasts that previously maintained the territorial integrity of 
BiH were broken into the Vrbas banovina centered in Banja Luka and the Drina banovina 
centered in Sarajevo. Other parts of BiH were distributed to banovinas controlled by 
cities in former oblasts outside the historic borders of BiH: Sava (Zagreb), Littoral 
(Split), and Zeta (Cetinje). Mostar became part of the Littoral banovina, but it was one of 
four cities in the banovina that held the status of an independent city. 
In 1939, Yugoslav Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Croat politician Vladko 
Maček made an agreement to set up a Banovina of Croatia, which consisted of the Sava 
and Littoral banovinas with parts of the Zeta and Danube banovinas. This agreement gave 
Croatians an ethnically-based autonomous state within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and a 
future territorial reference point for nationalists to create a Greater Croatia. When World 
War II expanded to Yugoslavia, BiH become part of the fascist Independent Croatian 
State (NDH), which had an Italian zone and a German zone. Mostar was an important 
city in the NDH and maintained an Office of Colonization that directed the ethnic 
cleansing efforts for the Croatian nationalist Ustasha movement. 
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After World War II, the SFRY established BiH as a socialist republic, placing 
Mostar back in BiH. During the socialist period, Mostar experienced enormous 
population growth as the city grew to about 76,000 people. This growth was a result of 
the SFRY’s industrial investment policies into the city. After World War II, Yugoslavia 
had a large displaced population because of the war and ethnic cleansing campaigns, and 
through industrialization the new Yugoslav government promoted mass urbanization and 
demographic change. According to Amir Pašić, the industrial base in Mostar was 
expanded with the construction of a metal-working factory, cotton textile mills, and an 
aluminium plant. Skilled workers, both men and women, entered the work force and the 
social and demographic profile of the city was broadened dramatically.
128
 Mostar drew 
workers through its numerous factories: “SOKO” (military aircraft factory), “Fabrika 
duhana Mostar” (tobacco industry), “Hepok” (food industry), “Aluminij” (aluminum 
factory), and APRO “Hercegovina” (food industry). 
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to 06/30/2003,” 29) 
 Bosniak % 
Bosnian 
Croat 
% 
Bosnian 
Serb 
% Other % Total 
Socially-
Owned 
4950 32.72% 4246 28.07% 3452 22.82% 2481 16.40% 15129 
Private 5416 37.32% 5711 39.35% 2766 19.06% 619 4.27% 14512 
Total 10366 34.97% 9957 33.59% 6218 20.98% 3100 10.46% 29641 
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To house the new workers, large residential blocks were built and the city was 
expanded on the west side. As can be seen in Table 1 above, there were more socially-
owned than private housing units in Mostar before the Bosnian War. Mostar was only 
one of a handful of municipalities in BiH that had more socially-owned than private 
housing units.
129
 The housing situation in Mostar and the fact that it became a divided 
city after the Bosnian War makes it a rather unique case in regard to postwar property 
restitution. First, unlike most of Bosnia, the complex situation of restituting socially-
owned apartments and the subsequent privatization of these apartments is more important 
to Mostar’s case. Second, Mostar being a divided city complicates the returnee decision 
process because they are able to move to a part of the city where they would be part of 
the ethnic majority, but still remain in the same urban area that they lived in before. IDPs 
from Mostar had the social ties to different parts of the city, allowing them to reestablish 
their livelihood, but necessarily in their former home. 
Before the Bosnian War, Mostar was a multiethnic city without a single majority 
ethnic group. Of the 76,000 citizens in the 1991 census, 34 percent of the residents 
declared themselves as Muslim, 29 percent as Croatian, and 19 percent as Serbian. While 
nationality numbers themselves do not indicate the multi-cultured nature of a city, Mostar 
had an unusually high percentage of its residents identifying themselves as Yugoslav – 15 
percent. The percent of people in BiH that declared themselves as Yugoslav was 5.5 
percent, which was higher than the countrywide percentage of 3.
130
 This high number of 
Yugoslavs correlated with the fact that a third of all marriages in the city before the war 
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were interethnic.
131
 Geographically, the ethnicities were dispersed. On the east bank, 
6,000 of the 30,000 residents were Croat, while 15,000 of the 45,000-plus residents on 
the west bank were Bosniaks. Also, there were large minorities of Serbs, Yugoslavs, and 
Jews scattered throughout the city.
132
 According to John Yarwood, “only in the Donja 
Mahala community did the Muslims constitute 60 per cent, only in Zahum did the Croats 
match that proportion.”133 While geographic ethnic pluralities and majorities existed in 
neighborhoods, the pre-Bosnian War city was hardly divided into geographically 
bounded ethnic enclaves. 
CREATING THE GEO-BODY 
On 25 June 1991, the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia initially declared 
independence from the SFRY.
134
 Even though fighting between military and 
paramilitaries forces representing Croatian and Serbian nationalist interests already began 
in late March 1991, the declaration escalated the fighting, expanding the conflict to 
eastern Slavonia and Dalmatia, which borders Herzegovina. Croatia, under the leadership 
of President Franjo Tudjman, cobbled together a defense force consisting of territorial 
units and certain police units that were elevated into a National Guard. There were also 
volunteer units formed by the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) called the Croatian Defense 
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Forces (HOS).
135
 Thousands of Herzegovinian Croats joined HOS units to fight in 
Croatia and BiH.
136
 Even though BiH was not in a state of war, armed skirmishes 
between Bosnian Croat paramilitary troops and the JNA began in BiH, particularly in 
Herzegovina, as Bosnian Croats attempted to frustrate the JNA’s use of BiH as a base to 
launch attacks against Croatia. This in turn led to political conflicts between Bosnian 
politicians and the JNA.  
On 5 March 1992, the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared 
independence from the SFRY. The declaration was made after a popular referendum 
where 99.7 percent voted in favor of independence; however, many Bosnian Serbs 
boycotted the referendum, resulting in only a 63.4 percent voter turnout. In anticipation 
of the referendum, on 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People in BiH 
proclaimed the existence of Republika Srpska, and declared that it would remain part of 
Yugoslavia.
137
 After BiH’s declaration of independence, fighting between cooperating 
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat military forces, and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and 
the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) quickly accelerated. 
Conceptualizing Geo-bodies 
With the war underway, the 16
th
 Assembly of Republika Srpska led by Radovan 
Karadžić outlined six strategic goals for the VRS, which were published in their Official 
Gazette on 12 May 1992. The goals were the creation of an ethnically clean Serb state in 
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BiH territory, the establishment of a corridor from Semberija to Krajina, the elimination 
of the border on the Drina River between Serb territories, the division of Sarajevo into 
Serb and Muslim parts, the establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva rivers 
(Mostar is on the Neretva River), and, finally, Serbian access to the sea.
138
 These six 
goals set the agenda for ethnic cleansing and conceptualized the borders of an ethnically 
homogeneous Serb state that Karadžić and his party, the Serbian Democratic Party in 
BiH, intended to create through the VRS’ military conquest. 
The leaders of the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH) also took 
similar measures to conceptualize a geo-body out of BiH municipalities with substantial 
Bosnian Croat populations. On 18 November 1991, a faction of the HDZ BiH leadership, 
meeting in Grude, established the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna as a “political, 
cultural, economic, and territorial union” of the Croats of BiH. This was intended as a 
“concrete response to the formation of Serbian autonomous regions” in Croatia.139 In 
Article 2 of the Statute of Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, the newly selected president of 
Herceg-Bosna and former communist official from Grude, established which 
municipalities were to be included in the proclaimed Herceg-Bosna nation state.
140
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Mostar was identified as the state’s capital.141 These municipalities formed the basis of 
the imagined borders of a Herceg-Bosna state.  
After BiH declared independence, HDZ BiH established the Croatian Defense 
Council (HVO) to defend against the JNA and the VRS. However, since HOS units and 
Croatian military units were already fighting against the JNA in BiH, the HVO had to 
compete with them for recruits. Many Bosnian Croats fought in HOS units at the 
beginning of the war in Croatia so the HOS had the advantage over the HVO in 
experience and capacity. The HSP was an openly neo-Ustasha Croatian party. Its leader, 
Dobroslav Paraga, endorsed the Croatian annexation of BiH into a common Croat and 
Muslim neo-Ustasha state, using the borders of the NDH as a baseline. While some HDZ 
BiH elites and the Tudjman government were willing to cooperate with Bosnian Serb 
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politicians to carve BiH into ethnic enclaves, the HSP opposed any deals with any 
Serbian representative.
142
 The HSP openly criticized Tudjman in the national and foreign 
press, stating that the Croatian government abandoned Vukovar. Since the Croatian 
government did not want the HSP to undermine any sort of partition pact made with the 
Serbian or Bosnian Serb government, Tudjman banned the party in Croatia in mid-
November 1991 and arrested Paraga; however, HOS units continued to operate in BiH.
143
 
At the beginning of March 1992, HOS units battled JNA units in Herzegovina and 
by April the Municipal Crisis Staff in Mostar stated that the JNA had partially occupied 
the city. The Municipal Crisis Staff consisted of the political leadership in the city along 
with representatives of military units. Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks formed a joint 
defense against the JNA under the command of the HVO. By mid-June 1992, the Bosnian 
Croat and Bosniak troops successfully defended the city, dislodging the JNA to the 
east.
144
 During this period, most of the city’s Bosnian Serb population either left or were 
held in HVO-run detention camps when Bosnian Croat and Bosniak forces took the 
city.
145
 Today, much of Mostar’s prewar Bosnian Serb population has still not returned 
and now lives in Bileja, Gacko, Nevesinje, and Trebinje (eastern Herzegovina/part of 
Republika Srpska).
146
 Even though many of these exiles still have IDP status, allowing 
them priority aid support for return, they have shown little to no interest in returning to 
Mostar when aid organizations have approached them. 
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The first siege saw the rise of a new military elite in Mostar that would infiltrate 
the politics between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks with the rise of Jadranko Topić (HVO 
commander), Mladen Naletilić (special unit commander), Mijo Brajković (HVO 
president), and Safet Oručević (Territorial Unit commander). Oručević, the only Bosniak 
of the list, previously worked in the upper management of SOKO and was involved in 
slot machine and pool hall businesses before the war.
147
 During the war, he became part 
of the east Mostar war presidency, positioning himself to be the postwar mayor of east 
Mostar. The rest of this list are Bosnian Croats who became politically and economically 
important in west Mostar. Topić, a local soccer star, became mayor of west Mostar 
during the war and he was replaced as mayor by Brajković, a former manager at 
Aluminij, after the war. Naletilić, an émigré, particularly rose to fame after the first siege 
as posters populated the city, claiming that he was the great defender of the city. The rise 
of this group of military leaders to prominent political positions in Mostar followed the 
general militarization of BiH’s political elite, but was also indicative of a significant 
change in the HDZ BiH leadership. 
The Break between the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak Coalition 
After the 1990 elections, HDZ BiH had a fairly moderate stance, but it also 
included individuals that held more nationalist positions. Stjepan Kljuić, the president of 
HDZ BiH after the elections, represented the moderate side of the party. Kljuić’s power 
base was in Sarajevo and central Bosnia and he “favoured retaining the multi-ethnic 
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character and territorial indivisibility of Bosnia” so he maintained strong ties with Alija 
Izetbegović and the Bosnian government in Sarajevo.148 Boban, the president of Herceg-
Bosna, represented a cadre of individuals that sought either the creation of a Bosnian 
Croat entity in BiH or the annexation of Bosnian territory to Croatia. Boban was a former 
communist whose power base was in Herzegovina, particularly in his hometown and 
Herceg-Bosna’s capital, Grude. He led a faction that acted on instructions from Tudjman 
and HDZ Croatia in Zagreb.
149
 However, this overt policy influence was reciprocal 
because of the very powerful Herzegovinian lobby in Tudjman’s government. 
Bosnian Croats from western Herzegovina tended to view themselves as victims 
under Tito’s regime.150 A notable expression of this view is the name of the largest 
professional Bosnian Croat unit operating in Mostar – the Convicts’ Battalion. It was 
named this “because it was organized by people who had been politically persecuted 
during the communist regime.”151 Its main founder, Naletilić, was born in Široki Brijeg, a 
small town in western Herzegovina, but lived in Germany where he “made a name for 
himself running clubs, casinos, and protection rackets.”152 There was a fine line between 
the politically persecuted and small-time criminals in these militias, particularly in the 
Convicts’ Battalion. For example, cofounder of Natelitić’s Convicts’ Battalion, Branko 
Sopta aka “Baja,” was an alleged prewar car thief around Dalmatia and during the war he 
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became the commander of the Baja Kraljević Anti-Terrorist Unit under the umbrella of 
the Convicts’ Battalion.153 
While these militias generally took a nationalist line, the HVO and special units 
still accepted people from other ethnicities and welcomed international mercenaries into 
their units. The most famous interethnic member was the notorious Bosniak gangster 
from Sarajevo, Jusuf Prazina aka “Juka.” Prazina led a multiethnic anti-terrorist unit 
called Samir Kafedžić Kruško under orders from Naletilić’s Convicts’ Battalion. Prazina 
specialized in racketeering during the 1980s, but when the siege of Sarajevo began, he 
transformed his gang into an important paramilitary force. However, because his men 
robbed, extorted, and abused civilians, eventually a warrant was issued for his arrest and 
he fled.
154
 He brought part of his gang to Mostar to join with Naletilić’s group in early 
1993. Prazina’s unit participated in the expulsion of Bosniaks from east Mostar and ran 
the notorious Heliodrom camp where they mistreated prisoners. 
The Herzegovinian Croats had a powerful lobby in Zagreb because of Gojko 
Šušak, the Croatian defense minister, Herzegovinian émigré, and childhood friend of 
Naletilić. Šušak was born in Široki Brijeg, but made a name for himself as a business 
man in Ottawa. Near the onset of the war in Croatia, he returned to Yugoslavia to become 
Croatia’s defense minister and arguably the second most powerful person in Croatia. 
Šušak was responsible for the rise of other Bosnian Croats from Herzegovina into the 
military elite. Ćesić, a Herzegovinian native and prewar bus driver, rose the military 
ranks because he was Šušak’s official driver. Slobodan Praljak aka “Brada,” (commonly 
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known as the man who ordered the destruction of Stari Most) was a former assistant to 
Šušak who rose to the position of major general in the Croatian armed forces even though 
he was a trained filmmaker before the war. These connections represented strong 
connections between the Croatian and Bosnian Croat government. In the ongoing war 
crime trial of Prilić, et al., the prosecution alleges that Tudjman, the Herzegovinian lobby 
in Croatia, and Herceg-Bosna’s leadership intended to recreate the 1939 Croatian 
Banovina through the Bosnian War.
155
 
The escalation of the war in Croatia and the spread of war to BiH began a process 
of radicalizing the HDZ BiH leadership through political intervention by HDZ Croatia. 
On 27 December 1991, the HDZ Croatia and HDZ BiH elite held a meeting in Zagreb. 
According to the ICTY, the meeting had two purposes: to discuss the future of BiH and 
to develop an overall Croatian political strategy. In the meeting, Kljuić argued in favor of 
Croats remaining in BiH while Boban argued that Herceg-Bosna should declare 
independence if BiH dissolved and would become part of Croatia if the Croatian 
government agreed to accession.
156
 In January 1992 when Kljuić “protested that Croats 
should loyally support the elected government of Alija Izetbegović and the territorial 
integrity of the republic,” Tudjman asserted his influence in order to force Kljuić to 
resign in February and have Boban replace him.
157
 The other major change in the HDZ 
BiH leadership that affected Mostar was the mayorship of Mostar. After the 1990 
elections, HDZ BiH won the vote in the city and named Milivoj Gagro as mayor. Many 
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saw Gagro as a moderate representative of the party; however, like Kljuić, by the summer 
of 1992 the new HDZ BiH leadership pushed him to resign, replacing him with Topić, 
one of the new military elite discussed above. 
After the successful defense of Mostar, on 9 August 1992 Naletilić led a HVO 
unit in the successful assassination of HOS’ Herzegovinian commander Blaž Kraljević (a 
Herzegovinian émigré from Australia) and eight of his staff.
158
 Without their main 
commander, the HOS units in Herzegovina disbanded and reformed in the HVO either 
directly under its command or indirectly as special units or so-called Anti-Terrorist Units. 
For example, during the second siege of Mostar Vinko Martinović, a former HOS soldier 
and postwar convicted war criminal, formed the Vinko Škrobo/Mrmak Anti-Terrorist 
Unit with members of his former HOS unit. While the unit held a section of the 
confrontation line under the Sector Mostar Town Defense, the unit was also part of 
Naletilić’s Convicts’ Battalion, which voluntarily accepted orders from the HVO. 
Herzegovinian Bosnian Croat elites formed Herzeg Bosna and the HVO out of 
personal networks of former communist party members, émigrés, business managers, and 
small-time criminals. Boban formed Herceg-Bosna with a number of former Communist 
party members: Vladimir Šoljić from Široki Brijeg, Valentin Ćorić from Čitluk, Pero 
Marković from Čapljina, and Jadranko Prlić – the former vice president of the Socialist 
Republic of BiH. Boban appointed Prlić to the position of President of the HVO on 14 
August 1992, but Prlić became the Prime Minister of Herceg-Bosna when Boban 
                                                 
158
 Ibid., 434. Bjelaković and Strazzari, 84. 
 69 
declared the formation of the republic.
159
 Boban initially appointed Ćorić, the prewar 
director of the Čitluk Bauxite Mines, to the position of Chief of the HVO Military Police 
Administration in April 1992 and he rose to the position of Herceg-Bosna’s Minister of 
the Interior on 20 November 1993.
160
 Šoljić and Marković also gained prominent 
positions in the government of Herceg-Bosna from which they would use to extract the 
economic wealth of Herzegovina. The nationalist and anti-communist émigrés and 
criminals discussed above along with members of the commercial sector, such as 
Brajković who was a manager at “Aluminij,” worked together with these former 
members of the communist party. This led to the creation of a large network of Bosnian 
Croats mostly from Herzegovina that fought together during the Bosnian War, but this 
network began to fragment after the war as the rush to colonize economic resources 
accelerated. 
Before the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks military forces engaged in armed 
conflict, there were two peace plans that were negotiated to end the fighting: the 
Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan and the Vance-Owen Plan. From February to May 1992, 
negotiations between the ethnic leaders were conducted under the auspices of the EU 
peace conference. These negotiations resulted in the Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan, 
which attempted to maintain BiH as a state with constituent units divided along ethnic 
lines. The Bosnian Croat delegation found the constitutional provisions acceptable, but 
did not agree with the map, which did not include Mostar as a part of the Bosnian 
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Croatian unit.
161
 On 2 January 1993, the Vance-Owen plan was proposed to the 
combatants. The plan would have created a very decentralized state where provincial 
governments had more government duties and power than the federal state. The Bosnian 
Croat delegation quickly accepted the plan because of the favorable size of the Bosnian 
Croat provinces. However, the Bosniak delegation balked at the concept of a significantly 
decentralized state and the Bosnian Serb delegation found the map extremely 
unappealing since they would have to relinquish military control of a significant amount 
of territory that they had won on the battlefield and “ethnically cleansed.”162  
According to the ITCY, Mate Boban signed the Vance-Owen Plan for the HZ 
BIH on 2 January 1993 and “despite knowing that the other parties had not signed…the B 
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H Croats attempted to implement the Vance Owen Plan unilaterally.”163 Bosniaks either 
left or were dismissed from HVO units and went to join the Bosniak-led Army of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. By mid-April 1993, the HVO and the Army of BiH forces were 
engaged in an armed conflict in central Bosnia. On 9 May 1993, the HVO launched their 
first attack against the Army of BiH and Bosniaks in Mostar and began to ethnically 
“cleanse” west Mostar. The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the HVO and 
Herceg-Bosna declared that Bosniaks from eastern BiH must leave Mostar by 9 May, 
expelling approximately 10,000 Bosniak IDPs and refugees.
164
 HVO units rounded up 
approximately 1,800 Bosniaks in west Mostar and detained them at Bijeli Brijeg Stadium 
and the Heliodrom.
165
 When many of the detainees were released, they found their 
residences had been looted of all their personal belongings.
166
 While there are no 
estimates for the number of Bosniaks expelled from west Mostar, population estimates of 
east Mostar indicate that its population increased from approximately 30,000 to 55,000 
after 29 June 1993, which most believe was caused by expellees.
167
 The ICTY declared 
that these actions were part of a conscious effort by the HVO and Herceg-Bosna to 
ethnically “cleanse” west Mostar and then the entire city.168 
During these expulsions, the government of Herceg-Bosna seized the expellees’ 
housing, which Herceg-Bosna then allocated to HVO soldiers and Bosnian Croat 
civilians. According to the ICTY, the Herceg-Bosna and HVO officials placed a legal 
stamp on this by allowing Bosniaks to leave west Mostar “only if they signed a statement, 
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required by the Herceg-Bosna/HVO authorities, that they ‘voluntarily’ relinquished all of 
their belongings to the HVO.”169 Herceg-Bosna commonly expelled Bosniaks from west 
Mostar, Stolac, and Čapljina to territories held by the Army of BiH in east Mostar or 
Blagaj. They also released thousands of Bosniak prisoners detained at the Heliodrom, 
Vojno, Ljubuški and Dretelj camps if they agreed to leave BiH and be deported to Croatia 
as a transit point to other refugee-receiving countries.
170
 The HVO and anti-terrorist units 
committed various crimes against prisoners, including forced labor, abuse, torture, rape, 
murder and use as a human shield in the battlefield.
171
 The prosecution at the ICTY even 
accused Naletilić of requisitioning prisoners to help construct his fortress villa and pool 
in Široki Brijeg.172 
Along with the attempt to expel Bosniaks from Mostar, the HVO and Herceg-
Bosna sought to expel Bosniak culture and symbols in a process some have termed as 
urbicide.
173
 After the two sieges, ninety percent of the center of Mostar was damaged and 
a third of its buildings were completely destroyed.
174
 According to a report by Andras 
Riedlmayer for the ICTY, 255 mosques, 92% of the total surveyed in BiH, were heavily 
damaged or completely destroyed.
175
 The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and 
Culture in Istanbul noted that almost all of the mosques in Mostar were totally destroyed 
and not all of these mosques were in the line of fire.
176
 Military units cleared many 
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Bosniak symbols from HVO-held territory. For example, during the war, HVO troops 
dynamited the Derviš-paša Bajezidagi Mosque near the Franciscan Church on the west 
side of the Boulevard.
177
 They also, during the initial expulsion of Bosniaks, dynamited 
the Baba Besir Mosque and Hadži Ali-Beg Lafo Mosque – both in west Mostar.178 
Bosniak buildings were not the only ones targeted by troops. The JNA shelled, and in 
most cases destroyed, the Church of St Peter and St Paul, the Bishop’s Palace, the 
Catholic Cathedral, and numerous smaller churches. The European Union Administration 
of Mostar (EUAM) estimated that Mostar sustained DM400 million in damages, 
excluding new industrial estates, nearby villages, and historical monuments.
179
 The 
destruction of symbols of other ethnicities was a significant part of the ethnic cleansing 
process. 
According to Yarwood, Croat leaders believed that Mostar would be their state’s 
only major city and the state would not be viable without it.
180
 Mostar became the 
cornerstone to building a Bosnian Croat state out of BiH, and the Bosnian Croat 
leadership emphasized the importance of consolidating control of the entire city through 
ethnic “cleansing.” The process of removing Bosniak people and culture from west 
Mostar was significant because the identity of the territory could then be defined in terms 
of the absence of Bosniaks’ physical and symbolic presence. In Ray Cashman’s study of 
Irish nationalism, he found that in rural Northern Ireland the known absence of an object 
became an unmarked symbol for nationalists. One example he found was the Lough 
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House, which was perceived as a symbol of Protestant domination. The IRA blew up the 
Lough House in 1971 and now the space has significance to nationalists because of the 
building’s absence.181 Similarly, the absence of Bosniak people and culture in west 
Mostar was significant because it identified the territory as mono-ethnic and a space 
where other cultures and societies are not. 
WARTIME PROPERTY REGIMES 
During the Bosnian War, there were two de facto property regimes that affected 
Mostar: Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of BiH. Both regimes passed laws on abandoned 
property so they could reallocate property to displaced persons in order officially to cope 
with the wartime housing shortage, which was considerable, and unofficially to reward 
soldiers and functionaries. Over the course of the war, over a third of the housing units in 
BiH were damaged to some degree
182
 and half of the prewar population was displaced 
abroad or domestically.
183
 At first, authorities intended that the laws manage the housing 
needs of displaced persons and soldiers. However, over time, amendments to these laws 
sought to consolidate the territorial gains of the new ethnocratic regimes. A study of 
Mostar allows for an analysis of both regimes’ methods of consolidating territory through 
the power over land administration, i.e. property redistribution. 
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In 1992, the government of the Republic of BiH passed the “Law on Abandoned 
Apartments,” which concerned the temporary revocation and reallocation of occupancy 
rights over socially-owned apartments. According to the law, prewar occupancy right 
holders temporarily lost their right of use if an apartment was temporarily not occupied or 
abandoned after 30 April 1991.
184
 The law gave the authority to Municipal Housing 
Offices to declare an apartment abandoned and to redistribute it to a temporary 
occupancy right holder, normally displaced persons or soldiers in the Army of BiH. Even 
though the law gave beneficiaries a temporary occupancy right that was supposed to last 
for only a year after the end of the “direct war danger,” amendments to the law privileged 
the right of the temporary occupant over the right of the prewar occupancy right holder. 
The amendments set vague criteria for the repossession of property. The main 
criterion was that if a displaced person had not returned to their property within seven 
days after the declaration of the end of the “State of War,” Municipal Housing Offices 
would cancel their occupancy right. In the case of refugees, they had 15 days to return to 
their property. Besides this ridiculously short time limit placed upon occupancy right 
holders who had significant problems with freedom of movement in postwar BiH, the end 
of the “State of War” was not published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of BiH 
until seven days after the Presidency’s official proclamation on 22 December 1995. Also, 
this new amendment to the law was added only months before the conflict ended so many 
did not even know about the time stipulation. However, even if a person was actually 
able to get to their property within the imposed time limit, the law and its amendments 
did not outline a procedure for removing the temporary occupant or even officially 
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repossessing the property. This rendered physical repossession impossible in practice if a 
temporary right holder occupied the apartment, especially since the law contradictorily 
gave temporary occupants a year to vacate. 
In 1993, the Republic of BiH proclaimed the “Decree with the Force of Law on 
Temporarily Abandoned Real Property under Private Ownership during the State of War 
or the State of Immediate War Danger.” Similarly, this decree gave Municipal Housing 
authorities the power to allocate private property that was abandoned after 30 April 1991 
to temporary occupancy right holders who were allowed to live there for a year after the 
end of the “State of War” was declared. Amendments allowed for the extension of the 
temporary usage right upon the temporary occupants’ request. Also, like the “Law on 
Abandoned Apartments,” there was no outlined recourse for prewar property owners to 
repossess their property. Even though the wartime property legislation provided for 
exemptions in case of the occupant’s fear of ethnic cleansing by “aggressor” forces, in 
practice the term “aggressor” forces did not apply to the Army of BiH, effectively 
stripping this protective exemption from Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
185
 
In 1993, Herceg-Bosna passed an inclusive “Decree on Deserted Apartments,” 
which dealt with both socially-owned and private property. The decree allowed the 
Municipal Council to declare a socially-owned or private housing unit abandoned if it 
was not occupied for an unspecified amount of time after 30 April 1992. Also, the 
Minister for Infrastructure Planning, Construction, and Environmental Protection as a 
second instance authority could declare a housing unit to be abandoned if the Municipal 
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Council did not render a decision. Similarly, amendments sought to empower the rights 
of the wartime occupant over those of the prewar right holder. In practice, the Logistics 
Department of the HVO under the command of Slezak directed the allocation of housing 
in Mostar.  After the war, this function was mainly operated by veteran associations in 
the city. 
Nationalists also manipulated the prewar “Law on Housing Relations” to legalize 
the ethnic redistribution of property. The law stated that the occupancy right holders of 
socially-owned property would lose their rights if the property was unoccupied for more 
than six months. However, there were exceptions to the rule called “justified grounds,” 
such as temporary work abroad, military service, and education, which housing 
authorities during and after the Bosnian War ignored in most cases. Also, according to 
the law, in the case that a cancellation of a usage right was enforced, the allocation right 
holder was obligated to provide a different accommodation to the former occupancy right 
holder. However, the housing officials never exercised this part of the law so if this 
manipulation of the law was not challenged, people would have to move to a UNHCR-
operated collective center.
 186
 
At times, local housing officials would use this law by claiming that war activities 
did not occur in the area and therefore the danger of war was not a legitimate ground for 
temporarily abandoning a property.
187
 According to Rhodri Williams, the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to BiH (OSCE) recorded about 3,000 of 
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these cases in Mostar alone.
188
 It is unclear from her text if this use of the “Law on 
Housing Relations” occurred during open hostilities in Mostar or if they were applied 
after to further legitimize the seizure of property under the abandoned apartment laws. 
Regardless, these cases represent roughly 42% of the social-owned apartment restitution 
cases in Mostar.
189
 The prewar socialist laws and the vague definition of social ownership 
played a large role in the territorial consolidation of Mostar by “permanently” 
reallocating abandoned property by shifting the authority from wartime laws that granted 
temporary rights to established prewar laws that could permanently reallocate usage 
rights. Beyond satisfying the housing needs of IDPs and soldiers, the abandoned property 
laws also gave people with powerful political connections an avenue to grab the best 
property. These individuals came to be known as domicile upgraders and they became the 
center of multiple/double occupancy cases. In Mostar, there were at least 1,300 
individuals who reported cases of double occupancy.
190
 These cases really demonstrate 
the criminal nature of ethnic cleansing as it allowed people to upgrade their social and 
fiscal status through violent force. 
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CONSOLIDATING THE CITY 
Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a ceasefire 
agreement called the Washington Agreement on 1 March 1994,
191
 which established the 
basis of the future Federation of BiH (FBiH), which now consists of ten fairly 
autonomous cantons.
192
 Following the Washington Agreement, Bosnian Croat and 
Bosniak representatives signed the Geneva Memorandum of Agreement on Mostar on 5 
May 1994, which established the local government of Mostar under the auspices of the 
EU Administration of Mostar (EUAM). The EUAM supervised the local government and 
spearheaded the significant rebuilding process in Mostar, which was one of the most 
damaged cities in BiH. The agreement established a number of agreed goals for Mostar 
and the EUAM: create a unified police force, establish freedom of movement across the 
confrontation line, create suitable conditions for the return of refugees and IDPs, establish 
an elected council of a unified city, and reconstruct buildings and infrastructure.
193
 The 
memorandum divided the city into six city-municipalities, which the EUAM supervised. 
The city-municipalities were divided along ethnic lines: three for the Bosnian Croat west 
side (Southwest, South, and West) and three for the Bosniak east side (Old Town, 
Southeast, and North). 
The European Union appointed Hans Koschnick, a former mayor of Bremen, as 
the Chief Administrator and established the EUAM’s base of operations at Hotel Ero 
along the confrontation line. The EUAM managed to make significant inroads on the 
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reconstruction of Mostar, committing DM270 million to the effort. However, tensions 
between the sides remained high. After the city’s first postwar elections in the summer of 
1996, the EUAM transferred power to the Office of the Special Envoy for Mostar 
(OSEM), but by that time the EUAM only had semi-realized its reconstruction and 
freedom of movement goals. At the beginning of 1997 the OSEM was transformed into 
the new Office of the High Representative for BiH (OHR) regional office in Mostar. 
Interim Statute Agreement & Parallel Structures 
From the beginning of the fragile peace, the two ethnocratic regimes sought to 
consolidate their power. The Bosniak side sought to unify the city due to their superior 
advantage in population, and the Bosnian Croat side sought to institutionalize the 
wartime border along the Boulevard.
194
 These postwar stances switched in 2002 when 
new population estimates demonstrated that the Bosnian Croat side had gained the 
population advantage. However, before then, the Bosniak side was seen as more willing 
to work with the IC because both of them sought the unification of Mostar. The EUAM’s 
goal of unifying the city brought it into frequent confrontation with Bosnian Croat side. 
Only two months into the EUAM’s mandate, an unidentified person fired a rocket-
propelled grenade at Koschnick’s bedroom. Luckily, he was at the bar of Hotel Ero 
having a drink at the time.
195
 The EU directed Koschnick to establish the Interim Statute 
for the City of Mostar. As part of the statute, the EUAM tried to create a Central Zone, 
which would be administered by the EUAM and was intended to be a shared, neutral 
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space where Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks could interact to reestablish relations. The 
Central Zone was a major point of contention in negotiations because the sides could not 
agree on its size and borders. The argument was not just over the percentage of the city, 
but specific symbolic and economic sites, such as the Liska Street cemetery, the water 
facilities, the bus station, and the Old Gymnasium.
196
 
After a number of failed negotiations to establish the Interim Agreement, 
Koschnick issued an order on 7 February 1996 to establish unilaterally the boundaries of 
the city-municipalities, which included a large Central Zone. Because of the plan, 
Brajković, the postwar mayor of west Mostar, announced that “the Croat side was 
breaking off all relations with the EU” and called for a demonstration at the EUAM 
office at Hotel Ero. Approximately 150 protesters laid siege to the EUAM offices and 
trapped Koschnick in his car for an hour, threatening to lynch him.
197
 This led to an 
emergency EU meeting in Rome on 18 February where delegations signed the Rome 
Agreement, which outlined the Interim Statute and a smaller Central Zone. In the 
agreement, the Central Zone included the Old Gymnasium and bus station, but not the 
water facilities or Liska Street cemetery. This cemetery was a missed opportunity for the 
Central Zone because it was a unique creation from the Bosnian War that contained both 
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat graves, making it a rare shared symbol of wartime suffering 
by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in Mostar.
198
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The Interim Statute was intended to counteract the ethnic territorial division of the 
city with complex power-sharing structures. However, as Florian Bieber argues, these 
structures only institutionalized ethnic divisions, instead of neutralizing them.
199
 Political 
parties manipulated the agreement’s ethnic quota system to consolidate control. For 
example, the mayor and deputy mayor posts were supposed to be divided with one being 
Bosnian Croat and the other Bosniak, but instead of sharing responsibilities, they only 
governed their respective sides.
200
 Because of the threat of violence, the EU backed down 
from asserting a possibly more beneficial statute and in doing so undermined its 
credibility and power in Mostar, leading to Koschnick’s eventual resignation.  The 
political structure that this statute created had serious effects on the city’s economic 
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Figure 5: Map of the Central Zone (left) and the City-Municipalities (right) of Mostar. 
On the City-Municipalities map, the city-municipalities are as follows: 1. North 
municipality, 2. Old Town (Stari Grad) municipality, 3. Southeast municipality, 4. South 
municipality, 5. Southwest municipality, and 6. West municipality. Municipalities 1-3 
were Bosniak and municipalities 4-6 were Bosnian Croat. (image: Yarwood, 113) 
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recovery and ethnicized the city’s infrastructure. The statute’s legacy has frustrated the 
IC’s attempts to truly unify Mostar. Beyond the economic costs, this decentralized, 
paralleled political structure allowed the city-municipalities to divide the city’s 
infrastructure through ethnic alliances, reinforcing the division along the Boulevard. 
The most visible example of these ethnic alliances was the “Union of Croat 
Municipalities,” which the HDZ BiH declared in June 1996 during Mostar’s first postwar 
election. Even though the union was allegedly disbanded after pressure from the OHR in 
1997, Sumantra Bose saw cultural events being advertised under the auspices of the 
Union of Croat Municipalities in 2000.
201
 The water supply company among other utility 
companies was divided along ethnic lines by the war. Supposedly, the water companies 
were unified through mediation and financial investments by the World Bank. But, there 
still were different bills for west and east Mostar in 2003, indicating that the systems 
were operated separately. Other utilities, such as waste disposal and electricity, had 
similar ethnic divisions, leading to mismanagement and corruption.
202
 The provision of 
electricity at the time of writing is still divided. During my research in Mostar in 
February 2012, I was caught in a snow storm and two days later a windstorm knocked out 
the power on the east side, which is where I was staying. Luckily for me, I was able to go 
to the west side where their electricity was still running. Interestingly, the division of 
electricity is ethnic as the dividing line runs along the confrontation line and not the 
Neretva River, which could be a logical grid division. According to Sheelagh Brady, an 
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international audit of Elektroprivreda Mostar (Mostar’s electric company) revealed that 
the company helped bankroll the HDZ.
203
 These alliances and ethnic divisions allowed 
politicians to consolidate and maintain ethnic control over resources and provided 
structures for organized crime networks to reap the benefits from divided polities. 
Territorializing Space 
The divided ethnic enclaves looked to the capitals of their imagined communities 
– Zagreb for Bosnian Croats and Sarajevo for Bosniaks – for cultural symbols and 
infrastructure to use to territorialize space. After the Washington Agreement, there was a 
police station for each city-municipality and there was little communication between the 
Bosnian Croat stations and the Bosniak stations. The Bosniak police forces would send 
autopsies, blood samples, and DNA tests to Sarajevo, while the Bosnian Croat police 
forces would send theirs to Split, Croatia. The police officers wore different national 
symbols on their uniforms even though the OHR decreed that police stations should only 
display symbols of the FBiH. While the Bosniak officers followed orders from Sarajevo 
wearing the FBiH symbols, the Bosnian Croat officers would display the Sahovnica, the 
red and white checkered state emblem of Croatia.
204
 Until 2000, the two sides commonly 
used two different currencies, representing two separate monetary spaces. Bose observed 
in the late 1990s that west Mostar used the Croatian Kuna and east Mostar used the 
common Bosnian currency, the convertible mark (KM), which was created in 1998.
205
 In 
education, the two sides had separate curricula. Bosnian Croat students in west Mostar 
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used textbooks from Croatia, while Bosniak students in east Mostar used textbooks from 
Sarajevo. The content contained noticeable nationalist viewpoints, especially regarding 
subjects like history and interpretations of the Bosnian War. Besides the separation of 
content, the schools were segregated demographically, necessitating east Mostar to build 
seven temporary secondary schools to handle all of its students.
206
 These separations by 
ethnicity reinforced the territorial division of the city and gave validity to the residents’ 
mental maps. 
While ethnic expulsions occurred around BiH after the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agremetn, most of them were linked to violent episodes of postwar ethnic tension. 
Mostar is one of the unique cases where regular, significant ethnic expulsions continued 
for years after there was putatively peace in the city and even while the city was under 
direct international supervision. Even though Mostar was under the EUAM, in practice 
the administration was too weak politically to enforce much of its mandate, much less 
create an atmosphere where people could actually return to their prewar homes or 
sufficiently protect them from expulsion. Yarwood and international observers reported 
that ethnic expulsions from west Mostar still occurred for a few years after the 
Washington Agreement.
207
 According to a 2000 report by the International Crisis Group, 
over 100 non-Bosnian Croat families were expelled from the west side after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was signed.
208
 The report argues that this was possible because of a 
combination of HDZ political power and international disorganization to confront that 
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power.
209
 Often the IC was more concerned with placating political forces to avoid the 
resumption of hostilities than with imposing agreements to which all parties agreed. 
In Mostar, the most significant postwar expulsion occurred after the Liska Street 
cemetery incident. As mentioned above, the EUAM and the representatives of the east 
side wanted to include this wartime cemetery in the Central Zone, but in the end the IC 
conceded to the west side’s demands for it to be included in the Southwest Municipality. 
On the afternoon of 10 February 1997, Mufti Seid Smajkić and east Mostar mayor 
Oručević led a group of 100-200 Bosniaks in an attempt to visit graves at the Liska Street 
cemetery during Bajram. A group of 15 plain-clothed and uniformed Bosnian Croat 
police officers blocked the visitors from visiting the cemetery and began threatening 
them. The official reason for the blockade was that Bosnian Croats were celebrating 
carnival at the Rondo, which is located near the cemetery, so authorities wanted to keep 
the parties separated to ensure that a disruption did not occur. After verbal threats and the 
throwing of objects, shots were fired, killing one person and injuring 19 others.
210
 
Unfortunately, these visitors did not have any international protection even though they 
informed the International Police Task Force beforehand. Oddly a Spanish division of the 
task force was present at the site earlier in the day, but for unexplained reasons left 
shortly before the crowd of Bosniaks arrived. During the night following the incident, 23 
Bosniak families were evicted from west Mostar and an additional 25 Bosniak families 
who were visiting relatives on the east side were not allowed to return to their homes on 
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the west side.
211
 Expulsions such as these demonstrated that without unified international 
pressure and enforcement postwar Bosnia would continue to experience “war by other 
means.” 
Politicians in Mostar attempted to culturally, politically, and socially colonize the 
space that was “cleansed” by war to attach an ethnic identity to the territory. The most 
visible example of this attempt in Herzegovina is the numerous Catholic crosses that 
mark the landscape. These crosses, which were constructed after the war, are intended to 
emphasize Bosnian Croats’ claim to the territory that was once called Herceg-Bosna 
because the crosses declare it to be “Croat/Catholic space.”212 Mostar is also part of this 
process with arguably the most provocative cross in Herzegovina, the Jubilee Cross on 
the top of Mount Hum, which was erected officially to celebrate the millennium. The 
Jubilee Cross is an imposing symbol that can be seen from most of Mostar. The erection 
of this cross also might have been an attempt to rejuvenate a waning Bosnian Croat 
electorate and nationalist zeal for the HDZ party since this occurred at the beginning of 
the Croat Crisis of 2000-2001.  
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During the reconstruction process, Bosnian Croats substantially used Catholic 
symbols synonymously with Croat identity. Considering that the destruction of religious 
spaces was tied to the process of ethnic “cleansing” in BiH, many of the Catholic 
buildings in Mostar had to be rebuilt. While the simple reconstruction of a previous 
object should not cause problems, the ethnic communities typically rebuilt buildings 
“bigger and better.” The most notable example in Mostar is the bell tower of the 
Franciscan Church. The church incurred significant damage during the first siege by the 
JNA and the VRS, and only the exterior walls and the bell tower remained intact. Before 
reconstruction, the church was on the Provisional List of potential National Monuments 
of BiH; however, the reconstructed church differed so much from the original that it was 
removed from the list. The most significant change was the height of the bell tower, 
which originally was around 30 meters tall, but the “reconstructed” tall is 107.2 meters 
tall. This makes it the tallest bell tower of the “Croatian people,” exceeding the Zagreb 
Figure 6: Comparison of the Bell Tower of the Franciscan Church Before the War in 
1981 and After Reconstruction in 2006 (image: Makaš, 262). 
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Cathedral’s bell tower by one meter.213 Obviously, the people attached to the project 
purposefully transformed it into the tallest tower as a declaration of their Croat-ness. 
Along with this project, the “recreation” of other Catholic buildings has been significant 
to Bosnian Croat expression of identity and marking the territory as Bosnian Croat. 
An example of the Bosnian Croat use of Catholic symbols as an equivalent for 
Croatian identity is the HVO Monument. Officially, it is named the “Monument to the 
Fallen Croat Defenders in the Homeland War” (Spomenik poginulih hrvatskim 
braniteljima u Domovinskom ratu). While the name does not exclusively mention the 
HVO, most of the “Croat defenders” in the Bosnian War were part of or funded by the 
HVO and the monument commonly has been “used for ceremonies and events associated 
with HVO veterans and losses.”214 The monument is a block that has a carved-out cross 
that runs from the front to the back with three women holding a “fallen soldier” on the 
sides. These are the only symbols on the monument. Obviously, the women and soldier 
represent the fallen soldiers and the pain of war, but the cross is the only symbol that 
could mark the monument as a Croat monument, which the name of the monument 
declares. Since there are mainly only Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in Mostar, crosses in 
that space can be safely interpreted as a Bosnian Croat symbol. 
Within a few years of signing the Washington Agreement, the HDZ BiH 
attempted a few construction projects along the wartime confrontation line to mark the 
border. At the heart of the confrontation line is Brotherhood and Unity Square (Trg 
Bratstva-Jedinstva), which is now called Spanish Square, where the Old Gymnasium and 
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the prewar “HIT” department store were located. Herceg-Bosna established a 
Commission for Building a Croatian National Theatre headed by Brajković and began 
constructing a theatre on the location of the department store in 1996. At the first the 
project was stalled because of funding issues, but in 2002 it was halted because it was not 
properly acquired from the prewar owner.
215
 Another project was the construction of a 
new Catholic Cathedral called the Church of Christ’s Resurrection along the wartime 
border, which the EUAM stopped in February 1996 after complaints from the Islamic 
community.
216
 Beyond the construction of buildings, west Mostar changed the name of 
almost every street in its territory in the main urban center, mostly using names related to 
famous Croat historical figures,
217
 Catholic clergy,
218
 members of the Ustasha,
219
 or 
places in Croatia.
220
 
Even though manipulating reconstruction is more evident in west Mostar, the 
Islamic Community also attempted to colonize space to emphasize their claim to 
territory, but in a less confrontational manner. As mentioned earlier, most of the mosques 
were destroyed in Mostar. All of them in east Mostar have been rebuilt; however, by 
2002 there were thirty-eight mosques in east Mostar compared to the sixteen in the 
1980s.
221
 The significant increase in the number of mosques is because Islamic 
communities gave money to rebuild mosques that were either damaged or abandoned 
before the Bosnian War. Like the bell tower, mosques have generally been rebuilt with 
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slightly larger and more ostentatious minarets.
222
 Neziraga Mosque was rebuilt in Stari 
Grad in 1999. However, the mosque was not there immediately before the war because it 
was demolished in 1950 after receiving some damage during World War II.
223
 The east 
Mostar government restored the land to the Islamic Community in order to rebuild the 
mosque. This is an example of using political power unilaterally to recreate different 
historical moments for property restitution in select cases. The increased number and size 
of mosques was part of east Mostar’s attempt to control the skyline and assert their 
identity upon the cityscape. 
Factions 
After the early divisive politics during the Bosnian War, the Bosnian Croat 
regime under the leadership of HDZ BiH was fairly unified behind its growing 
Herzegovinian elite throughout the war. However, after the signing of the Washington 
Agreement, fractures in the Bosnian Croat leadership grew as the leadership tackled how 
to handle to the postwar situation in regard to the FBiH and groups argued over the 
economic spoils of war. Three Bosnian Croat factions developed early in the postwar 
period, representing different economic and political agendas. Since Mostar was the 
capital of the Bosnian Croat ethnocratic regime, many of the factional disputes occurred 
in the city, particularly west Mostar. The Bosniak regime, on the other hand, was 
regionally fractured during the Bosnian War and this arrangement continued in the 
postwar period as different factions worked together under the Party for Democratic 
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Action (SDA) umbrella by maintaining their own territories. So, in Mostar, the SDA 
party led by Oručević ran the city with little interference from Sarajevo. 
After signing the Washington Agreement, Boban stepped down from the HDZ 
BiH presidency and was given a high-ranking position in the Croatian state oil 
company.
224
 Krešimir Zubak, a Bosnian Croat politician from Doboj, replaced Boban in 
the HDZ BiH presidency, and Pero Marković became the unofficial president of Herceg-
Bosna. Even though the Washington Agreement stipulated that Herceg-Bosna would be 
dismantled within 30 days of signing the agreement, Herceg-Bosna and its institutions 
continued to exist semi-secretly for years. After the war, the prewar payment bureaus, 
which managed “socially owned resources through monopoly control of the financial 
sector,” were split into three ethnically-based institutions in BiH.225 The payment bureau 
of Herceg-Bosna (ZAP) controlled all official economic activity. Herceg-Bosna 
maintained separate public utilities and social services. It regularly met to discuss budget 
and fiscal policy and review socially-owned companies and social funds.
226
 Even Bosnian 
Croat enclaves in mixed cantons paid taxes and social security contributions to Mostar 
instead of the FBiH. Since so much power was centralized, Herceg-Bosna was prone to 
factional competition. 
The leadership in east Mostar mostly was united behind its postwar mayor 
Oručević. After the war, he became the postwar mayor of east Mostar because of his 
wartime political positioning. Through this position, Oručević acquired numerous 
                                                 
224
 Grandits, 110. 
225
 European Stability Initiative, “Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian 
Power Structures,” 1999, 5. 
226
 Ibid., 8. 
 93 
properties in Mostar and Blagaj as the owner or co-owner. However, the full extent of his 
holdings is unknown because he was not “required to file an assets card because he left 
office before the law requiring them took effect.”227 Since the main leadership of SDA in 
Sarajevo had little to do with the defense of the city and the Bosniak leadership and the 
IC agreed on unifying Mostar, Oručević had free reign to run his part of the city with 
little interference. 
West Mostar, on the other hand, was marked with considerably more factionalism 
because Mostar was the HDZ BiH administrative center. Grandits delineates three main 
Bosnian Croat factions divided according to three major banks in west Mostar after the 
war. First, Hrvatska Banka Mostar, which was founded in 1992, was the main bank 
where Croatia funneled money into Herzegovina. Hannes Grandits explains that “after 
these financial flows were re-routed to the Hercegovačka Banka in 1999, Hrvatska Banka 
Mostar came to represent economic rather than political centres of power in Croat 
Herzegovina.”228 According to news reports from Croatia, this bank was connected to the 
economic interests of Prlić, Slezak, Marijan Primorac, and Niko Dodig.229 Discussion of 
these individuals is mostly absent from international reports and academic research on 
postwar Bosnian Croat politics because they mostly tried to avoid confrontation with the 
IC. However, they used their postwar positions gained through the war to increase their 
wealth significantly. After the war, Prlić became the BiH Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
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chairman of the board of “INA” oil company. He used his contacts with Primorac 
(wartime cigarette producer and smuggler, postwar bank director) and Dodig (owner of 
an oil trading company) and his postwar financial assets to acquire numerous businesses 
through privatization, amassing a fortune estimated at $1.3 billion.
230
 Also, Slezak used 
his wartime contacts that he gained as the HVO Chief of Logistics to “win” contracts for 
his postwar construction company, “Interinvest,” which became a formidable 
construction giant. 
The second most powerful bank was Dubrovačka Banka Mostar, which was 
established when Dubrovačka Banka in Dubrovnik, under threat of collapse, transferred 
large sums of money to Mostar in 1998. This bank represented the interests of Zubak, 
Bruno Stojić (a former Herceg-Bosna Minister of Defense), and Božo Ljubić (a doctor 
from Široki Brijeg). This group worked within the HDZ BiH leadership, but they took a 
more pro-FBiH stance than other factions. By 1997, Ljubić and Zubak had serious roles 
at the FBiH and BiH levels. They were the FBiH Minister of Health and the Bosnian 
Croat member of the BiH presidency, respectively. When this faction became isolated in 
the party, some of them broke away from the HDZ BiH and began their own Bosnian 
Croat opposition parties. 
The most powerful bank in Mostar was Hercegovačka Banka, which was formed 
in late 1997 by a hard-line group of former HVO members called the generals’ or “Široki 
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Brijeg” faction. The bank was created in response to Zubak appointing the moderate, pro-
FBiH candidate Ljubić to be his successor as president of HDZ BiH. The key members of 
the generals’ faction can be deduced from the list of registered founding partners of 
Hercegovačka Banka.231 Sopta was the bank’s first director and he made a fortune as the 
postwar owner of the large “Soldo” construction complex in Široki Brijeg. Ćesić and 
Ante Jelavić (wartime colleagues at the HVO’s Grude logistic center and co-founders of 
“Monitor” construction company), Ivan Medić (a member of the board of “Monitor” and 
“Cro-benz”), Dragan Čović (director of “SOKO”), Šoljić, Zdenko Kordić (dean of the 
university in Mostar) and members of the Franciscan order formed a majority in the 
bank’s management board. 
The elite of these factions amassed significant wealth during the postwar period 
by using their wartime positions to acquire BiH economic and natural resources and to 
start or take over businesses to exploit these resources. However, even though there were 
antagonistic factions, the factions themselves were not homogeneous and consisted of 
individuals with different agendas and levels of engagement. The two main veteran’s 
associations in west Mostar after the war – the Association of Croat War Invalids of the 
Home War (HVIDR-a), and the Association of Volunteers and Veterans of the Homeland 
War (UDIVDR-a) – were a hard-line part of HDZ BIH that worked within and outside of 
the other factions. The later organization was established by Naletilić who was arrested 
by the ICTY in 1997. While these organizations conducted normal activities of such 
organizations, they were also involved in hard-line nationalist politics, promoting the 
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creation of a third entity (excluding Bosniaks) and protesting the return of ethnic minority 
IDPs. They maintained a combative stance with any party or party faction open to any 
“cooperation” with the IC and attacked the HDZ BiH in the media numerous times, 
normally criticizing the party and the politicians’ “betrayal” of war veterans. The 
organizations were also reportedly involved in organized crime and the illegal allocation 
of housing stock.
232
 As will be seen in the next chapter, these groups assisted hard-line 
politicians to ensure that other politicians towed the obstructionist party line through fear 
and intimidation. 
During the HDZ BiH party convention in May 1998, the generals’ faction took 
over the party leadership when Jelavić was elected president over Ljubić. This takeover 
has been called the “generals’ putsch” and began Jelavić’s purge of the party faithful who 
sought cooperation with the IC. This purge trickled down to officials in the police, army, 
and public institutions.
233
 In response to this turn of events, Zubak – the Bosnian Croat 
member of the BiH presidency at the time – formed a Bosnian Croat opposition party 
called the New Croat Initiative (NHI). This party became part of the “Alliance for 
Change” coalition (Alijansa za promjene) that blocked the traditional nationalist parties 
in BiH from power in 2000, which initiated the 2000-2001 Croat Crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
The two geopolitical processes of ethnic cleansing that Gerard Toal and Carl 
Dahlman delineate – the producing of a new ethnoterritorial order of space and the 
building of an ethnocratic political order upon that space – transformed a multi-cultured 
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community into two geographically divided competing groups. The conceptualization of 
Mostar as an integral part of Herceg-Bosna drew military forces to ethnically “cleanse” 
the city through ethnic expulsions and urbicide to create a homogeneous Bosnian Croat 
space. The competing regimes created a legal legacy (the abandoned property laws) that 
frustrated the IC’s efforts to reverse ethnic “cleansing” in the postwar period. Even 
though the HVO failed to “cleanse” the entire city, a new ethnoterritorial order of space 
was born. 
In the postwar period, the two new ethnocratic regimes that ran their sides of the 
city attempted to consolidate their political power by territorializing space through the 
division of social structures, the obstruction of returnees, and the symbolic colonization 
of space. The control of political, demographic, and cultural space allowed nationalists to 
maintain the imagined division, in spite of the increased freedom of movement and the 
administrative unification of the city. In 1998, Judith Bing recorded an instance where a 
Bosniak woman refused to cross into west Mostar in a group because she feared for her 
safety, even though the EUAM claimed that there was freedom of movement.
234
 
Hromadžić stated that as a Bosniak she never felt “on her own territory” in west Mostar, 
nor did she feel at home in east Mostar after living there for 22 months in the mid-
2000s.
235
 In 2007, Makaš noted that “even as individuals cross the physical dividing 
boulevard and use both sides of the city, the separation and distinctions persist in 
people’s minds.”236 The ethnicization of space is a constant reminder to Mostarians that 
their city is divided into two territorialized groupings, allowing politicians and criminals 
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to seize economic resources. However, as seen, this division of Mostar should not imply 
that the regimes on either side were homogeneous, and their internal factionalism was 
important to the dismantling of the regime. In Mostar, factionalism in the Bosnian Croat 
regime continued to affect the regime as the IC began to undercut the structures that 
maintained its power when OHR began to take a more activist and unified approach in 
1999. 
 99 
CHAPTER 4 
MOSTAR AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION 
On 14 December 1995, representatives of the Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian 
Croat military and political forces signed the Dayton Peace Agreement, which established 
a two-entity country under the international supervision of the OHR. As seen in the 
previous chapter, during the war nationalist military forces used a combination of 
expulsions, genocide, and urbicide in an attempt to transform the heterogeneous social 
and spatial organization of BiH into a mosaic of “homogeneous” nation-states. After the 
Bosnian War, over half of the country’s population (over 2 million people) lived as IDPs 
or refugees, and the country’s physical, economic, and social infrastructure was 
devastated. Under the auspices of the IC, the OHR undertook the considerable task of 
rebuilding BiH into a viable state. Annexes 6 (Human Rights) and 7 (Refugees and IDPs) 
of the Dayton Agreement established new and installed pre-existing international 
institutions in BiH. Also, they outlined the OHR’s agenda to reverse the effects of the 
war by demographically and physically “reconstructing” the country in an attempt to 
recreate the prewar ethnic geography. 
The basis of the Dayton Agreement was the IC’s rejection of ethnic expulsions of 
persons and culture as a means of consolidating power and state building over territory.
237
 
However, even though the agreement included significant protection for human rights, 
the political structure that the agreement created was highly decentralized. This gave 
significant autonomy to nationalist politicians and allowed them to obstruct efforts at all 
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levels of government and maintain their newly created mono-ethnic regimes. Annex 7 
outlined the goal of returning IDPs and refugees to their homes. To achieve this goal, the 
OHR and the IC first abolished the wartime property laws and then gradually established 
a comprehensive return program to break political obstruction. One of the major 
components of the return process was property restitution, and while property restitution 
could not and did not restore or recreate ethnic harmony without intensive reconciliation 
efforts, recreating heterogeneous ethnic spaces was a start to the grander project of 
reconciliation. 
The conflict between the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak military forces in Mostar 
changed the city from Yugoslavia’s symbol of ethnic harmony to BiH’s symbol of ethnic 
division. The war demographically changed Mostar. The nationalists’ ability to strong-
arm the EUAM and the IC by implicit threat of resuming the conflict between the 
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat wartime regimes allowed for the consolidation of ethnic 
division. After the EUAM was decommissioned, the OHR continued to direct significant 
financial, human, and physical resources into Mostar. After an initial period of 
international disorganization, which allowed nationalists to play international 
organizations against each other in order to achieve the most beneficial and least 
interventionist deal, the OHR began to dismantle some of the mono-ethnic structures by 
leading the IC in a more activist and unified approach. However, the OHR only achieved 
mixed results in Mostar and BiH, in general, because the OHR could not finish the 
dismantling of ethnocratic power structures due to the IC’s waning interest and funding 
in the early 2000s. Even though the OHR administratively unified the political system, 
instituted a high rate of property restitution, and reconstructed a significant portion of the 
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city over the last sixteen years, Mostar remains a city territorially divided along the 
wartime confrontation line. 
THE STRUCTURES OF PROPERTY RESTITUTION 
BiH became the IC’s first experiment to return refugees and IDPs not only to their 
prewar country of residence, but to their actual prewar address. As recently as the end of 
World War II, ethnic cleansing or “population transfers” was an internationally 
acceptable solution to ethnic tension. However, with the increase of ethnic conflicts in the 
third world and the pressure of asylum cases, repatriation became the favored 
international solution over relocation by the end of the Cold War.
238
 Annex 7 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement established the basis of this effort in BiH: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their 
homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to 
them.
239
 
The IC considered property restitution to be a “necessary component” of rebuilding BiH 
and the return process.
240
 One of the arguments for concentrating on property restitution 
put forth by international observers was that property was IDPs’ and refugees’ most 
valuable financial asset after the war for creating sustainable return or establishing 
relocation. However, with the state of the financial service industry in BiH and its 
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inability to manage an adequate property market, refugees and IDPs rarely could exploit 
the value of the property that was returned to them after the war. 
Institutions of the Dayton Peace Agreement and Mostar 
Among the Dayton Agreement’s comprehensive provisions for the protection of 
human rights, Annex 6 established two institutions to determine and impose compliance 
with the Dayton Agreement upon the parties of the agreement: the Human Rights 
Chamber for BiH (hereafter: Chamber) and the Office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsperson (hereafter: Ombudsperson).
241
 The main difference between the 
institutions was that the Ombudsperson only made non-legally binding recommendations 
while the Chamber issued final and legally binding decisions.
242
 The Ombudsperson 
investigated maladministration and human rights violations upon submitted complaints 
and its own initiative. Even though the Ombudsperson could only issue 
recommendations, the office sent cases to the Chamber if the non-compliant party did not 
follow the recommendation. The Chamber also did not have an executive arm to enforce 
its decisions, but, in lieu of one, it forwarded its decisions that needed monitoring for 
compliance to the OHR and the OSCE. Originally, these institutions only had five-year 
mandates, but both mandates were extended for an additional three years at the end of 
which the Ombudsperson was transformed into a state institution and the European Court 
of Human Rights assumed the responsibilities of the Chamber. According to Walpurga 
Englbrecht, it is evident that these institutions “mainly dealt with housing and property 
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matters.” However, the nature of the Dayton Agreement created problems for the 
implementation of return because the OHR and OSCE had difficulty exerting pressure on 
the different levels of government to enforce compliance.
243
 The position of these 
institutions in housing matters necessitated the extension of their mandates because 
minority return in cities like Mostar only began in earnest in 2000 (the end of their initial 
mandate). 
Annex 7 established the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, which 
was called the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees 
(CRPC), to impartially and independently resolve property issues for return cases.
244
 The 
CRPC decided if a claimant had lawful or legal prewar possession of real property 
according to categories specified in the “Law on Basic Ownership Relations” from 1980. 
The condition of the land books was the most significant problem in determining 
ownership because these books contained all the ownership records. According to the 
CRPC, only one-third of the land books remained fully intact due to World War II and 
the Bosnian War. The ones that survived were poorly updated during the SFRY because 
of high registration and transaction taxes and the complexity of the system. Therefore, 
many properties were never registered in the land books.
245
 Because the land books were 
in such poor condition and the Real Property Cadastre was only established in 10% of the 
country, the CRPC was only able to confirm ownership rights for about 21% of private 
property claims. The CRPC, instead, mostly relied on prewar possession lists maintained 
in cadastral records to confirm possession and occupancy rights, which were regularly 
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updated and represented a relatively accurate picture of property possession before the 
war. Even though the cadastre only recorded possession rights, they were at least enough 
for claimants to repossess their property. However, the FBiH privatization law required 
occupancy right holders to occupy the apartment before they could purchase it, limiting 
the housing stock for BiH’s rental sector.246 Also, because of the continuous security 
issues in postwar BiH, IDPs and refugees in many cases were unable to reoccupy safely 
their prewar home. So, this rule effectively excluded them from the privatization process. 
Therefore, when they sold the property as a form of compensation, they received lesser 
value for the property because they could only sell an occupancy right, not an ownership 
right.  
Because of the dire condition of property records in BiH, the CRPC accepted a 
large range of documentation to establish ownership, possession, and occupancy rights, 
and it even accepted applications with no evidence.
247
 Since the CRPC would accept 
applications without any supporting evidence, the commission conducted its own 
research on property claims. However, the CRPC was at the mercy of local housing 
officials and courts’ cooperation to acquire the necessary documentation, which as will 
be demonstrated in the case of Mostar was not forthcoming.
248
 Because of this, it almost 
took the initial length of the commission’s mandate to establish its comprehensive 
                                                 
246
 Ibid., 18. 
247
 A list of the documentation that the CRPC accepted as supporting evidence to confirm different types of 
right is included in Appendix B. 
248
 Before and after the war, cadastral records are maintained at municipal housing offices and geodetic 
departments, and the land books are maintained at the municipal courts. Also, to complicate matters 
further, allocation decisions are maintained at socially-owned enterprises and municipal housing offices. 
 105 
Cadastre Database from the collected municipal land record data.
249
 Like the 
Ombudsperson and the Chamber, the CRPC’s initial mandate was initially only five 
years, but it was extended for an additional three years. In Mostar, most of the records 
were not significantly damaged during the Bosnian War even though the Cadastral 
Institute was totally gutted. However, because of the postwar political situation in Mostar 
the records were not frequently available to all sides as documents were withheld from 
competing sides.
250
 Apparently, the destruction of records was not pervasive in Mostar, 
but the manipulation of records did occur in the cases of financially valuable properties. 
At the end of the CRPC’s mandate, the institution transferred its databases to BiH 
ministries and its records are maintained at the BiH National Archives.
251
 
Some have argued that the CRPC was an unnecessary agency that duplicated the 
work of the municipal housing offices, especially since many refugees and IDPs applied 
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to both in order to resolve their property restitution issue.
252
 However, while the problem 
with redundancy was true in the CRPC’s case, this argument ignores the valuable work 
the CRPC did beyond the delivering of decisions. The institution made significant 
contributions to improving the condition of property records in BiH by collecting, 
conforming and editing them. It was also an important institution in the development of 
property legislation, and it established and maintained the Integrated Property System, 
which integrated the CRPC’s claim and decision database with the Repossessions 
Tracking Database. This system assisted agencies in identifying double occupants and 
improved monitoring capabilities. 
Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement provided for the creation of a compensation 
fund to be established by the Central Bank of BiH and administered by the CRPC, 
allowing refugees and IDPs the right to choose between return and compensation. 
However, the right to compensation in the return process early became a dividing issue 
among members of the IC, causing the compensation fund to be never established. Even 
though the CRPC pursued the creation of the fund, neither the Government of BiH nor 
the IC provided any funds for its establishment.
253
 Critics of the fund argued against the 
right to compensation guaranteed in the Dayton Agreement because they feared that IDPs 
and refugees would readily use it, undermining the goal of ethnic reintegration and 
rewarding the obstruction of return.
254
 Others argued that property repossession and 
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people’s ability to sell their property allowed IDPs and refugees to receive compensation 
for the property they lost during the war at a fairer market price and in a more timely 
manner than a compensation scheme could provide.
255
 However, there was a significant 
problem with the latter’s perspective, which became the de facto policy: the real estate 
market in postwar BiH lacked important mechanisms to function properly. First, the 
market lacked official state or self regulation regarding the conduct of real estate brokers 
and the procedures. Second, there was not an applicable system for property valuators to 
use or even enough trained valuators for the market to work in a coherent manner. Third, 
excessive taxes still existed on the sale of property, causing people to operate outside of 
the official mechanisms that existed to complete unofficial property sales and exchanges. 
This grey real estate market only served to exacerbate the discrepancies in the property 
records and introduced higher levels of corruption.
256
  
In Mostar, after the signing of the Washington Agreement, the municipal housing 
authorities were divided along ethnic lines as well as the departments that managed IDP 
and refugee issues. DOM Mostar, the city’s PHE for managing socially-owned property, 
was divided. On the west side, URBING Mostar was established, while on the east side 
the Public Housing Enterprise was still called DOM Mostar. However, as of January 
2013 both have failed to be completely privatized as construction companies. There were 
multiple Departments for IDPs and Refugees at the cantonal and municipal levels. At the 
cantonal level, there were two departments, one Croat and one Bosniak, until 2004. 
During the unification of the departments, the two departments’ records and reports on 
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IDPs and refugees were mysteriously lost. Copies of these records are maintained at the 
BiH Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees and the only surviving records at the 
cantonal level for this time period is a database of applicants from 1998. At the municipal 
level, each of Mostar’s six city-municipalities had their own departments for housing 
affairs, health, IDPs and refugees. The unification process of these municipal departments 
took longer than the cantonal department so they were not unified until 2007. 
Economic Privatization 
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) began the privatization 
of commercial property in 1997. USAID planned for a rapid two-year process, using a 
voucher system that already had failed in Russia and the Czech Republic. However, the 
process fell far short of the two-year goal.
257
 By the end of 1997, only 384 of 3,200 
enterprises in BiH had prepared privatization plans and “by mid-2002, only 27 percent of 
state capital had been privatized.”258 The process was also slowed by the fact that 
privatization was executed at the entity and cantonal levels, so 12 different privatization 
agencies were involved. Also, nationalists preferred to maintain enterprises within the 
control of their regimes or, in other words, state-owned. In postwar BiH, there was very 
little institutional framework, such as functioning impartial courts and banks, to monitor 
and execute the privatization process, leading to slow, unpredictable and “often perverse 
consequences.”259 
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Due to concerns of the ethnicization of the privatization process raised by people 
like Haris Silajdzić, the OHR established the Privatization Monitoring Commission in 
June 1998 to prevent discrimination.
260
 However, according to Timothy Donais, “it 
proved unable to effectively prevent privatization from becoming another battlefield in 
Bosnia’s ongoing ethnic conflict.”261 In addition, there was little interest from 
international investors in BiH, and even when there was interest, politicians obstructed 
the process so that favored nationalists could acquire the enterprise cheaply instead. This 
led to many politicians acquiring positions in BiH’s most profitable enterprises, 
especially during the OHR’s crackdown on hard-line nationalists as they migrated from 
politics to business.
262
 
One of the privatization models used in west Mostar and other Bosnian Croat 
municipalities was co-capitalization, which was first developed in Croatia under the 
Tudjman regime. Pugh and Cooper describe this model: 
Shadow boards took over enterprises prior to privatization and ensured, 
through contractual continuity, that existing directors would own the 
privatized firm. Former state enterprises were allowed to run down, any 
worthwhile assets were stripped, and the property sold cheaply to the 
shadow board in return for donations to the dominant nationalist party.
263
 
This scheme became common practice in west Mostar and allowed for the ethnicization 
of the economy and employment. This created economic problems for returnees because 
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they no longer could return to work at their prewar places of employment nor could they 
collect the benefits of privatization because ethnocratic management would distribute 
their shares to others. The problem of the enthicization of employment added another 
obstacle to an IDP’s attempt to make a sustainable return. By losing their former 
employment, they normally lost one of their few possibilities to generate income, 
especially with the poor state of the BiH economy. 
Of Mostar’s major prewar factories, “Aluminij” is the only one that remains today 
with a production capacity even close to its prewar level. Before the war, the plant was 
one of BiH’s most important socially-owned enterprises, but during the war the plant was 
damaged and looted by Bosnian Serb and Serb paramilitaries. In June 1992, a new board 
of managers was appointed, consisting of four Bosnian Croats who had been on the board 
previously.
264
 One of the Bosnian Croats was Brajković, an HVO commander and future 
mayor of west Mostar, and he was appointed as the company’s general director when it 
restarted operations in 1997.
265
 Reportedly, during the war Bosniak prisoners from the 
Heliodrom camp were forced to the clean the plant for six months.
266
 
According to Michael Pugh, during privatization “the management had the 
enterprise valued at $84 million, a fraction of its prewar value of $620 million, 
although…its exports in the first year of revival reached $85 million.”267 Brajković 
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managed to privatize the company through a co-capitalization process. However, in the 
fall of 2006, the government of the FBiH and “Aluminij” reached a shareholding 
agreement to revise the privatization result so shares were divided according to the 
following: 44% FBiH, 44% former and current employees of “Aluminij,” and 12% 
Croatian Privatization Fund. Brajković managed to redirect the shares of employees who 
were of an ethnic minority to the Bosnian Croat management and workers.
268
 In 2010, 
Glencore, a Swiss commodity trading and mining company, attempted to gain a majority 
share in “Aluminij,” but the government of BiH cancelled the negotiations.269 As a result 
of the ethnocratic management board, the workforce was cleansed so, as of 2003, 
Bosnian Croats were 93% of the workforce. While the total number of Bosnian Croat 
workers is almost half of the prewar level, losing 692 workers, 994 of 1119 Bosniaks and 
740 of 777 Bosnian Serbs no longer worked at “Aluminij.” 
Other companies in Mostar were privatized under circumstances that ethnocized 
their management boards and workforce. “SOKO,” which was a large Mostar-based 
prewar producer of planes and automobiles that employed people in the countryside as 
well as in the city, was divided into numerous companies, breaking its vertical monopoly. 
Many parts of the company were privatized by Croatian firms and members of Herceg-
Bosna. “Hepok” was a prewar food processor in Mostar and during the war the company 
was divided in the city. During privatization, a Croatian company bought the west side’s 
part of Hepok and a Sarajevo-based company bought the east side’s part. “Fabrika Mostar 
Tobacca” was one of the largest prewar companies on the east side, but the privatization 
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of the company to date has failed. The ethnicization of the commercial sector through 
privatization mainly affected the return of IDPs and refugees in three ways: it gave 
greater financial support to ethnocratic power structures; it significantly damaged the 
possibility of IDPs and refugees to make a sustainable return, particularly in small 
villages where there was only one prewar enterprise; and in many cases these past 
workers were excluded from the disbursement of the privatization funds so they were 
barred from money that would help fund relocation. 
Renovating Legal Structures 
Much of the early literature on the mechanics of property restitution in BiH was 
produced by the agencies or members of the agencies that were involved in the process, 
such as the CRPC and OSCE.
270
 Later literature by academics and researchers focuses on 
the effects of property restitution and return in reversing ethnic cleansing. The main topic 
of the earlier literature was how the IC could or did enforce property restitution, generally 
arguing that greater cooperation among the IC and focusing on rights-based restitution 
were the keystones of property restitution’s relative success.271 The main argument was 
the need for the institutionalization of the rule of law. However, this seems to imply that 
law was absent from BiH. In some cases there was in effect lawlessness in BiH, but that 
hides the fact that there was rule of law, just not laws that the IC found acceptable. The 
legal structure of post-Dayton BiH was founded on principles of ethnic separation and 
control. Nationalist politicians created property regimes founded on laws that they could 
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and did use to implement these principles. Therefore, the first order of business that the 
OHR and IC embarked upon in order to institutionalize an internationally-acceptable rule 
of law was to dismantle this ethno-exclusionist legal regime. Without its dismantlement, 
the enforcement of property return would be an ideal that could never be realized. 
Prior to the USAID’s efforts, the FBiH passed in 1997 its own privatization law, 
the “Law on the Sale of Apartments with an Occupancy Right,” which outlined the 
procedure for the purchase of socially-owned housing.
272
 Since property restitution for 
minority return had barely begun, this law endangered the legal prewar occupant’s ability 
to reclaim the property because the temporary occupant could quickly initiate 
privatization proceedings and make the reallocation permanent. Also, even though the 
CRPC began processing cases and delivering decisions, the wartime property laws were a 
major obstacle to beginning the return process because the Dayton Peace Agreement did 
not give the CRPC the power to enforce its decision, and municipal housing authorities 
used the wartime laws as a legal fig leaf to validate their obstruction. Because of 
widespread occupancy right cancellations using the “Law on Housing Relations” and the 
postwar purchase law, many IDPs and refugees risked losing their property 
permanently.
273
 
Immediately after the war, the IC through the OHR began pushing for the FBiH 
and Republika Srpska to repeal the abandoned property laws. Even though promises were 
made and conferences were attended, the political will to accomplish the task at the 
federal level was weak, if not, non-existent. After two missed deadlines and a painful 
                                                 
272
 “Law on Sale of Apartments with an Occupancy Right,” Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,  nos. 27/97, 11/98, 22/99, 27/99, 32/01. 
273
 Williams, “Post-Conflict Property Restitution,” 487. 
 114 
two-year process that a participant compared to “hitting your head against a wall,”274 the 
FBiH after negotiations with the OHR and UNHCR on 4 April 1998 passed the “Law on 
the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments,” the “Law on the 
Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary Abandoned Real Property Owned 
by Citizens” and the “Law on Taking Over the Law on Housing Relations” to remove the 
legal veneer of ethnic cleansing.
275
 However, since the laws were too conditional, making 
it excessively difficult for prewar occupants to reclaim their homes, the OHR imposed 
amendments to the laws and the final set of amendments in October 1999 harmonized the 
claims process in both entities.
276
 
The cessation laws defined a multiple or double occupant as a current user who 
holds an occupancy right to more than one apartment and the multiple occupant is able 
return to their prewar residence with only minimal repair or another alternative 
accommodation already has been provided by the authorities. This definition included all 
members of a prewar family household to include cases where a family “branched out” 
during the war, gaining additional properties.
277
 According to the law, multiple occupants 
were given 15 days to vacate the property with no right to alternative accommodation to 
be provided by the municipal housing authorities. This law gave rise to Double 
Occupancy Commissions that determined multiple occupants and pushed for their 
eviction. These commissions were constructed because multiple occupancy represented 
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one of the worst housing crimes that occurred during the war as many were domicile 
upgraders and because these cases were easier to resolve since multiple occupants did not 
need alternative accommodation. 
The laws also defined people who occupied someone else’s property after 30 
April 1991 as a temporary user. It also invalidated any occupancy right given between 1 
April 1992 and 7 February 1998, transforming the holder of this right into a temporary 
user. It also distinguished between temporary users with a legal basis and ones without. A 
legal temporary user was an occupant that had an allocation decision from the relevant 
authorities. They were given 90 days to vacate the property and were to be provided 
alternative accommodation by the municipal housing authorities. In contrast, an illegal 
temporary user did not possess an allocation decision and they followed the same process 
as multiple occupants – 15 days to vacate the property without a right to alternative 
accommodation.
278
 After resolving the legal foundation of property regimes, the OHR 
had a stronger legal basis to apply the Bonn Powers – the power to dismiss political 
officials – to address enforcement issues and political obstructionism of these ethnocratic 
regimes. 
MINORITY RETURN IN MOSTAR 
Wolfgang Petritsch became the High Representative in August 1999, which 
marked the beginning of a more activist approach in implementing the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. This new approach particularly affected Mostar where four officials were 
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removed, operation WESTAR was conducted, and Hercegovačka Banka was raided.279 
Even though the OHR gained the Bonn Powers in 1997, which gave it the power to 
dismiss political officials, the office did not make significant use of the power to remove 
officials for “soft” obstruction until about a month after the final amendments to the 
cessation laws were passed.
280
 The final-binding nature of CRPC decisions did not have 
much effective force in BiH until the OHR imposed the “Law on Implementation of the 
Decisions of the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and 
Refugees” on 27 October 1999. However, even then the OHR still needed the capacity to 
enforce this law at the local level.
281
 On 29 November 1999, it dismissed twenty-two 
officials, three of which were in Mostar, from office and banned them from future 
elections and politically appointed position. Through these removals, the OHR gained the 
capacity to enforce change in localities in order to make returns possible. However, 
significant progress was not made in Mostar until ethnocratic power structures began to 
weaken and the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) adapted a rights-based 
approach to property restitution. 
Removals in Mostar 
The implementation of refugee and IDP return in BIH was a slow process because 
of political obstruction, and Mostar is one of the clearest examples of how political 
obstructionism affected the process. Even though the Bosnian government passed laws 
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and the OHR imposed decisions to facilitate the implementation of property restitution, 
many Bosnian authorities at the local level made little to no effort to implement the laws 
and instead actively sought to obstruct their implementation. Nationalist parties 
encouraged workers in municipal housing offices to process property requests slowly or 
lose them. Authorities used a variety of methods of obstruction, such as charging high 
processing fees, refusing to receive claims, referring claimants to bodies that were not 
authorized to deal with claims, demanding unnecessary documentation, amending claim 
forms to ask inflammatory questions, and refusing to establish housing authorities.
282
 
Mostar is no different than the rest of BiH in this respect and the return of displaced 
persons to Mostar did not make significant progress on property repossession or return in 
general until activist intervention in Mostar sought to dismantle ethnocratic power 
structures and the implementation of the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP). 
On 29 November 1999, the OHR removed Nedžad Behram from the position of 
Head of the Housing Department in the Old Town Municipality (east Mostar),
283
 Marina 
Deronjić from the position of Head of the Housing Department in the Southwest 
Municipality (west Mostar),
284
 and Stipe Marić from the position of Mayor in the 
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Southwest Municipality (west Mostar).
285
 The OHR accused Behram of failing to 
properly process repossession claims and mismanaging vacant housing stock. Among the 
listed violations are illegally reallocating vacated apartments to new IDPs and social 
cases while disregarding repossession claims against them; deliberately delaying the 
resolution of double occupancy cases, particularly in a internationally-funded 
reconstruction project in Podvelezje where none of the IDPs had repossessed their 
apartments; deliberately misinforming claimants about their rights; and denying that his 
office was responsible for repossession claims.
286
 According to the International Crisis 
Group, after the removals, the housing officials in east Mostar were more willing to evict 
double occupants in cases that were confirmed by the Double Occupancy Commission.
287
 
Obstruction in west Mostar was more uniform and absolute because the 
Southwest municipality exerted significant influence on the functioning of the other two 
west Mostar municipalities. Therefore, the Southwest municipal housing office had de 
facto executive authority over all three Bosnian Croat municipalities.
288
 Until 1999, none 
of the confirmed double occupancy cases in west Mostar were solved by the housing 
office.
289
 The office only gave negative decisions concerning private property cases 
claiming that the office did not have the competency to decide such cases. Also, Marić 
stated that neither war veterans nor families of war victims would be evicted from the 
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housing units that were allocated to them.
290
 According to the International Crisis Group, 
as of 2000, there were 103 confirmed double occupancy cases, but housing officials were 
unwilling or afraid to resolve them because the occupants had connections to politicians 
or HVIDR-a.
291
 By July 1999, 6,044 socially-owned property claims and 463 private 
property claims had been filed with the west Mostar housing offices, but the offices only 
processed a handful of double occupancy claims. The Southwest municipality was the 
worst of them with a backlog of approximately 4,500 unprocessed claims.
292
 The backlog 
was a result of politically pressured discrimination against minority returns, causing the 
OHR to remove Marić and Deronjić. 
On 7 February 2000, the Municipal Council of the Southwest Municipality 
brought a suit against the OHR to the Human Rights Chamber over the removal of Marić 
and Deronjić, claiming that the removals violated their “freedom of thought, conscience 
and belief, [their] freedom of expression, as well as [their] right to work.”293 The 
Chamber dismissed the case as inadmissible because the Dayton Agreement established 
the Chamber to decide cases against Parties to the Agreement brought by alleged victims 
of a violation of the Agreement. Since the OHR was not a party to the Agreement, the 
Chamber determined it could not accept cases against the OHR. 
In spite of these removals, the obstruction of property restitution continued in the 
Southwest municipality because of pressure from HDZ BiH and HVIDR-a. The 
following is an excerpt from a statement provided to the Chamber on 30 November 2000 
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by the American Refugee Council for property restitution cases regarding Đulba Krvavac 
(Bosniak) and Danica Pribišić (Bosnian Serb): 
During several meetings, housing officials informed ARC [American 
Refugee Council] lawyers that they, the housing officials, were under 
instructions from higher authorities, including the mayor, not to process 
any claims for apartment decisions and not to return any property to 
minority occupancy right holders… 
In the April 17
th
 2000 meeting, Ms. [R.C.] also indicated that the 
municipality considered the property cases to be political and therefore 
they would not seek a legal solution as the municipality was obligated to 
do by law. In a meeting on May 29
th
 2000 with [R.C.] and [Z.M.], the 
heads of housing Mostar West and Mostar Southwest municipalities, they 
directly referred to the lack of instructions by the mayor of their 
municipality that would allow them to process cases…294 
It is important to note that these meetings occurred after the OHR dismissed Marić and 
Deronjić from office. Marić’s replacement, Ivica Rozić, resigned at the beginning of 
April 2000 after “the international community pressured him to resolve 39 multiple 
occupancy cases within 15 days of taking office.” Rozić explained that he was “not 
prepared to fulfill the duties of mayor” due to the political pressure exerted upon him.295 
After Rozić’s resignation, the positions of mayor and head of the housing office in the 
Southwest municipality were vacant during this period, effectively stopping the housing 
office from functioning. The International Crisis Group referred to this situation as part of 
HDZ BiH’s “empty chair strategy” to obstruct housing restitution.296 
Besides obstructing property restitution and minority return to consolidate their 
control over western Herzegovina, HDZ BiH had Bosnian Croat IDPs from other parts of 
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BiH, particularly central Bosnia, relocate by providing them with new homes. The 
Herceg-Bosna regime appropriated, for this demographic purpose, state- and socially-
owned farmlands normally owned by IDPs from the ethnic minority, transforming them 
into housing estates and giving them to favored IDPs. In the Herzegovina-Neretva 
Canton, HDZ BiH built 3,000 plots by mid-1999 in the municipalities of Čapljina, Mostar 
and Stolac.
297
 On 5 May 1999, the OHR issued a ban on the disposal of public land and 
continued the ban until 15 May 2003 when the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 
ended. However, even with the ban HDZ BiH continued to build new estates, expanding 
the total to 4,000 plots by 2002.
298
 The OHR even noted the continuation of the practice 
by HDZ BiH in a decision extending the ban.
299
 
The manipulation of public lands occurred in east Mostar as well, but to a lesser 
extent. In 2003, the FBiH financial police investigated Oručević and eight others for 
illegally allocating public land to build apartment buildings in the Cernica area of Mostar. 
He was also charged with forging official documents to exempt investors from 
construction taxes.
300
 The IC needed to dismantle the power structures and networks 
behind the ethnocratic regimes before significant change at the local level could occur in 
order to stop these egregious offenses. 
Activist Intervention 
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On 14 October 1999, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) conducted Operation 
WESTAR, which entailed the raiding of four different office buildings of Herceg-Bosna 
and the police in west Mostar.
301
 The raid uncovered that the Croatian National 
Intelligence Service (HIS) and the Bosnian Croat National Security Service (SNS), which 
was supported by HDZ BiH, were working bilaterally on intelligence operations. The 
focus of these operations was to spy on international organizations, particularly the 
Hague Tribunal Investigation Team.
302
 Among the 200 gigabytes of information and 
10,000 text documents, SFOR found CDs with pornography and equipment to counterfeit 
credit cards and cell phone chips, which were apparently used either to support illegal 
operations or for personal gain. SFOR found evidence of four major intelligence 
operations directed against the IC: Grom, Munja, Puma, and Panther. Operation Puma 
targeted 30 ICTY investigators in Livno by tapping phone lines, monitoring radio signals, 
and recruiting interpreters. Operation Munja sought to install surveillance equipment in 
the offices of international organizations. Operation Grom attempted to recruit operatives 
in international organization. Operation Panther had agents monitor members of the IC to 
uncover their roles in putting pressure on Bosnian Croats in BiH for the gain of the 
members’ home country.303 While SFOR’s initial allegation against the SNS – the 
operations were intended to lead to the creation of a third entity – was never expanded 
upon, this raid was one of few actions that did cut into Herceg-Bosna’s capacity to 
maintain its operations. 
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The activist intervention against HDZ BiH compounded the economic problems 
that Herceg-Bosna faced. In January 1999, the OHR created a unified customs 
administration, which slowed, but by no means stopped, previously unhindered 
smuggling along the Croatian-Herzegovinian border. This strained the financial resources 
of Herceg-Bosna and its elite.
304
 Many Bosnian Croat voters became disillusioned with 
the party as they failed to fulfill their promises and faced significant financial problems. 
Canton 10 owed the Mostar pension fund significant outstanding contributions, Bosnian 
Croat schools had a shortage of textbooks in 1999, and some of the housing construction 
for Bosnian Croat IDPs in Herzegovina was halted due to a shortage of funds.
305
 Also, in 
February 2000 following the death of Tudjman, Stipe Mesić was elected president of 
Croatia. Mesić was committed to ending Croatia’s subsidization of Herceg-Bosna: 
[W]e are also making it known that the involvement [of Croatia] in the 
internal affairs of BiH is coming to an end. …In every sense there is still 
the big problem of the continued existence of the remnants of Herzeg-
Bosna [Herceg-Bosna], and Croatia cannot and should not finance these. It 
is clear that all of these must be incorporated into the Federation and into 
BiH. There cannot be this Chamber of Commerce and that Chamber of 
Commerce, one for this part of the state and one for the other. The 
remnants of Herzeg-Bosna, with which some still offer the false picture or 
illusion that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided, cannot survive.
306
 
News reports about the Herzegovinian crime bosses helped turn public opinion in Croatia 
against Bosnian Croats in Herzegovina.
307
 This growing disillusionment was reflected in 
the 2000 election results. 
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HDZ BiH exerted considerable effort to reenergize their political base to defend 
itself from growing competition created by new Bosnian Croat political parties, such as 
Zubak’s New Croatian Initiative (NHI) and Prlić’s Forum 2000. Even though HDZ BiH 
still won the Bosnian Croat vote, Bosnian Croat voter turnout was extremely low in both 
the April 2000 municipal elections and the November 2000 general elections. They 
captured a smaller percentage of the vote and did not become part of the new “Alliance 
for Change” governing coalition at the state and Federation levels.308 The Alliance for 
Change was a ten-party coalition that provided an alternative to the three main nationalist 
parties that ruled BiH since the SFRY’s first pluralist elections (SDA, HDZ BiH, and the 
Serbian Democratic Party). HDZ BiH refused to accept the situation of being excluded 
from power and boycotted the new government, claiming that it was illegitimate because 
it did not include them – the largest Bosnian Croat party. 
HDZ BiH held a Croat National Congress on 3 March 2001 in Mostar where 528 
delegates proclaimed temporary self-government for all Bosnian Croats in BiH. This 
proclamation was the last straw for the OHR in dealing with Jelavić and HDZ BiH. On 7 
March 2001, the OHR removed Jelavić from office for attempting to “undermine the 
constitutional order of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and establish an illegal parallel structure.”309 On 18 April 2001, the OHR 
had the SFOR raid Hercegovačka Banka on charges that HDZ BiH was using money in 
the bank to finance efforts to create a third entity. The bank was put under international 
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supervision and many of the bank’s transactions were blocked. This stopped payment to 
the Bosnian Croat soldiers whom the Croat National Congress paid to leave the 
Federation army “in protest” of the government. Weeks later, negotiations began for their 
return to command. The investigation of the bank concluded that the bank violated BiH’s 
banking laws and regulations, used funds to finance attempts to change BiH’s 
constitution through illegal means, and, at the expense of workers and customers, 
funneled money into private enterprises owned by the management board.
310
 
A final office removal in Mostar occurred on 15 January 2002. Ivan Mandić was 
removed from the position of Head of the Southwest Municipality for obstructing the 
property restitution process and illegally allocating public land.
311
 Mandić failed to 
observe the OHR’s ban on allocating public property. He illegally allocated public lands 
and added extra rooftop floors to existing apartment buildings in the Southwest 
municipality. As Head of the municipality, he ensured that the municipal housing office 
did not have enough qualified staff members and improperly distributed the workload to 
the staff even after being warned by supervisory organizations. He continually blocked 
the restitution of sensitive properties, especially those illegally occupied by members of 
HDZ BiH and UDIVDR-a. He also publicly defended double occupancy in the cases of 
newly formed families. The combination of these removals of obstructionist politicians, 
raids against Herceg-Bosna’s financial sources, and the weakening of local and regional 
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political support for nationalists allowed the IC the ability to enforce change in Mostar 
and implement the property restitution process. 
Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 
While the IC worked to dismantle the illegal shadow state, Herceg-Bosna, 
through activist intervention, it also built the institutional capacity to undercut local 
obstruction in order to implement property restitution countrywide. The OHR established 
the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) in 1997 as an inter-agency body 
tasked with creating “an integrated approach to the return of refugees and economic 
reconstruction,”312 meeting in Sarajevo for the first time in February 1997.313 During the 
first year, the RRTF continued existing return schemes developed by UNHCR, but it also 
developed programs and competencies that were foundational to the future success of 
property restitution. According to Toal and Dahlman, the RRTF developed three main 
strategies: the identification of obstruction, the use of reconstruction aid as positive 
reinforcement, and the prioritization of minority returns.
314
 
In early 2000, PLIP was established as a collaborative effort between the OHR, 
the UNHCR, the OSCE, the UN Mission in BiH, and the CRPC. PLIP outlined its 
objective in its Inter-Agency document, establishing a shift in the IC’s BiH return policy 
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from return-based (prioritized processing of cases) to rights-based (chronological 
processing of cases) property restitution: 
The objective of the PLIP is to ensure that all outstanding claims by 
refugees and displaced persons to repossess their properties are resolved. 
It aims to do this by building domestic legal processes which apply the 
laws neutrally, processing property claims as efficiently as possible until 
all claimants are able to exercise their rights under Annex 7. By treating 
repossession of property as a question of rule of law, the PLIP promotes 
respect for civil rights over political interests and opens enormous 
possibilities for the overall return of DPs and refugees.
315
 
Establishing rule of law as the main driving force behind property restitution allowed the 
IC to stop playing political games with BiH’s ethnocratic regimes according to the rules 
of these regimes. Even though there was considerable internal disagreement within the 
RRTF and agencies in PLIP about return-based and rights-based property restitution, 
focusing on rights-based restitution undercut nationalist politicians’ demands for 
reciprocity, claims of favoritism, and excuses for delays. PLIP established vertical and 
horizontal coordination between the agencies and field offices, but the RRTF largely took 
on the onus of coordinating PLIP.
316
 PLIP cells, which were run by one of the 
participating agencies, were established in each municipality, which were the main PLIP 
offices. Since Mostar had six city-municipalities and the Central Zone, there were seven 
PLIP cells in the city. 
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Mostar’s implementation ratio lagged behind the average for the FBiH and was 
the worst municipality in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton in 2001 and 2002.
317
 While all 
of Mostar had a bad track record in property restitution until the general elections in 
November 2000, the three Bosnian Croat municipalities of west Mostar were exceedingly 
bad at the beginning of PLIP. By May 2000 (when PLIP began publishing statistics), the 
Bosnian Croat municipalities basically had a 0% implementation ratio. While the Bosniak 
municipalities did not have a good implementation ratio either, it was considerably better 
than zero. However, over time starting from 2001, the difference between the Bosniak 
and Bosnian Croat municipalities became less pronounced. 
In this section, I analyze the decision and implementation ratios of the different 
municipalities in Mostar.
318
 The decision ratio is calculated by the number of decisions 
divided by the number of cases, and the implementation ratio, on the other hand, is 
calculated by the number of closed cases/repossessions divided by the number of cases. 
Even though PLIP agencies did not officially use the decision ratio as a measurement of 
progress, analyzing both indicators helps to differentiate the progress made by municipal 
housing offices to administratively decide cases, and the work of enforcement by the 
offices and the police to implement the decisions. 
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As seen from the graph on the decision ratio above, while the Bosniak 
municipalities began with and maintained a lead on Bosnian Croat municipalities, both 
sides maintained similar rates of improvement, indicating that the initial removals of 
obstructive officials in the Southwest municipality produced a positive effect on the work 
of the municipal housing offices. However, it does not appear that the removal of Mandić 
produced any perceivable effect on the work of deciding or enforcing claims. This 
possibly indicates that his intimidating political rhetoric and relocation policies through 
the appropriation of public land and illegal construction played a stronger role in his 
removal than his obstructions in the municipal housing offices.  
Examining the implementation ratio of each side tells a similar story, but instead 
of the Bosniak municipalities being ahead, both sides had very similar ratios throughout 
most of PLIP. Even though the east side had a significantly higher implementation ratio 
than the west side at the beginning of PLIP, the numbers reported by the east side were 
significantly adjusted around the beginning of 2001 and their implementation ratios were 
fairly similar since the readjustment. Three reasons could explain the significant change 
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in the reported numbers. First, the housing authorities were unclear on the procedure for 
calculating the statistics, which is not unrealistic since some of the numbers reported by 
the municipalities, for example the Southeast municipality, were obviously wrong.
319
 
Second, enforcement authorities misreported the number of repossessions to the 
municipal housing offices to cover up their own obstruction or incompetency. Finally, the 
municipal housing authorities “cooked” the books, trying to fool the IC in order to 
maintain a more positive image than the notoriously obstructive west side. 
The property restitution process in relation to PLIP effectively ended for all seven 
of Mostar’s municipalities in January 2004 when the PLIP cells verified the results. In 
total, there were 9,756 submitted claims in Mostar, which means that roughly a third of 
the city’s prewar housing stock received repossession claims against them. However, 
PLIP only recorded claims on properties that were occupied by another inhabitant or 
inhabitants so the number of properties affected by general return was higher because this 
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number does not include destroyed or unoccupied units.
320
 6,644 or 68.1% of the claims 
were lodged against socially owned property, which is a higher percentage than the rest 
of the Federation of BiH (60.3%).
321
 Of all the property claims in Mostar, there were 556 
negative decisions, which means that the municipal housing office either refused or 
rejected a direct claim to the housing official or a CRPC decision. Even though CRPC 
decisions were considered final and binding, there were cases where the CRPC issued 
multiple positive decisions for a single property, necessitating a housing official to 
determine the rightful occupant or owner.
322
 Most of the negative decisions were on 
socially-owned housing in the Southwest and West municipalities, 169 and 249 
respectively.
323
  
The city achieved a 94.01% property implementation ratio and appeared to be 
moving on the right track; however, in spite of the 9,172 cases of returned property ten 
years after the Washington Agreement, the city remained divided. The property 
implementation ratio, like the UNHCR’s statistics on minority returns, is a problematic 
indicator of return and reintegration because it only counted when a person reclaims their 
property, not if the owner actually returned to live in the property. The number of closed 
cases determined the property implementation ratio, but a case was closed when the 
temporary occupant either voluntarily vacated or was evicted from the property and the 
rightful owner was notified that the property can be repossessed.
324
 Therefore, the number 
of closed cases does not indicate if the owner actually lived there or even if the property 
                                                 
320
 “PLIP Statistics Guidelines,” Property Law Implementation Plan, 11 25, 2002, 
http://www.ohr.int/plip/key-doc/default.asp?content_id=30053 (accessed April 19, 2011). 
321
 “PLIP Statistics, September 2004,” 
322
 Williams, “The Significance of Property Restitution,” 45. 
323
 “PLIP Statistics, April 2004,” Property Law Implementation Plan (April 2004). 
324
 Ibid. 
 132 
was actually repossessed. These recording policies have created a situation where the 
number of reported minority returns is potentially inflated and no one knows how many 
people made sustainable returns, which was the initial goal of the Dayton Agreement’s 
Annex 7. 
PROPERTY RESTITUTION CASES IN MOSTAR 
Because of political obstruction, the Human Right Chamber and the 
Ombudsperson were extremely important institutions in the implementation of property 
restitution. The Chamber decided 31 cases related to 72 properties in Mostar. While this 
may not seem like a lot of cases when considering the total amount of property claims in 
the city, the Chamber had a tremendous backlog of cases. 8,949 of 15,191 applications 
were pending when the Chamber transferred its cases to national courts after 2003 so the 
31 cases is not representative of the total possible filed property disputes. These cases do 
illuminate some of the issues and difficulties that IDPs and refugees faced in the property 
restitution process. Of the 72 property disputes in cases that I found on file, 53 of them 
were related to properties in the West and Southwest municipalities, and two of the three 
cases in the Central Zone were related to properties on the west side of the wartime 
confrontation line. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate seven properties in the cases and 
24 of the properties in question were part of an American Refugee Council’s case where 
the addresses of the properties were not included in the Chamber’s decision. However, 
the decision did state that the properties were in the West and Southwest 
municipalities.
325
 Since most of the properties in question were apartments, I was able to 
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examine the apartments’ intercom panels in order to guess if the residents reside there. I 
found 21 properties with intercom panels that had the residents’ names on the labels. Of 
these properties, only seven people or 33% had their names on the panel. Of course, this 
does not necessarily mean that the prewar residents do not own the other 14 properties 
and rent them or have given them to family members with different last names. However, 
this does indicate that sustainable return was possibly low.  
The Chamber unfortunately processed cases very slowly, which undermined the 
institution’s effectiveness in this sector. For example, the case of Hondžo v. the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was struck out because the applicant had moved 
to England and he was unable to be reached. However, these letters inquiring about 
developments in the case arrived FIVE YEARS after he submitted the application.
326
 In 
cases regarding 15 of the properties, the Chamber did not receive a response or the letter 
was undeliverable, indicating that the applicant possibly had moved and the result of the 
restitution claim is ambiguous. 
Human Rights Chamber Cases 
One of the most interesting cases that went to the Human Rights Chamber 
involved Mr. Bojić who attempted to recover his apartment in the Southwest 
municipality, but found that it had been “nationalized.”327 Bojić was evicted from his 
apartment during the first ethnic expulsion of Bosniaks from west Mostar on 9 May 2003. 
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On 3 April 1995, the municipality gave real estate, which included the building in which 
Bojić’s apartment was located, to the Franciscan School Sisters – a Province of the Holy 
Family in Herzegovina. On 5 March 1998, the Franciscan School Sisters concluded a 
lease contract with the municipality whereby they would no longer pay rent, but instead 
were obliged to invest in the repair and reconstruction of the building. When Bojić 
requested to repossess his apartment and information on purchasing the apartment 
through the Southwest muncipality’s Department for Physical Planning, Construction and 
Housing-Public Utility Development in July 1999, a little over a month later the housing 
department replied that nationalized buildings were not subject to purchase until a Law 
on Restitution would be enacted. Additionally, it recommended that Bojić resolve his 
housing problem in a different way without specifying a way to resolve this issue, nor 
addressing the question of repossessing the apartment. To date, none of the government 
entities in BiH have passed a Law on Restitution. However, this future law, if there is 
one, would not be applicable to this case since the property was taken after 1992 and 
Annex 7 and the Constitution of BiH both state that all property seized as a result of the 
war should be returned to their former occupant or at least compensated. In comparison 
to other cases, this was a very quick response from this department, especially when the 
department’s typical modus operandi was never replying to requests. This was probably 
because the department could easily issue a negative response based on their enthnocratic 
rule of law. 
On 20 March 2001, the CRPC confirmed Bojić’s occupancy right over the 
apartment and submitted a request to the municipal housing department to enforce the 
CRPC decision on 8 May 2001. Over a year later, the municipal housing department 
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responded by offering Bojić an alternative accommodation, which he refused for the 
following reasons: all of the original Bosnian Croat tenants of the building were allocated 
purchasable apartments – not an alternative accommodation, the offered property 
belonged to a Bosniak who had been unable to repossess his apartment until that point, 
and the one-room apartment was located close to the Jubilee Cross on Mount Hum. Also, 
Bojic’s negative response to this offer could be related to his eviction on the east side a 
month later. He possibly foresaw the game of “musical chairs” that would result from the 
city’s attempt at property repossession to satisfy the growing influence of PLIP. The 
change in response from the housing department also indicates a change in the governing 
legal mechanisms of the office where the municipality became responsible for former 
occupants of “nationalized” property. 
Between the time of the housing department’s offer and the Chamber’s decision, 
Bojić was evicted from his temporarily allocated apartment on the east side on 18 July 
2002 and then had to pay 250 KM for rent monthly. On 8 April 2003, the Southwest 
municipality’s Department for Housing and Business Affairs issued a decision for the 
enforcement of the CRPC decision. However, by December 2003 (the date of the 
Chamber’s decision), the decision had not been enforced. The Southwest municipality 
used a number of delay tactics to lengthen the trial at the Chamber and the municipal 
court to last 2.5 years. These tactics included asking for a suspension of the trial to 
resolve the matter internally or extra-judicially, not showing up to trial, and not enforcing 
a recommendation from the Ombudsperson. The Chamber found the municipality guilty 
of discrimination and ordered it to reinstate Bojić to his apartment and pay compensation 
totaling 23,200 KM to Bojić. 
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Four cases involved JNA apartments. In the case of Mr. Ralević, he repossessed 
his apartment in west Mostar before the conclusion of the trial at the Human Rights 
Chamber, four years after he submitted his initial complaint.
328
 The other three JNA cases 
were related to apartments in the Old Town (Stari Grad) municipality. The JNA allocated 
an apartment to Mrs. Turundžić, a Bosnian Croat, on 20 December 1990.329 She lived 
there until the Bosnian war began in April 1992. On 27 January 1998, she began the 
process to repossess her apartment. However, after not receiving a reponse from the Stari 
Grad Municipal Service for Housing Communal Issues, Property Legal Issues and 
Building; the Secretariat for Urbanism, Building and Communal Affairs; and the Federal 
Ministry of Justice to enforce her CRPC decision, the Human Rights Chamber was her 
only recourse. She submitted her application to the Chamber in June 1999 and the 
Chamber determined in February 2001 that the municipality should allow the applicant to 
repossess her apartment and also pay her 3,600 KM in compensation. The third case 
resulted in a negative decision. On 11 April 1992, the Command of the Mostar Garrison 
JNA allocated an apartment to Mr. Poparić for the purpose of purchase. However, 
Poparić never moved into the apartment nor concluded an occupancy or purchase 
contract so the Chamber rejected the admissibility of the claim.
330
 
The fourth JNA case involved the prewar privatization of an apartment. Mr. 
Brčić, a Bosnian Croat, purchased his JNA apartment in the Stari Grad municipality on 2 
February 1992 before the Socialist Republic of BiH issued a law temporarily prohibiting 
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the sale of socially-owned apartments.
331
 He was demobilized from the JNA on 19 April 
1992, approximately a month and half after the Bosnian War officially began. On 3 
November 1992 he moved to Austria as a refugee, but subsequently went to Zagreb in 
October 1999. After submitting three requests to repossess the apartment in 1998, Brčić 
finally received a statement from the Head of the Municipal Service on 8 December 
1998, stating: 
“In view of the problems in finding alternative accommodation for the 
temporary user of your facility, as well as the number of such cases in the 
area of the Municipality Mostar Stari Grad, we kindly ask you to take into 
account these circumstances because we are not in the position to comply 
with your request within the legally prescribed time limit.” 
However, according to Ombudsperson, the temporary users of the apartment occupied the 
apartment without legal grounds, which, according the cessation laws that went into 
effect the previous April, was grounds for swift eviction. On 28 September 2001, the 
municipality issued a positive decision for repossession; however, the temporary users of 
the apartment were not evicted until 13 May 2002. The FBiH argued against Brčić’s 
claim to the apartment as an owner. Their argument was that Brčić did not provide 
evidence of payment for the apartment, but the chamber ruled against this claim, deciding 
that the FBiH’s unwillingness to do so was a violation of Brčić’s human rights. 
Unfortunately many of the verdicts given by the chamber did not specify the 
ethnicity of the plaintiff. One of the disadvantages of this is the inability to examine the 
role of gender in property restitution, especially in a place like Mostar where there were 
numerous inter-ethnic marriages. One case may be suggestive of the way ethnicity and 
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gender played a role in the ethnocratic politics of property restitution and hopefully will 
spur further research on the subject. In the case of Trklja et al v. the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the plaintiffs were represented by the ARC’s Legal Aid Center, which 
claimed that the plaintiffs were unable to repossess their properties in the West and 
Southwest municipalities because of discrimination.
332
 The applicants consisted of two 
Bosniaks, four Bosnian Serbs, and one Bosnian Croat. The sole Bosnian Croat, Mrs. 
Ovčina, was married to a Bosniak, Mr. Ovčina. From the reviewed cases, Mrs. Ovčina 
was the only person that made a complaint against a municipality in which they were of 
the majority ethnicity because they could not repossess their prewar home. The 
assumption is that the restitution case was blocked because the husband was of a minority 
ethnicity. 
Mr. and Mrs. Petrović, who are Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat respectively, had 
a case regarding their house in the Stari Grad municipality where a CRPC decision was 
not fully executed.
333
 During the war, they left their home and three families moved in. 
When they filed their first request for repossession to the Municipal Service for Housing 
Affairs, Reconstruction and Cadaster of Real Property on 21 July 1999, it was rejected 
because the service stated that the request was incomplete. They filed an appeal on 3 
August 1999 and learned that they needed to submit copies of relevant documents. On 3 
December 1999, they resubmitted the request with the necessary copies, but did not 
receive a response. A common trend in the cases was that if the authority easily could 
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issue a negative response, the authority responded quickly, but if there was a possibility 
of a positive response, the authority would either not respond or send a significantly 
delayed response. On 6 April 2000, they requested for an administrative inspection to the 
Federal Ministry of Justice about the situation. Even though the ministry also did not 
respond, the municipality issued a decision to evict only one of the temporary users four 
days after the request to the ministry. The municipality followed this action with another 
decision on 26 April 2000, evicting another temporary user; however, the municipality 
only executed one of the two evictions by 18 November 2000. Unfortunately, the couple 
was unable to move into the ground floor of their house because the space was looted (the 
rest of the house was still occupied by temporary users). Because of the chamber 
decision, the Petrovićs were to be allowed to repossess the entire house. 
In the case of Mrs. Kelecija, after she returned from Germany where she lived 
during the war, she attempted to rebuild the ground floor of the building that housed her 
apartment. She did this herself because, as she claimed, the Stari Grad municipality – the 
owner of the apartment building – did not demonstrate the willingness to reconstruct the 
building.
334
 On 17 August 1999, the Municipal Urban Construction Inspector ordered 
Kelecija to demolish what she had built. She did not respond to the order, hoping that the 
demolition would not take place. She submitted an application to the Human Rights 
Chamber a day before the demolition, not knowing that she could have appealed the 
decision at the municipality. The Chamber refused her request the same day and on 24 
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December 1999, her work was demolished. Unfortunately, this woman today lives in the 
Baffo collective settlement for IDPs. 
The Razvitak Case 
The systematic strikes against property records allowed local powerbrokers the 
ability to take advantage of the privatization process to reap significant economic gains. 
These powerbrokers acted on both sides of Mostar and used their power gained during 
the war to manipulate the privatization and property restitution processes. Generally, any 
person with a sense of self-preservation in Mostar speaks of these people in vague terms, 
referring to them as “interests” or “forces.” Names of perpetrators need to be deduced 
from news articles because most, if not all, residents are too scared of violent backlash 
from organized criminal elements that pervade the entire political economy of the city.  
One of the most publicized cases of the manipulation of privatization and property 
restitution in Mostar involves the Razvitak complex, which included a 13-unit apartment 
building and a shopping complex. The Razvitak complex was sold illegally during the 
privatization process by cutting out the former residents of the complex, but has now 
been stuck in a legal battle since 2001. In 1992, JNA forces significantly damaged the 
complex during the first siege of Mostar. The housing units were still in good condition 
even though the building was gutted. Around 1995-6, Razvitak Metković, through the 
Croatian government, released a public invitation for the privatization of the entire 
complex. After the tender process, Razvitak Metković decided to sell the complex to 
Slezak, which sparked a court battle initiated by Emir Kečo who believed that he 
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submitted the better offer.
335
 Ironically, this court case brought the situation to the 
attention of the apartment building’s former residents, learning that the deal would cause 
them to completely lose their former homes – a situation of which they were completely 
unaware. The original contract between Razvitak Metković and Slezak only mentioned 
the former residents once, stating that solving the housing situation of the former 
residents was the responsibility of the city because it claimed that the residents had 
missed the deadline to reclaim the property. The initial municipal court trial was sent to 
the Cantonal Court and between the two trials, from February to September 2002, the 
former residents were finally able to examine the land books. Upon examination, they 
determined the books were altered. 
The city illegally demolished the apartment building in 1997, dubiously claiming 
that the building was a risk to collapse.
336
 As anybody who has walked around ruin-filled 
postwar Mostar knows, this reason has not led to the demolition of the numerous 
hazardous structures that populate the city. The land books had no record of the 
apartment building ever existing, effectively consolidating the various interests of the 
property, such as the various allocation right holders, to just Razvitak Metković so the 
company could sell the whole land. This development is interesting because the contract 
still mentioned the existence of the apartment building and its former residents even 
though the documents were altered to show that they never existed. The cadastre, on the 
hand, was not changed and showed the true condition of the property in relation to rights. 
Since the trial at the Cantonal Court began, all of the records related to the property are 
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closed to the public until the case is settled. Over ten years later, the case is still not 
complete and the property records are still withheld from the public. During this time, the 
trial went from the Cantonal Court to the Supreme Court of BiH and back to the 
municipal court. 
The reason for the interest in the property is because of the space's potential 
economic value. The land is located in the heart of the city at the intersection of Braća 
Brkić and Maršal Tito, right next to the modern urban center of the east side. An 
interesting ethnic component of the case is that Razvitak Metković,337 a Croatia-based 
company, favored Slezak, a Bosnian Croat, over Kečo, a Bosniak, who offered the 
company a better deal. While the property is locked in the legal dispute, the land where 
the apartment building once stood is being used as a parking lot. Oddly, no one knows 
who collects the money for the parking fees, but the watchmen of the parking lot are 
generally war veterans. 
Even though the apartment building only had 13 units, the former inhabitants of 
this building are spread across the world in the United States, Austria, Denmark, 
Montenegro, Norway, and Mostar. Oručević, the mayor of east Mostar at the time, 
promised to rebuild the apartment building with international and domestic donations. 
However, all of the collected donations were redirected to other reconstruction projects 
because of the building's undetermined legal status. This includes 1.5 million KM that the 
UNHCR gave to reconstruct the building. Residents claim they have enough personal and 
pledged funds that if the court rules in favor of restoring their occupancy rights, they can 
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reconstruct the building. Former resident, Mrs. Bašić claims that the problems of this 
building are unique in Mostar because it combines land record manipulation, illegal 
privatization, and the demolition of the building.
338
 Other properties in Mostar that are 
locked in court battles only have one or two of these characteristics. 
EPILOGUE: IDPS AND HOUSING IN POST-PLIP BIH 
Unfortunately, since BiH has not conducted a census since 1991, there are no 
concrete demographic statistics that demonstrate if the OHR’s attempt to reverse ethnic 
cleansing has been a success or a failure. The scholarly discourse on refugee and IDP 
return appears to indicate that many returnees exercised other options than actual return, 
which has arguably done more to solidify ethnic cleansing than reverse it.
339
 In 2007 after 
a majority of the “minority returns” occurred, the UNHCR conceded that after property 
repossession, many returnees “sold, exchanged or rented it, opting not to return 
permanently.”340 Scholars have observed that people in Mostar decided to sell their old 
property and buy new property on the other side of the imagined boundary.
341
 
Anders Stefansson argues that the OHR’s prioritizing of small home (residence) 
over big home reconstruction (political and socioeconomic structures) has led to a 
situation where returnees could not make sustainable returns. Without fixing local 
economies and political situations, sustainable returns were highly unlikely because 
returnees were unable to find work due to discrimination, political obstructionism, or 
high unemployment rates. According to Anders Stefansson, “In these circumstances the 
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‘right of return’ is more fiction than fact, as for most displaced Bosnians the option of 
“going home” is in practice a path to (renewed) poverty and social marginalization.”342  
However, Toal and John O’Loughlin directed a doorstep survey in December 
2004, which contradicted this discourse on returnees. Their results showed that in BiH 62 
percent of people who made property claims through PLIP decided to live in their houses 
and only 13 percent sold them. In the survey, Mostar had an especially high rate of 
physical return with 82 percent returning to live in their reclaimed property.
343
 If this 
situation holds true, then it would make the IC’s belief on minority return more 
problematic because minority returns have not led to ethnic harmony or true integration, 
at least in Mostar. In spite of returns, the city remains structurally and mentally divided. 
There is another explanation for these results at least in relation to Mostar. 
Around 500,000 or 25% of people displaced by the conflict found sustainable resolutions 
to their refugee status abroad and Mostar was a large contributor to the number of such 
refugees.
344
 During the conflict, a significant portion of Mostar’s population was 
displaced abroad; however, the city’s population did not see a significant corresponding 
drop as one would expect.
345
 According to Bjelaković and Strazzari, as “the conflict 
progressed and the destruction of Mostar became extraordinary among Bosnian cities, the 
original population of Mostar left the city in large numbers and was gradually replaced by 
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the refugees from the surrounding countryside fleeing ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns.”346 
Due to the nature of the survey, refugees who stayed abroad would be excluded from the 
results. My theory is that a significant number of the prewar population did not return to 
Mostar and instead IDPs from surrounding areas relocated to the city, taking advantage of 
the ethnocratic regimes’ relocation programs and reinforcing the ethnic homogeneity of 
the two sides. For example, in the Razvitak case at least 38%, but probably more, of the 
prewar residents live abroad. Of course this theory is based on conjecture and cannot be 
proven without painstaking effort or until BiH conducts an official census. 
The up-coming census will provide a significant opportunity to answer many of 
the questions related to reversing ethnic cleansing. The new census in BiH will be 
conducted when this thesis will be released. If the pilot version of the census on the 
website for the BiH Agency for Statistics is utilized, the information will allow scholars 
to plot the geographic axes of final displacement according to a number of factors. 
Census interviewees will give their ethnicity/nationality, current address, address in 1991, 
address of displacement (if displaced), current or past refugee or IDP status, and if they 
have attempted to reclaim their original property.
347
 If these categories remain on the 
official census, this information will provide a better overview on the dynamics of 
displacement and the resilience of ethnic expulsions and consolidation. 
“Uniting” Mostar 
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In 2003, the OHR created a multiethnic commission called the Commission for 
Reforming the City of Mostar to analyze the political and structural problems of Mostar 
and suggest recommendations to remedy the problems.
348
 The commission found that 
Mostar had a bloated government that was an unnecessary burden upon the city’s 
population. According to the report by the commission:  
In the current City-Municipality and city administrations there is one 
public employee for every 189 citizens. Experts suggest that a ratio of 
1:500 would be a more acceptable level. This bloated bureaucracy in 2003 
has cost each citizen an average of 288 KM (Bosnian Convertible Mark), 
up from an average of 234 KM in 2002. When one considers that the 
average monthly salary in the Federation is approximately 470 KM, it 
becomes apparent that citizens devote too large a portion of their hard-
earned income to pay the salaries of superfluous public employees. This 
represents money not spent on starting a small business, buying 
educational supplies for children or making home improvements.
349
 
Bieber demonstrates that Brčko has a similar sized public administration as Mostar, but 
he argues that the greater problem was ineffectiveness instead of size.
350
 While Mostar is 
an exemplary case of an ineffective bloated government apparatus, the structural 
problems of a significant tax burden with few social benefits affected BiH as a whole. 
Based on the committee’s recommendation and after failed negotiations with the city’s 
elite, the OHR imposed the Statute of the City of Mostar, which transformed the city-
municipalities into electoral units and decreed that Mostar would form a single 
municipality.
351
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In spite of the decree, change in the political and social structures was slow to 
take effect. By October 2006, the Peace Implementation Council noted that “no tangible 
progress has been achieved in completing the unification of the Mostar city 
administration as required by the Statute as a result of political intransigence.”352 The 
OHR imposed the establishment of the Spatial Development Institute in Mostar to advise 
spatial development in the city in order to accelerate the unification of the city, but 
politicians have only slowly established the institute.
353
 Since the OHR imposed the 
administrative unification of the city, there have been a number of political issues related 
to declaring a mayor and determining a budget. For long periods, the city has been left 
without a mayor or a budget because of disputes over ethnic representation. In November 
2010, the BiH Constitutional Court declared that the electoral system created by the City 
Statute was unconstitutional because of “the large differences in the number of voters 
required to elect councilors to the City Council between Mostar’s six City Areas” and 
“the discriminatory treatment of voters in Mostar’s Central Zone who…only elect 
councilors from a city-wide list and not from a geographical voting district.”354 Because 
politicians have failed to implement the Constitutional Court decision, people in Mostar 
did not vote in the 2012 municipal elections. 
The OHR attempted to mend the social and political divisions in Mostar, but the 
divisions run deep and have typically obstructed the OHR’s best efforts. The unification 
of the Old Gymnasium presents an excellent example of the problems encountered when 
                                                 
352
 “Communique by the PIC Steering Board,” PIC SB Political Directors (20 October 2006). 
353
 Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Decision Enacting the Decision on 
Establishment of the Spatial Development Institute,” (22 December 2006), 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=38777 (accessed April 5, 2011) 
354
 Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "42nd Report.” 
 148 
unifying the structures through decree and with little power to enforce change locally. 
The Old Gymnasium is within the Central Zone, but officials of Herceg-Bosna quickly 
took over the facilities after the building was reconstructed. By 2004, Bosnian Croats and 
Bosniaks finally attended the same school under a “unified” Mostar Gymnasium; 
however, “in practice this means that reunification has maintained separate national 
curricula for the students of the two ethnic groups, thus preserving ethnic segregation 
through unification,” i.e. “two schools under one roof.”355 One of the main arguments for 
the separate curricula is the “different” languages, which less than twenty years ago were 
considered one language. On 27 April 2012, Mostar’s municipal court ordered the 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton to end “two schools under one roof” but the judgment has 
yet to be realized to date.
356
 This example demonstrates the obstinate persistence of the 
division in Mostar and the obsession over highlighting small differences in language and 
culture.  
Collective Centers in Mostar 
The creation of collective centers (CC) in Mostar began early during the Bosnian 
War. These centers were located in places like abandoned buildings, schools, and 
barracks with widely varying conditions. During the first siege of Mostar by the JNA and 
Bosnian Serb military forces, 2-3 collective centers were established to house the 
displaced. When the split between the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak military alliance 
occurred, there was a significant increase and by 1997-98 there were 18 collective centers 
in the city, housing thousands of IDPs. In 1998 the Baffo collective settlement was 
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established to be a transitional house for IDP families waiting for the reconstruction of 
their homes. However, its transitional status changed as reconstruction projects were 
seriously delayed and more IDPs found their time in Baffo to be extended by years or 
indefinitely. The conditions in Baffo are better than most, if not all, of the collective 
centers. In the Baffo settlement, unlike most collective centers, families have their own 
housing units, more living space, and each family has their own bathroom. With the 
return or relocation of a significant number of IDPs, BiH and the IC have made closing 
collective centers a priority in BiH; however, the type of residents left in collective 
centers requires different solutions than used previously. 
After the end of PLIP, the RRTF and CRPC were closed, and local authorities 
undertook the responsibility of completing the goals of Annex 7.
357
 The first step that the 
BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugee took was a comprehensive re-registration of 
IDPs in 2005 according to the new, stricter definition of an IDP, resulting in a significant 
drop in the number of IDPs. Since “IDPs who had received construction aid, had acquired 
property or had in some other way integrated into the community of their post-war 
residence lost their status,” only 125,072 of 186,451 applicants received a positive 
decision to maintain their IDP status in BiH.
358
 As of 2008, Mostar had 1,025 IDPs, 
which was the fifth most in the FBiH and the twelfth most in all of BiH.
359
 Since re-
registration, most IDPs in Mostar could not resolve their status because their prewar 
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home was still destroyed so there was strong focus on acquiring reconstruction aid from 
the BiH government and international donors through humanitarian organizations, such 
as Catholic Relief Services, Hilfswerk-Austria, Mercy Corps, and the Danish Relief 
Council.
360
 This situation is similar to the rest of the FBiH where 16,160 of 17,941 
displaced families were unable to return because their housing was destroyed or 
unusable.
361
 
Local authorities and the IC slowly dispersed funds for reconstruction, decreasing 
the number of IDPs living in collective centers and alternative accommodations. As of 
October 2011, there were still four collective centers and the Baffo collective settlement 
in Mostar, but two collective centers were closed during the summer of 2012: Juzni 
Logor and Sjeverni Logor collective centers. While the numbers are decreasing, an issue 
is arising because the problems of the majority of the beneficiaries in collective centers 
are changing. In the Baffo settlement there are 100 families (309 individuals) and of these 
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families only 15 have IDP status. The populations in collective centers now are generally 
elderly, sick, people with physical or mental disabilities, and people who did not have 
housing before the war.
362
 
The solutions of restitution and reconstruction are becoming no longer applicable 
as the percentage of social cases in collective centers rises. For example, for the Catholic 
Relief Services’ 2012 social housing project in Mostar, the organization needed to 
petition the municipality to be allowed to change the criteria for beneficiaries to include 
social cases because not enough IDPs applied. The social housing model pioneered by 
Catholic Relief Services in BiH is similar to the solidarity apartments built during the 
SFRY period and is the best approach moving forward to resolve cases where people did 
not own property before the war, people cannot live on their own, or the person’s 
property will never receive adequate funds for reconstruction, but still help to satisfy their 
housing needs. The regional joint return program that was established between BiH, 
Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia in 2011 did not take this growing group into 
consideration so only people with IDP or refugee status qualify for aid from this program. 
While this program will help alleviate the burden of the displaced on the governments, it 
will not result in the end of collective centers and alternative accommodation. The 
criterion for receiving aid needs to be adjusted generally in order to complete Annex 7 
and finally close all of the collective centers in BiH. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have argued that nationalist politicians and criminals espoused a 
discourse of ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in 
order to establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal 
colonization of residential and commercial property by manipulating the prewar 
discourse on property relations. During the SFRY, five developments conspired to permit 
nationalists and criminals to colonize space and economic resources and maintain power: 
the vague definition of social ownership, the legacy of previous land reform, the role of 
the informal economy, personal networks and the development of organized crime. 
Since the Ottomans, each new governing regime in BiH left a mark on either the 
mechanics of land administration or land ownership. However, for thesis, the introduction 
of social ownership as a model of property distribution under the SFRY was the most 
important. The fact that the concept was administered with contingent usage rights 
provided nationalists ways to manipulate old laws (the Law on Housing Relations) and 
create new laws (abandoned property laws), which allowed them to create a legal veneer 
to hide their criminal actions. To compound matters, the land administration system in 
BiH was in a poor condition even before the war. This allowed nationalists to make only 
minimal alterations to seize economic assets and frustrate future efforts at property 
restitution. Also, previous land reform created past grievances and historical moments 
that nationalists could exploit to curry favor with religious institutions that were closely 
tied to nationalistic ideologies in order to maintain their place in the nationalist hierarchy 
of champions. 
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During the war, nationalists and criminals created territory-hungry ethnocratic 
regimes through their prewar networks that sought to carve out their ideal geo-body. 
Personal networks were strengthened and expanded during the war, creating strong ties 
among former communist elites, nationalist émigrés, criminals, and businessmen. These 
networks used the wartime conditions and prewar shadow economies to colonize 
economic resources and develop new illicit trade in regional organized crime networks. 
After the Bosnian War, these networks competed for supremacy over the centralized, 
ethnocratic political economies and began to fracture into competing factions that sought 
their piece of the political economy.  
In Mostar, the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak ethnocratic regimes competed for 
control of the city during and after the Bosnian War. The Bosnian Croat regime was the 
more documented perpetrator of ethnic cleansing in the city as the regime attempted to 
transform Mostar into the capital of a Bosnian Croat nation-state through expulsions of 
people, but the Bosniak regime also did its fair share damage. During the war, fighting 
was intense, reducing Mostar to rubble, which led it to be compared with Dresden during 
World War II. However, the destruction of the city while general was also very specific. 
Along with the demographic operations of ethnic cleansing, the regimes attempted to 
destroy heterogeneous space as symbols of other identities, such as religious building, 
were intentionally destroyed. After the Bosnian War, the regimes sought to colonize this 
cleansed space by relocating people of the same ethnicity who were expelled from other 
parts of BiH and (re)constructing buildings and monuments that represent a particular 
identity. The regimes also created parallel institutions that gave the regimes a source of 
income and consolidated the spatial division of the city forged by war. 
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After the Bosnian War, the IC attempted to undo ethnic cleansing and to 
implement the human rights agenda of the Dayton Peace Agreement – the recreation of 
ethnic territorial heterogeneity. However, since the goals of the Dayton Agreement were 
antithetical to the ethnocratic regimes’ maintenance of power, the regimes continually 
obstructed international efforts. They particularly sought to obstruct the property 
restitution process because undoing ethnic cleansing would have undermined the 
ethnocratic sociocultural relations that helped them maintain their hold over their 
constituencies. The IC finally made progress against these regimes, particularly the 
Bosnian Croat regime, when the IC took a unified, activist approach to intervention. 
Also, the Bosnian Croat regime and BiH in general was in what Pugh and Neil Cooper 
define as a “regional conflict complex.” In the 1990s, BiH was surrounded by nationalist 
states that were in conflicts and/or deeply involved in the illicit trade of guns and drugs. 
For the Bosnian Croat regime, the Croatian government politically and financially 
supported the regime’s obstructionist government, but in early 2000 this situation 
changed. Croatia began withdrawing support, which placed significant strain on the 
ability of the Bosnian Croat’s regime to placate its constituents while the elites gorged 
themselves on the territory’s resources. 
These developments began to erode the structures that supported the regimes, 
allowing for property restitution to make significant progress. However, the economic 
and social condition of BiH was in bad shape, many of the economic resources were 
already ethnicized, and people began to settle in their place of relocation because of the 
length of the waiting period. These factors damaged BiH’s ability to nurture sustainable 
return for IDPs and refugees. In the end, the power of property restitution in return was 
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not properly exploited and the IC’s agenda of recreating territorial ethnic heterogeneity to 
a large extent failed. This final chapter analyzes the possible lessons learned from this 
case study, which can possibly be applied to other post-conflict and development aid 
situations. I focus mainly on addressing aid/intervention planning, “regional conflict 
complexes,” the informal economy, and property rights. 
Taking Stock of IC Intervention and Aid 
The IC’s intervention in BiH draws some parallels to discussions about the IC’s 
role in international development. Many scholars argue for widely different approaches to 
international development and aid that can be used to fight and end poverty.
363
 The main 
battle in the sphere of international development is basically between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches or what William Easterly calls planners and searchers.
364
 I will use 
Easterly and Jeffrey D. Sachs to represent the two different sides in this debate. 
Easterly argues against all-encompassing plans, particularly those of Sachs, and 
IC-generated solutions, and instead emphasizes the importance of an experimental 
piecemeal approach that takes criticism and local feedback seriously. Easterly is 
extremely critical of how most aid has been used over the past half century, believing that 
much of the aid has been wastefully used and that in many cases it has done more harm 
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than good.
365
 One of the big criticisms of aid is its lack of attention to the needs and 
wants of the poor. According to Easterly, aid has been generally used in the framework of 
“pushing” people out of poverty instead of giving them the tools to develop out of 
poverty. 
Sachs, on the other hand, promotes big plans and goals, believing that piecemeal 
programs are not enough to solve poverty. He argues that the poor are in poverty traps 
and the use of funds can push them out of it. He favors approaches that attempt to solve 
structural problems from the top-down and grand schemes to solve certain problems. 
Sachs criticizes Easterly for understating aid’s actual contribution to development and 
Easterly’s assertion that the West already has made a significant contribution. Sachs does 
applaud Easterly for criticizing the use of aid being wasted on certain projects and the 
political effect upon aid distribution.
366
 However, Sachs then in his plan wants to create a 
grand structure for the distribution of aid, consisting of the UN, the World Bank, the 
IMF, and national aid agencies like USAID.
367
 Sachs commonly makes excuses when his 
plans failed, for example in the SFRY and Russia, blaming the actions of politicians. 
However, he fails to see that his UN plan would give the power of aid distribution to 
organizations that are strongly impacted by their political benefactors. 
Peter Singer takes a similar stance of Sachs that rich countries can and should 
provide more money for the development of poor countries, but provides a different 
solution than Sachs. Even though Singer maintains a similar criticism of Easterly, he 
more correctly emphasizes that Easterly’s focus on the World Bank and the IMF ignores 
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the real contributions by good NGOs, such as Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, World 
Vision, and CARE.
368
 Singer advocates that individuals from rich country directly give a 
certain percentage of their income to good aid organizations. This involves individuals in 
the process so that organizations are held more accountable when aid is distributed 
poorly.
369
 This discussion on international development has immense importance to this 
thesis’ case study and provides a good baseline to tease out lessons from this study. 
From this case study, I would argue that property restitution made significant 
progress in Mostar because the IC adopted a unified and interventionist approach, 
imposing international human rights standards and rule of law on regimes, and the 
“regional conflict complex” changed. However, the cost of the project was high as many 
financial and political resources were inefficiently used or wasted. It is important to learn 
from mistakes made in BiH because most post-conflict situations will not enjoy the same 
financial and political support.
370
 
In post-conflict situations where significant amounts of aid are funneled into the 
country, the international aid and intervention effort must be coordinated.
371
 This 
recommendation goes beyond post-conflict situations and encompasses general 
development aid situations as well when a country becomes a favored target of many 
donors. Generally, when there is a large influx of aid and donors into a location, donors’ 
average knowledge base of the local situation and its particular dynamics decreases as 
many more donors and employees move in with no real knowledge of the location. Also, 
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as Singer points out, many organizations historically measure their effectiveness through 
input (aid money disburse) instead of output (impact upon recipient) so donors who need 
to spend out their budgets become too willing to donate to any project when good 
projects are scarce.
372
 Therefore, when there is an overabundance of aid and donors in an 
area with little coordination, local organizations and networks can easily play 
international organizations against each other to negotiate the most lucrative and least 
intrusive deal. This significantly reduces local accountability and increasing the chances 
of people “lining their pockets.” 
Also, international organizations need a managing structure in these situations in 
order to effectively handle the regional context and dynamics that generally funnel 
money and goods into these regimes. Through an organized structure, the IC can assert 
pressure that influences both ethnocratic regimes and their regional enablers. A 
significant advantage of this approach is that it allows for the efficient management of a 
“regional conflict complex.” The IC must pay attention to and understand the country’s 
shadow economics in order to dismantle structures that maintain criminal regimes. 
Mainly, these structures need to be dismantled through the tight control over financial 
flows that come from international donors, regional powerbrokers, and illegal activities. 
The IC needs to attempt to stop or seriously obstruct illegal activities that, in more cases 
than not, fund these regimes, allowing them to operate unhindered. An example in this 
case study is the raid of Hercegovačka Banka. Particularly, the obstruction of smuggling 
by reforming and reinforcing customs administration is an important first step to hinder 
the flow of illicit products and dirty money. 
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However, this approach should be taken in tandem with efforts to decrease the 
demand for smuggled goods domestically and abroad. If demand is high enough, but the 
corresponding supply is not available, informal economies grow to satisfy the demand. 
Because the IC never fully addressed this second part, ethnocratic regimes have limped 
along, maintaining their smuggling routes into the present. How to accomplish this 
second part is beyond the scope of this thesis and I, by no means, intend to imply that 
accomplishing this second part is a simple task. This is not to argue that economic factors 
wholly determine the fate of these regimes, especially since ideological sympathies can 
allow a regime to endure immense hardship, but controlling the financial element can 
force regimes to cooperate and encourage factions within those regimes to cooperate with 
the IC as a moderate alternative. The reality of intense donor migration to certain 
locations creates a situation where the IC can waste money, losing good opportunities and 
financing the problem. To accomplish this, the IC must deal with these geopolitically 
entrenched regimes with a united front. 
However, this recommendation has a number of problems that were touched upon 
in this thesis in regard to property restitution and compensation. Even though the IC did 
not act uniformly early in the process, it did have a plan – the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
One of the main problems in the Dayton Agreement in regard to property restitution was 
that Annex 7 obligated two mechanisms for the execution of property restitution: the 
domestic housing authorities and the CRPC. However, since the CRPC’s mandate did not 
include an enforcement mechanism and domestic housing authorities still had to process 
and implement claims, the CRPC was largely redundant and its role in the processing of 
claims was an inefficient use of money. Also, the domestic authorities were mostly 
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unwilling to process claims so the IC established PLIP, which was successful, but it 
involved three different agencies to ensure that domestic housing authorities did their 
jobs, increasing the cost of property restitution. It would have been more useful if the 
Dayton Agreement made the CRPC work within the administrative structure of domestic 
housing offices and operate as PLIP did. This would have made domestic housing offices 
more accountable to the displaced population, but the offices would have been sole target 
of criticism and pressure. 
With a unified interventionist approach by the IC, a major issue becomes who 
determines policy and the needs and desires of beneficiaries. The IC structure that 
governs the reconstruction process is less accountable to the local population and there is 
less opportunity for them to voice their opinion. The IC can easily fall into the trap of 
imposing their agenda on the people with international aims taking precedent over local 
needs. One example is that compensation was not developed as an option for IDPs and 
refugees mainly because the IC believed that compensation implicitly condoned ethnic 
cleansing. I am not intending to argue that property restitution is not a more favorable 
result than relocation. However, not providing IDPs and refugees a real choice between 
return and relocation violated the Dayton Agreement, and it disregarded the true desire of 
a proportion of the displaced population. Also, not addressing the issue of compensation 
allowed the CRPC and the IC to avoid effective intervention into the property market. If 
the CRPC had managed a compensation fund, it would have been forced to develop an 
appropriate valuation method of property and would have been a stabilizing force in the 
market. The decision to not offer compensation and the timeframe of property restitution 
bring the moral stance of the IC’s agenda into question. While supporting compensation 
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and relocation can be viewed as implicitly accepting the violent results of ethnic 
cleansing, the absence of compensation ignores the possible wishes of the wronged, and 
the significant length that it took property restitution to be accomplished increased the 
suffering of the wronged. 
As discussed with problems in the real estate market, the argument that IDPs and 
refugees effectively received compensation when they sold their returned property is 
shaky at best. Beyond the issues of the formal structure of the market, IDPs and refugees 
sold their property at cheaper prices because buyers were aware that they would not 
return so buyers could extort cheaper prices from them. Also, many left Mostar at the 
beginning of the second siege in 1993 and did not receive their property back until 2001 
in most of Mostar, at the earliest, so many waited eight years or more until they could 
return home. This is neither timely nor fair as argued by members of the IC.
373
 If the IC 
wanted to achieve the recreation of ethnic heterogeneity at the expense of the wishes of a 
portion of the wronged, the IC should have ensured that these people did not continue to 
suffer in collective centers and alternative accommodations. However, because the 
wishes of the locals were ignored, these people waited for an excessive amount of time to 
do what they possibly wanted to do in the first place. 
Instituting a clear, well-documented system of property rights is an important 
preventative measure against wide-scale, permanent dispossession. IDPs and refugees in 
BiH were lucky that the possession lists existed, which acted as a safety net against the 
large informal real estate market that existed in the SFRY. However, if only the land 
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books existed, the poor condition of property records in BiH could have created a dire 
situation where property restitution would have been impossible to implement. Even 
though this study approaches the importance of property rights from a different angle, 
this study builds upon Hernando de Soto’s argument for formalizing the informal.374 
Even though Robert Neuwirth argues against de Soto, stating that privatization and 
stronger property rights rarely leads to increased financial capacity, Neuwirth also 
documented how the absence of the legal protection that property rights provide leaves 
populations open to being permanently and irrevocably dispossessed of hard-earned 
wealth even in peace time.
375
 It would be prudent for countries to simplify property 
systems and create less prohibitive taxation systems, especially since these were the 
largest deterrents in the SFRY. Property rights are more than a tool for development as 
elucidated by de Soto. Property rights are a legal protection from antagonistic regimes 
and groups. 
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1463 – The Kingdom of Bosnia fell to the Ottoman Empire 
1566 – Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent ordered Stari Most to be built 
1580 – The Ottoman Empire established the Eyalet of Bosnia 
1859 – The Ottoman Empire passed the Safer Decree 
1864 – Administrative reform transformed the Eyalet of Bosnia into the Vilayet of 
Bosnia 
1877-1878 – The Russo-Turkish War 
1878 – Austro-Hungary occupied the Vilayet of Bosnia and established it as a 
condominium  
13 September 1994 – The Austro-Hungarian administration instituted the land registry 
law 
1886-1911 – Implementation of the land books in the entirety of BiH 
7 October 1908 – Austro-Hungarian officially annexed the Condominium of BiH 
1 December 1918 –The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is formed 
28 June 1921 – Vidovdan Constitution is passed 
6 January 1929 – Constitution is abolished and King Alexander became dictator 
3 October 1929 – The kingdom is renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia  
1930 – The Austro-Hungarian dual registration land system is expanded to the rest of 
Yugoslavia 
6 April 1941 – Axis Powers invaded Yugoslavia 
1945 – The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is established and the Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is established as a constitutive republic 
1948 – Yugoslav-Soviet Split 
1963 – The Third Yugoslav Constitution is passed 
1965 – Reforms of 1965 are passed 
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1974 – The Fourth Yugoslav Constitution is passed 
4 May 1980 – Josip Broz Tito died 
1984 – Cadastre and Real Estate Law is pass in the Socialist Republic of BiH 
18 November 1991 – Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna is established 
April 1992 – The Bosnian War began 
3 April 1992 – The First Siege of Mostar began 
14 April 1993 – The Croat-Bosniak Civil War began 
9 May 1993 – The Second Siege of Mostar began 
14 August 1993 – Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna is proclaimed 
9 November 1993 – Stari Most destroyed 
1 March 1994 – The Washington Agreement is signed between the Croatian Republic of 
Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FBiH is 
formed 
5 May 1994 – Geneva Memorandum of Agreement on Mostar is signed, establishing the 
EUAM 
14 December 1995 – Dayton Peace Agreement is signed and Carl Bildt is named the first 
High Representative 
18 February 1996 – Rome Agreement is signed 
30 June 1996 – Mostar held its first post-Dayton elections, after which the EUAM is 
replaced by the OSEM 
1 January 1997 – The OHR regional office in Mostar is established. 
January 1997 – The OHR and UNHCR formed the RRTF 
10 February 1997 – Liska Street incident occurred 
18 June 1997 – Carlos Westendorp became High Representative 
14 September 1997 – Second postwar elections occurred in Mostar 
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December 1997 – Bonn powers granted to the OHR 
4 April 1998 – Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned 
Apartments, Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary 
Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens and Law on Taking over the Law 
on Housing Relations are passed 
23 June 1998 – Privatization Monitoring Commission is established 
18 August 1999 – Wolfgang Petritsch became High Representative 
14 October 1999 – Operation WESTAR conducted 
27 October 1999 – Law on Implementation of the Decisions of the Commission for Real 
Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees is imposed 
29 November 1999 – OHR removed Stipe Marić (Mayor of Mostar-Southwest 
Municipality, Marina Deronjić (Head of Mostar-Southwest Municipality’s 
Housing Department), and Nedzad Behram (Head of Mostar-Stari Grad’s 
Housing Department) from office. 
18 April 2001 – SFOR raided Hercegovačka Bank 
15 January 2002 – OHR removed Ivan Mandić (Head of Southwest Mostar Municipality) 
from office  
27 May 2002 – Paddy Ashdown became High Representative 
November 2002 – FBiH Law on Land Registry was adopted 
2003 – The Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar is established 
23 July 2004 – Reconstructed Stari Most is inaugurated 
31 January 2006 – Christian Schwarz-Schilling became High Representative 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF DOCUMENTATION ACCEPTED BY THE CRPC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Everything in this appendix is quoted from the CRPC’s Books of Regulations.
 183 
Documentation accepted to confirm an occupancy right: 
a.) Contract on apartment usage; or 
b.) Contract on apartment exchange; or 
c.) Court decision confirming the occupancy right (with the clause of validity); or 
d.) Decision of a competent administrative body replacing the contract on apartment 
usage with the clause of validity; or 
e.) Excerpt from official records of holders of occupancy rights which indicates the 
holder of the occupancy right on 1 April 1992. 
f.) Decision on apartment usage (decision on allocation of apartment); 
g.) Decision on apartment rent; 
h.) Apartment rent slip; 
i.) Decision by which an apartment is declared abandoned; 
j.) Decision by which an apartment is allocated to another person for his/her temporary 
usage; 
k.) Certificate of place of residence at claimed apartment; 
l.) Utility bills; or 
m.) other appropriate evidence. 
 
The types of evidence for confirming an ownership right are: 
(1) property book extracts confirming an ownership right to the claimed real property, 
with the situation as of 01.04.1992 ; or 
(2) real property cadastre extracts confirming an ownership right to the claimed real 
property with the situation as of 01.04.1992 for cadastre municipalities where the real 
 184 
property cadastre came into effect prior to 1.4.1992 by the decision of the competent 
authority; 
(3) real property cadastre extracts confirming ownership to the claimed real property, 
issued after 01.04.1992, for areas where the real property cadastre has not entered into 
force or where it entered into force after 01.04.1992, provided that the competent 
authority has confirmed that the recorded status is identical to the status as of 01.04.1992. 
For municipalities where the Property Book is not in existence, the types of evidence for 
confirming an ownership right are: 
(1) property book extracts issued before 01.04.1992; or 
(2) court decisions allowing the presentation of documents with the aim of acquiring 
ownership over the claimed real property; or 
(3) legally valid contracts of sale or legally valid gift contracts of the claimed real 
property concluded prior to 1.4.1992, if the person who acquired rights to the claimed 
real property is found to be registered in the cadastral records valid for 1.4.1992; or 
(4) legally valid contract on transfer of real property from social ownership concluded 
before 01.04.1992. if the buyer of the claimed real property is found to be registered in 
the cadastral records valid for 01.04.1992.; or 
(5) inheritance decisions, made prior to 1.4.1992, which include the clause of validity; or 
(6) court decisions on ownership rights to the claimed real property, made prior to 
1.4.1992, which include the clause of validity; or 
(7) valid decisions made before 1.4.1992 in administrative procedures on the basis of 
which agrarian based ownership (usurpation, redistribution of land, redistribution of 
fields and others) is acquired. 
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The types of evidence for confirming lawful possession of real property are: 
(1) cadastral records (transcript of the possession document) for the claimed real property 
which indicate the state of facts on 1.4.1992; 
In cases where the evidence referred to in the previous paragraph is not available, lawful 
possession may be confirmed on the basis of the following: 
(2) building permits issued prior to 1.4.1992;or 
(3) usage permits issued prior to 1.4.1992; or 
(4) urbanistic agreement issued prior to 01.04.1992. for reconstruction, additional 
building and other works on objects that already exist as well as for legalization of 
objects which were built without a building permit; or 
(5) contracts on current maintenance of joint premises concluded prior to 1.4.1992 in the 
building where, according to the statement of the claimant, there is ownership by floors 
of an apartment; or 
(6) decisions on presentation of real property and determining right to the real property, 
issued prior to 1.4.1992, for cadastral municipalities for which the real property cadastre 
did not come into effect prior to 1.4.1992; or 
(7) court decisions on inheritance prior to 1.4.1992, with the clause of validity; or 
(8) other court decisions establishing the right to real property prior to 1.4.1992, with the 
clause of validity; or 
(9) decisions made prior to 1.4.1992 in administrative procedures on the basis of which 
agrarian based ownership (usurpation, redistribution of land, redistribution of fields and 
others) is acquired; or 
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(10) decisions of administrative organs related to the claimed real property, made before 
1.4.1992; or 
(11) property book extracts issued before 1.4.1992, confirming the right of use of the 
claimed city construction land; or 
(12) legally valid contracts on sale or legally valid contracts on gift of the claimed real 
property concluded prior to 1.4.1992;or 
(13) legally valid contract on transfer of the claimed real property from social ownership, 
concluded prior to 01.04.1992; or 
(14) records on payment of tax on transfer of real property, income tax from real 
property, or tax on real property itself and other taxes; or 
(15) copies of possession lists related to the claimed real property issued prior to 
1.4.1992; or 
(16) copies of cadastral plans with complete data on the real properties and their users 
issued prior to 1.4.1992. 
(17) real property cadastre extracts confirming the right to use city construction land, 
issued after 01.04.1992, for areas where the real property cadastre has not entered into 
force or where it entered into force after 01.04.1992, provided that the competent 
authority has confirmed that the recorded status is identical to the status as of 01.04.1992 
(18) copy of possession list referring to the claimed real property issued after 01.04.1992. 
which, in combination with other evidence, confirms that the claimant was lawful 
possessor of the claimed real property on 01.04.1992. 
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APPENDIX C 
PLIP STATISTICS ON MOSTAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These statistics are a compilation of PLIP statistics maintained at: 
http://www.ohr.int/plip/. Two months are missing from the website and from tables 
included herein: February 2001 and March 2001. Negative decisions were not included in 
the statistics until November 2003 so the column called “Number of Decisions” 
transforms into “Number of Positive Decisions” from November 2003 onwards even 
though it is not explicitly stated. Sometimes updates were not sent from the municipal 
housing offices to PLIP headquarters for months at a time so the true progress of property 
restitution is not always illustrated. Also, municipal housing offices did not consistently 
post correct statistics so a number of adjustments are noticeable from the tables.
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Southwest Municipality 
Year Month Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 3633 65 N/A 7 256 3 N/A 0 3889 68 N/A 7 1.75% 0.18% 
June 3633 108 N/A 68 256 3 N/A 0 3889 111 N/A 68 2.85% 1.75% 
July 3633 164 N/A 77 257 8 N/A 0 3890 172 N/A 77 4.42% 1.98% 
Aug. 3633 251 N/A 111 260 11 N/A 0 3893 262 N/A 111 6.73% 2.85% 
Sept. 3633 270 N/A 142 257 12 N/A 0 3890 282 N/A 142 7.25% 3.65% 
Oct. 3633 270 N/A 142 257 12 N/A 0 3890 282 N/A 142 7.25% 3.65% 
Nov. 3801 579 N/A 298 298 43 N/A 22 4099 622 N/A 320 15.17% 7.81% 
Dec. 3801 670 N/A 333 302 46 N/A 22 4103 716 N/A 355 17.45% 8.65% 
2001 
Jan. 3801 670 N/A 333 302 46 N/A 22 4103 716 N/A 355 17.45% 8.65% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 3801 1047 N/A 552 305 64 N/A 40 4106 1111 N/A 592 27.06% 14.42% 
May 3801 1130 N/A 617 305 69 N/A 47 4106 1199 N/A 664 29.20% 16.17% 
June 3801 1239 N/A 685 305 74 N/A 50 4106 1313 N/A 735 31.98% 17.90% 
July 3801 1322 N/A 767 305 81 N/A 57 4106 1403 N/A 824 34.17% 20.07% 
Aug. 3801 1417 N/A 877 305 83 N/A 63 4106 1500 N/A 940 36.53% 22.89% 
Sept. 3801 1538 N/A 975 305 85 N/A 68 4106 1623 N/A 1043 39.53% 25.40% 
Oct. 3801 1685 N/A 1096 305 97 N/A 72 4106 1782 N/A 1168 43.40% 28.45% 
Nov. 3801 1778 N/A 1184 305 102 N/A 76 4106 1880 N/A 1260 45.79% 30.69% 
Dec. 3801 1847 N/A 1258 305 105 N/A 79 4106 1952 N/A 1337 47.54% 32.56% 
2002 
Jan. 3801 1988 N/A 1385 305 107 N/A 80 4106 2095 N/A 1465 51.02% 35.68% 
Feb. 3801 2101 N/A 1492 305 117 N/A 81 4106 2218 N/A 1573 54.02% 38.31% 
March 3801 2227 N/A 1597 305 120 N/A 86 4106 2347 N/A 1683 57.16% 40.99% 
April 3801 2400 N/A 1724 305 127 N/A 92 4106 2527 N/A 1816 61.54% 44.23% 
May 3801 2520 N/A 1851 305 131 N/A 97 4106 2651 N/A 1948 64.56% 47.44% 
June 3801 2612 N/A 1945 305 135 N/A 104 4106 2747 N/A 2049 66.90% 49.90% 
July 3801 2740 N/A 2080 305 139 N/A 106 4106 2879 N/A 2186 70.12% 53.24% 
Aug. 3801 2823 N/A 2202 305 146 N/A 112 4106 2969 N/A 2314 72.31% 56.36% 
Sept. 3801 2916 N/A 2317 305 168 N/A 120 4106 3084 N/A 2437 75.11% 59.35% 
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Oct. 3801 3019 N/A 2408 305 182 N/A 131 4106 3201 N/A 2539 77.96% 61.84% 
Nov. 3572 3088 N/A 2741 305 208 N/A 210 3877 3296 N/A 2951 85.01% 76.12% 
Dec. 3572 3149 N/A 2828 305 222 N/A 222 3877 3371 N/A 3050 86.95% 78.67% 
2003 
Jan. 3478 3181 N/A 2890 475 239 N/A 239 3953 3420 N/A 3129 86.52% 79.16% 
Feb. 3478 3252 N/A 2983 476 264 N/A 264 3954 3516 N/A 3247 88.92% 82.12% 
March 3478 3304 N/A 3038 476 270 N/A 270 3954 3574 N/A 3308 90.39% 83.66% 
April 3478 3352 N/A 3125 476 359 N/A 355 3954 3711 N/A 3480 93.85% 88.01% 
May 3478 3378 N/A 3182 482 375 N/A 366 3960 3753 N/A 3548 94.77% 89.60% 
June 3478 3406 N/A 3238 482 385 N/A 387 3960 3791 N/A 3625 95.73% 91.54% 
July 3478 3436 N/A 3287 482 399 N/A 398 3960 3835 N/A 3685 96.84% 93.06% 
Aug. 3473 3457 N/A 3324 482 401 N/A 400 3955 3858 N/A 3724 97.55% 94.16% 
Sept. 3473 3485 N/A 3362 482 412 N/A 402 3955 3897 N/A 3764 98.53% 95.17% 
Oct. 3572 3572 N/A 3285 494 494 N/A 476 4066 4066 N/A 3761 100.00% 92.50% 
Nov. 3572 3370 202 3338 497 487 10 487 4069 3857 212 3825 94.79% 94.00% 
Dec. 3572 3336 164 3241 497 480 10 480 4069 3816 174 3721 93.78% 91.45% 
2004 
Jan. 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
Feb. 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
March 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
April 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
May 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
June 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
July 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
Aug. 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
Sept. 3411 3241 169 3241 497 480 10 480 3908 3721 179 3721 95.21% 95.21% 
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West Municipality 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 2218 49 N/A 13 132 9 N/A 7 2350 58 N/A 20 2.47% 0.85% 
June 2218 62 N/A 14 132 9 N/A 7 2350 71 N/A 21 3.02% 0.89% 
July 2218 76 N/A 20 132 9 N/A 7 2350 85 N/A 27 3.62% 1.15% 
Aug. 2218 140 N/A 46 132 9 N/A 9 2350 149 N/A 55 6.34% 2.34% 
Sept. 2218 140 N/A 46 132 9 N/A 9 2350 149 N/A 55 6.34% 2.34% 
Oct. 2443 219 N/A 157 132 9 N/A 9 2575 228 N/A 166 8.85% 6.45% 
Nov. 2442 219 N/A 157 132 9 N/A 9 2574 228 N/A 166 8.86% 6.45% 
Dec. 2442 364 N/A 249 132 12 N/A 12 2574 376 N/A 261 14.61% 10.14% 
2001 
Jan. 2442 470 N/A 297 132 20 N/A 20 2574 490 N/A 317 19.04% 12.32% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 2442 606 N/A 389 139 20 N/A 20 2581 626 N/A 409 24.25% 15.85% 
May 2442 787 N/A 487 141 25 N/A 20 2583 812 N/A 507 31.44% 19.63% 
June 2442 802 N/A 529 141 25 N/A 20 2583 827 N/A 549 32.02% 21.25% 
July 2443 863 N/A 603 145 25 N/A 20 2588 888 N/A 623 34.31% 24.07% 
Aug. 2443 945 N/A 672 145 25 N/A 21 2588 970 N/A 693 37.48% 26.78% 
Sept. 2443 1070 N/A 732 145 25 N/A 21 2588 1095 N/A 753 42.31% 29.10% 
Oct. 2443 1169 N/A 829 145 25 N/A 21 2588 1194 N/A 850 46.14% 32.84% 
Nov. 2443 1235 N/A 893 146 25 N/A 21 2589 1260 N/A 914 48.67% 35.30% 
Dec. 2443 1239 N/A 936 146 25 N/A 21 2589 1264 N/A 957 48.82% 36.96% 
2002 
Jan. 2446 1290 N/A 1005 146 25 N/A 21 2592 1315 N/A 1026 50.73% 39.58% 
Feb. 2457 1358 N/A 1078 167 25 N/A 21 2624 1383 N/A 1099 52.71% 41.88% 
March 2457 1404 N/A 1145 169 25 N/A 21 2626 1429 N/A 1166 54.42% 44.40% 
April 2457 1465 N/A 1229 169 25 N/A 21 2626 1490 N/A 1250 56.74% 47.60% 
May 2460 1521 N/A 1307 169 25 N/A 47 2629 1546 N/A 1354 58.81% 51.50% 
June 2460 1571 N/A 1381 169 25 N/A 47 2629 1596 N/A 1428 60.71% 54.32% 
July 2460 1630 N/A 1481 169 25 N/A 47 2629 1655 N/A 1528 62.95% 58.12% 
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Aug. 2460 1670 N/A 1549 169 25 N/A 47 2629 1695 N/A 1596 64.47% 60.71% 
Sept. 2397 1722 N/A 1614 169 25 N/A 47 2566 1747 N/A 1661 68.08% 64.73% 
Oct. 2397 1758 N/A 1671 169 25 N/A 47 2566 1783 N/A 1718 69.49% 66.95% 
Nov. 2332 1791 N/A 1725 169 25 N/A 58 2501 1816 N/A 1783 72.61% 71.29% 
Dec. 2332 1818 N/A 1754 169 25 N/A 58 2501 1843 N/A 1812 73.69% 72.45% 
2003 
Jan. 2280 2007 N/A 1787 120 104 N/A 93 2400 2111 N/A 1880 87.96% 78.33% 
Feb. 2280 2024 N/A 1807 121 105 N/A 94 2401 2129 N/A 1901 88.67% 79.18% 
March 2280 2052 N/A 1823 123 106 N/A 96 2403 2158 N/A 1919 89.80% 79.86% 
April 2280 2073 N/A 1846 128 106 N/A 96 2408 2179 N/A 1942 90.49% 80.65% 
May 2280 2103 N/A 1859 128 108 N/A 99 2408 2211 N/A 1958 91.82% 81.31% 
June 2280 2120 N/A 1870 128 108 N/A 99 2408 2228 N/A 1969 92.52% 81.77% 
July 2189 2076 N/A 1935 129 109 N/A 99 2318 2185 N/A 2034 94.26% 87.75% 
Aug. 2189 2082 N/A 1945 129 116 N/A 102 2318 2198 N/A 2047 94.82% 88.31% 
Sept. 2189 2128 N/A 1958 129 124 N/A 109 2318 2252 N/A 2067 97.15% 89.17% 
Oct. 2189 2182 N/A 1978 132 130 N/A 115 2321 2312 N/A 2093 99.61% 90.18% 
Nov. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
Dec. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
2004 
Jan. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
Feb. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
March 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
April 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
May 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
June 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
July 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
Aug. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
Sept. 2156 1907 249 1901 139 121 18 119 2295 2028 267 2020 88.37% 88.02% 
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South Municipality 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 21 1 N/A 0 115 13 N/A 0 136 14 N/A 0 10.29% 0.00% 
June 21 1 N/A 0 115 13 N/A 0 136 14 N/A 0 10.29% 0.00% 
July 21 1 N/A 0 115 13 N/A 0 136 14 N/A 0 10.29% 0.00% 
Aug. 21 2 N/A 0 144 39 N/A 7 165 41 N/A 7 24.85% 4.24% 
Sept. 21 2 N/A 0 154 45 N/A 14 175 47 N/A 14 26.86% 8.00% 
Oct. 21 8 N/A 0 157 53 N/A 20 178 61 N/A 20 34.27% 11.24% 
Nov. 21 19 N/A 0 161 57 N/A 22 182 76 N/A 22 41.76% 12.09% 
Dec. 21 19 N/A 0 161 57 N/A 22 182 76 N/A 22 41.76% 12.09% 
2001 
Jan. 21 19 N/A 0 168 63 N/A 30 189 82 N/A 30 43.39% 15.87% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 21 19 N/A 0 186 74 N/A 36 207 93 N/A 36 44.93% 17.39% 
May 21 19 N/A 0 186 74 N/A 36 207 93 N/A 36 44.93% 17.39% 
June 21 19 N/A 0 194 99 N/A 36 215 118 N/A 36 54.88% 16.74% 
July 21 19 N/A 0 202 112 N/A 44 223 131 N/A 44 58.74% 19.73% 
Aug. 21 19 N/A 0 209 139 N/A 46 230 158 N/A 46 68.70% 20.00% 
Sept. 21 19 N/A 0 209 139 N/A 46 230 158 N/A 46 68.70% 20.00% 
Oct. 21 19 N/A 0 214 156 N/A 49 235 175 N/A 49 74.47% 20.85% 
Nov. 21 19 N/A 0 217 161 N/A 51 238 180 N/A 51 75.63% 21.43% 
Dec. 21 20 N/A 0 218 167 N/A 52 239 187 N/A 52 78.24% 21.76% 
2002 
Jan. 21 20 N/A 0 221 171 N/A 57 242 191 N/A 57 78.93% 23.55% 
Feb. 23 20 N/A 0 268 186 N/A 59 291 206 N/A 59 70.79% 20.27% 
March 24 20 N/A 0 280 222 N/A 61 304 242 N/A 61 79.61% 20.07% 
April 24 20 N/A 0 281 236 N/A 64 305 256 N/A 64 83.93% 20.98% 
May 0 0 N/A 0 125 108 N/A 70 125 108 N/A 70 86.40% 56.00% 
June 0 0 N/A 0 128 113 N/A 75 128 113 N/A 75 88.28% 58.59% 
July 0 0 N/A 0 136 105 N/A 80 136 105 N/A 80 77.21% 58.82% 
  
1
9
3
 
Aug. 0 0 N/A 0 138 106 N/A 84 138 106 N/A 84 76.81% 60.87% 
Sept. 0 0 N/A 0 137 106 N/A 87 137 106 N/A 87 77.37% 63.50% 
Oct. 0 0 N/A 0 128 108 N/A 84 128 108 N/A 84 84.38% 65.63% 
Nov. 0 0 N/A 0 131 115 N/A 87 131 115 N/A 87 87.79% 66.41% 
Dec. 0 0 N/A 0 133 118 N/A 88 133 118 N/A 88 88.72% 66.17% 
2003 
Jan. 0 0 N/A 0 133 118 N/A 88 133 118 N/A 88 88.72% 66.17% 
Feb. 1 0 N/A 0 104 101 N/A 99 105 101 N/A 99 96.19% 94.29% 
March 1 1 N/A 1 105 105 N/A 101 106 106 N/A 102 100.00% 96.23% 
April 2 2 N/A 1 106 106 N/A 101 108 108 N/A 102 100.00% 94.44% 
May 2 2 N/A 1 106 106 N/A 102 108 108 N/A 103 100.00% 95.37% 
June 2 2 N/A 1 109 107 N/A 103 111 109 N/A 104 98.20% 93.69% 
July 2 2 N/A 1 109 107 N/A 103 111 109 N/A 104 98.20% 93.69% 
Aug. 2 2 N/A 1 109 109 N/A 105 111 111 N/A 106 100.00% 95.50% 
Sept. 2 2 N/A 1 109 109 N/A 105 111 111 N/A 106 100.00% 95.50% 
Oct. 2 2 N/A 2 110 109 N/A 109 112 111 N/A 111 99.11% 99.11% 
Nov. 2 2 0 2 110 109 0 109 112 111 0 111 99.11% 99.11% 
Dec. 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
2004 
Jan. 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
Feb. 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
March 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
April 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
May 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
June 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
July 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
Aug. 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
Sept. 2 2 0 2 109 109 0 109 111 111 0 111 100.00% 100.00% 
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Old Town (Stari Grad) Municipality 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 1533 299 N/A 91 601 214 N/A 154 2134 513 N/A 245 24.04% 11.48% 
June 1533 299 N/A 91 601 214 N/A 154 2134 513 N/A 245 24.04% 11.48% 
July 1533 299 N/A 91 601 214 N/A 154 2134 513 N/A 245 24.04% 11.48% 
Aug. 1540 299 N/A 64 802 214 N/A 64 2342 513 N/A 128 21.90% 5.47% 
Sept. 1540 317 N/A 79 802 255 N/A 72 2342 572 N/A 151 24.42% 6.45% 
Oct. 1540 354 N/A 101 819 295 N/A 92 2359 649 N/A 193 27.51% 8.18% 
Nov. 1541 395 N/A 121 819 331 N/A 118 2360 726 N/A 239 30.76% 10.13% 
Dec. 1541 428 N/A 138 850 360 N/A 132 2391 788 N/A 270 32.96% 11.29% 
2001 
Jan. 1550 468 N/A 167 877 410 N/A 141 2427 878 N/A 308 36.18% 12.69% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 1550 579 N/A 254 923 459 N/A 188 2473 1038 N/A 442 41.97% 17.87% 
May 1550 627 N/A 284 930 471 N/A 200 2480 1098 N/A 484 44.27% 19.52% 
June 1555 660 N/A 319 951 496 N/A 207 2506 1156 N/A 526 46.13% 20.99% 
July 1555 686 N/A 355 970 513 N/A 210 2525 1199 N/A 565 47.49% 22.38% 
Aug. 1555 725 N/A 385 943 536 N/A 216 2498 1261 N/A 601 50.48% 24.06% 
Sept. 1556 808 N/A 422 958 575 N/A 239 2514 1383 N/A 661 55.01% 26.29% 
Oct. 1556 872 N/A 476 978 603 N/A 270 2534 1475 N/A 746 58.21% 29.44% 
Nov. 1556 926 N/A 517 996 657 N/A 292 2552 1583 N/A 809 62.03% 31.70% 
Dec. 1557 950 N/A 548 1008 672 N/A 305 2565 1622 N/A 853 63.24% 33.26% 
2002 
Jan. 1558 1027 N/A 582 1012 738 N/A 327 2570 1765 N/A 909 68.68% 35.37% 
Feb. 1575 1066 N/A 618 1028 788 N/A 345 2603 1854 N/A 963 71.23% 37.00% 
March 1579 1150 N/A 666 1033 849 N/A 366 2612 1999 N/A 1032 76.53% 39.51% 
April 1548 1203 N/A 719 1076 913 N/A 381 2624 2116 N/A 1100 80.64% 41.92% 
May 1424 1123 N/A 771 1049 929 N/A 404 2473 2052 N/A 1175 82.98% 47.51% 
June 1432 1143 N/A 802 1053 949 N/A 420 2485 2092 N/A 1222 84.19% 49.18% 
July 1435 1170 N/A 869 1068 982 N/A 440 2503 2152 N/A 1309 85.98% 52.30% 
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Aug. 1436 1192 N/A 912 1073 985 N/A 457 2509 2177 N/A 1369 86.77% 54.56% 
Sept. 1436 1211 N/A 947 1079 1014 N/A 486 2515 2225 N/A 1433 88.47% 56.98% 
Oct. 1436 1238 N/A 972 1079 1053 N/A 524 2515 2291 N/A 1496 91.09% 59.48% 
Nov. 1436 1249 N/A 1149 758 1093 N/A 501 2194 2342 N/A 1650 106.75% 75.21% 
Dec. 1436 1265 N/A 1186 760 1117 N/A 530 2196 2382 N/A 1716 108.47% 78.14% 
2003 
Jan. 1436 1273 N/A 1203 763 1119 N/A 545 2199 2392 N/A 1748 108.78% 79.49% 
Feb. 1437 1294 N/A 1217 765 765 N/A 558 2202 2059 N/A 1775 93.51% 80.61% 
March 1437 1307 N/A 1232 0 0 N/A 0 1437 1307 N/A 1232 90.95% 85.73% 
April 1437 1314 N/A 1247 773 773 N/A 579 2210 2087 N/A 1826 94.43% 82.62% 
May 1437 1321 N/A 1257 777 777 N/A 590 2214 2098 N/A 1847 94.76% 83.42% 
June 1437 1329 N/A 1262 779 778 N/A 598 2216 2107 N/A 1860 95.08% 83.94% 
July 1437 1332 N/A 1270 779 779 N/A 605 2216 2111 N/A 1875 95.26% 84.61% 
Aug. 1437 1337 N/A 1277 779 779 N/A 610 2216 2116 N/A 1887 95.49% 85.15% 
Sept. 1437 1346 N/A 1296 783 783 N/A 647 2220 2129 N/A 1943 95.90% 87.52% 
Oct. 1438 1361 N/A 1306 789 789 N/A 659 2227 2150 N/A 1965 96.54% 88.24% 
Nov. 1439 1251 118 1313 790 790 0 671 2229 2041 118 1984 91.57% 89.01% 
Dec. 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
2004 
Jan. 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
Feb. 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
March 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
April 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
May 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
June 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
July 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
August 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
Sept. 1397 1319 78 1319 734 693 30 693 2131 2012 108 2012 94.42% 94.42% 
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North Municipality 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 77 33 N/A 33 630 181 N/A 338 707 214 N/A 371 30.27% 52.48% 
June 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
July 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Aug. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Sept. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Oct. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Nov. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Dec. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
2001 
Jan. 77 33 N/A 33 690 184 N/A 338 767 217 N/A 371 28.29% 48.37% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 69 52 N/A 2 1104 373 N/A 197 1173 425 N/A 199 36.23% 16.97% 
May 69 52 N/A 2 1135 394 N/A 212 1204 446 N/A 214 37.04% 17.77% 
June 69 54 N/A 2 1148 406 N/A 220 1217 460 N/A 222 37.80% 18.24% 
July 69 54 N/A 2 1180 435 N/A 235 1249 489 N/A 237 39.15% 18.98% 
Aug. 69 54 N/A 2 1212 450 N/A 259 1281 504 N/A 261 39.34% 20.37% 
Sept. 69 54 N/A 2 1252 469 N/A 271 1321 523 N/A 273 39.59% 20.67% 
Oct. 69 54 N/A 2 1279 501 N/A 302 1348 555 N/A 304 41.17% 22.55% 
Nov. 69 54 N/A 22 1295 569 N/A 350 1364 623 N/A 372 45.67% 27.27% 
Dec. 69 54 N/A 22 1310 600 N/A 376 1379 654 N/A 398 47.43% 28.86% 
2002 
Jan. 69 54 N/A 22 1332 635 N/A 406 1401 689 N/A 428 49.18% 30.55% 
Feb. 76 56 N/A 22 1480 678 N/A 493 1556 734 N/A 515 47.17% 33.10% 
March 76 58 N/A 22 1513 755 N/A 580 1589 813 N/A 602 51.16% 37.89% 
April 76 58 N/A 22 1538 792 N/A 666 1614 850 N/A 688 52.66% 42.63% 
May 76 58 N/A 22 1550 878 N/A 699 1626 936 N/A 721 57.56% 44.34% 
June 76 59 N/A 22 1569 927 N/A 760 1645 986 N/A 782 59.94% 47.54% 
July 76 59 N/A 22 892 454 N/A 437 968 513 N/A 459 53.00% 47.42% 
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Aug. 76 59 N/A 22 864 498 N/A 479 940 557 N/A 501 59.26% 53.30% 
Sept. 76 60 N/A 22 834 535 N/A 497 910 595 N/A 519 65.38% 57.03% 
Oct. 76 62 N/A 22 1606 571 N/A 536 1682 633 N/A 558 37.63% 33.17% 
Nov. 76 64 N/A 22 1614 622 N/A 564 1690 686 N/A 586 40.59% 34.67% 
Dec. 76 62 N/A 22 1618 672 N/A 584 1694 734 N/A 606 43.33% 35.77% 
2003 
Jan. 10 7 N/A 3 758 701 N/A 684 768 708 N/A 687 92.19% 89.45% 
Feb. 10 7 N/A 4 760 706 N/A 694 770 713 N/A 698 92.60% 90.65% 
March 10 7 N/A 4 738 707 N/A 703 748 714 N/A 707 95.45% 94.52% 
April 10 7 N/A 4 743 708 N/A 710 753 715 N/A 714 94.95% 94.82% 
May 10 7 N/A 4 743 709 N/A 716 753 716 N/A 720 95.09% 95.62% 
June 10 7 N/A 6 748 717 N/A 720 758 724 N/A 726 95.51% 95.78% 
July 10 7 N/A 6 750 719 N/A 721 760 726 N/A 727 95.53% 95.66% 
Aug. 10 7 N/A 6 754 721 N/A 721 764 728 N/A 727 95.29% 95.16% 
Sept. 10 7 N/A 6 751 726 N/A 726 761 733 N/A 732 96.32% 96.19% 
Oct. 10 7 N/A 6 753 729 N/A 733 763 736 N/A 739 96.46% 96.85% 
Nov. 9 7 0 6 751 742 0 739 760 749 0 745 98.55% 98.03% 
Dec. 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
2004 
Jan. 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
Feb. 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
March 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
April 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
May 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
June 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
July 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
Aug. 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
Sept. 9 7 1 7 751 751 0 751 760 758 1 758 99.74% 99.74% 
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Southeast Municipality 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May 3 8 N/A 4 193 257 N/A 30 196 265 N/A 34 135.20% 17.35% 
June 3 0 N/A 0 218 265 N/A 36 221 265 N/A 36 119.91% 16.29% 
July 3 0 N/A 0 218 265 N/A 36 221 265 N/A 36 119.91% 16.29% 
Aug. 3 0 N/A 0 207 150 N/A 82 210 150 N/A 82 71.43% 39.05% 
Sept. 3 0 N/A 0 232 158 N/A 83 235 158 N/A 83 67.23% 35.32% 
Oct. 3 0 N/A 0 240 166 N/A 88 243 166 N/A 88 68.31% 36.21% 
Nov. 3 0 N/A 0 240 166 N/A 88 243 166 N/A 88 68.31% 36.21% 
Dec. 3 0 N/A 0 257 170 N/A 92 260 170 N/A 92 65.38% 35.38% 
2001 
Jan. 3 0 N/A 0 283 175 N/A 94 286 175 N/A 94 61.19% 32.87% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 3 0 N/A 0 329 206 N/A 100 332 206 N/A 100 62.05% 30.12% 
May 3 0 N/A 0 329 206 N/A 100 332 206 N/A 100 62.05% 30.12% 
June 3 0 N/A 0 372 218 N/A 104 375 218 N/A 104 58.13% 27.73% 
July 3 0 N/A 0 372 218 N/A 104 375 218 N/A 104 58.13% 27.73% 
Aug. 3 0 N/A 0 372 218 N/A 104 375 218 N/A 104 58.13% 27.73% 
Sept. 3 0 N/A 0 428 285 N/A 235 431 285 N/A 235 66.13% 54.52% 
Oct. 3 0 N/A 0 428 285 N/A 235 431 285 N/A 235 66.13% 54.52% 
Nov. 3 0 N/A 0 428 285 N/A 235 431 285 N/A 235 66.13% 54.52% 
Dec. 3 1 N/A 0 469 402 N/A 289 472 403 N/A 289 85.38% 61.23% 
2002 
Jan. 3 1 N/A 0 469 402 N/A 289 472 403 N/A 289 85.38% 61.23% 
Feb. 3 1 N/A 0 620 429 N/A 261 623 430 N/A 261 69.02% 41.89% 
March 3 1 N/A 0 620 429 N/A 261 623 430 N/A 261 69.02% 41.89% 
April 3 1 N/A 0 641 470 N/A 278 644 471 N/A 278 73.14% 43.17% 
May 3 1 N/A 0 643 501 N/A 290 646 502 N/A 290 77.71% 44.89% 
June 3 1 N/A 0 648 549 N/A 317 651 550 N/A 317 84.49% 48.69% 
July 3 1 N/A 0 650 557 N/A 331 653 558 N/A 331 85.45% 50.69% 
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Aug. 3 1 N/A 0 653 583 N/A 360 656 584 N/A 360 89.02% 54.88% 
Sept. 3 1 N/A 0 661 649 N/A 395 664 650 N/A 395 97.89% 59.49% 
Oct. 7 7 N/A 0 364 364 N/A 295 371 371 N/A 295 100.00% 79.51% 
Nov. 0 0 N/A 0 366 323 N/A 301 366 323 N/A 301 88.25% 82.24% 
Dec. 0 0 N/A 0 370 402 N/A 313 370 402 N/A 313 108.65% 84.59% 
2003 
Jan. 1 1 N/A 1 371 363 N/A 351 372 364 N/A 352 97.85% 94.62% 
Feb. 1 1 N/A 1 371 371 N/A 356 372 372 N/A 357 100.00% 95.97% 
March 1 1 N/A 1 372 371 N/A 356 373 372 N/A 357 99.73% 95.71% 
April 1 1 N/A 1 373 371 N/A 363 374 372 N/A 364 99.47% 97.33% 
May 1 1 N/A 1 372 371 N/A 356 373 372 N/A 357 99.73% 95.71% 
June 1 1 N/A 1 373 372 N/A 366 374 373 N/A 367 99.73% 98.13% 
July 1 1 N/A 1 375 372 N/A 366 376 373 N/A 367 99.20% 97.61% 
Aug. 1 1 N/A 1 375 374 N/A 366 376 375 N/A 367 99.73% 97.61% 
Sept. 1 1 N/A 1 375 374 N/A 371 376 375 N/A 372 99.73% 98.94% 
Oct. 1 1 N/A 1 375 375 N/A 375 376 376 N/A 376 100.00% 100.00% 
Nov. 1 1 0 1 341 341 0 341 342 342 0 342 100.00% 100.00% 
Dec. 1 1 0 1 341 341 0 341 342 342 0 342 100.00% 100.00% 
2004 
Jan. 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
Feb. 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
March 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
April 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
May 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
June 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
July 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
Aug. 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
Sept. 1 1 0 1 341 340 1 340 342 341 1 341 99.71% 99.71% 
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Central Zone 
Year Month 
Socially-Owned Property Private Property Total 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposse-
ssions 
No of 
Claims 
No of 
Decisions 
Negative 
Decisions 
Reposs-
essions 
Decision 
Ratio 
Implementation 
Ratio 
2000 
May N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
June 452 186 N/A 1 75 1 N/A 1 527 187 N/A 2 35.48% 0.38% 
July 452 192 N/A 3 77 3 N/A 2 529 195 N/A 5 36.86% 0.95% 
Aug. 452 198 N/A 7 77 3 N/A 2 529 201 N/A 9 38.00% 1.70% 
Sept. 452 198 N/A 7 77 3 N/A 2 529 201 N/A 9 38.00% 1.70% 
Oct. 468 228 N/A 12 71 4 N/A 4 539 232 N/A 16 43.04% 2.97% 
Nov. 468 36 N/A 16 76 5 N/A 4 544 41 N/A 20 7.54% 3.68% 
Dec. 466 36 N/A 17 77 5 N/A 5 543 41 N/A 22 7.55% 4.05% 
2001 
Jan. 468 38 N/A 19 80 7 N/A 7 548 45 N/A 26 8.21% 4.74% 
Feb. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
March N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
April 484 60 N/A 28 85 10 N/A 12 569 70 N/A 40 12.30% 7.03% 
May 484 65 N/A 29 85 13 N/A 13 569 78 N/A 42 13.71% 7.38% 
June 228 66 N/A 60 87 13 N/A 15 315 79 N/A 75 25.08% 23.81% 
July 485 331 N/A 71 88 20 N/A 17 573 351 N/A 88 61.26% 15.36% 
Aug. 485 334 N/A 83 89 23 N/A 20 574 357 N/A 103 62.20% 17.94% 
Sept. 486 347 N/A 85 89 27 N/A 21 575 374 N/A 106 65.04% 18.43% 
Oct. 486 361 N/A 85 90 31 N/A 21 576 392 N/A 106 68.06% 18.40% 
Nov. 486 372 N/A 90 92 31 N/A 23 578 403 N/A 113 69.72% 19.55% 
Dec. 486 380 N/A 99 92 34 N/A 26 578 414 N/A 125 71.63% 21.63% 
2002 
Jan. 492 391 N/A 100 94 35 N/A 27 586 426 N/A 127 72.70% 21.67% 
Feb. 499 401 N/A 111 99 43 N/A 28 598 444 N/A 139 74.25% 23.24% 
March 506 429 N/A 117 103 50 N/A 28 609 479 N/A 145 78.65% 23.81% 
April 510 445 N/A 121 106 53 N/A 37 616 498 N/A 158 80.84% 25.65% 
May 514 461 N/A 125 107 68 N/A 37 621 529 N/A 162 85.19% 26.09% 
June 521 469 N/A 128 109 76 N/A 39 630 545 N/A 167 86.51% 26.51% 
July 521 476 N/A 128 109 81 N/A 39 630 557 N/A 167 88.41% 26.51% 
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Aug. 523 487 N/A 129 110 83 N/A 39 633 570 N/A 168 90.05% 26.54% 
Sept. 525 494 N/A 130 113 84 N/A 39 638 578 N/A 169 90.60% 26.49% 
Oct. 525 506 N/A 130 119 84 N/A 39 644 590 N/A 169 91.61% 26.24% 
Nov. 530 524 N/A 130 119 85 N/A 39 649 609 N/A 169 93.84% 26.04% 
Dec. 530 530 N/A 130 119 85 N/A 39 649 615 N/A 169 94.76% 26.04% 
2003 
Jan. 530 530 N/A 130 119 85 N/A 39 649 615 N/A 169 94.76% 26.04% 
Feb. 190 158 N/A 154 42 42 N/A 42 232 200 N/A 196 86.21% 84.48% 
March 190 158 N/A 154 42 42 N/A 42 232 200 N/A 196 86.21% 84.48% 
April 190 158 N/A 154 42 42 N/A 42 232 200 N/A 196 86.21% 84.48% 
May 190 158 N/A 158 42 42 N/A 42 232 200 N/A 200 86.21% 86.21% 
June 190 158 N/A 158 42 42 N/A 42 232 200 N/A 200 86.21% 86.21% 
July 167 167 N/A 166 42 42 N/A 42 209 209 N/A 208 100.00% 99.52% 
Aug. 167 167 N/A 166 42 42 N/A 42 209 209 N/A 208 100.00% 99.52% 
Sept. 167 167 N/A 166 42 42 N/A 42 209 209 N/A 208 100.00% 99.52% 
Oct. 167 167 N/A 167 42 42 N/A 42 209 209 N/A 209 100.00% 100.00% 
Nov. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
Dec. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
2004 
Jan. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
Feb. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
March 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
April 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
May 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
June 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
July 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
Aug. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
Sept. 167 167 0 167 42 42 0 42 209 209 0 209 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
  
 
